A HISTORY
OF INDIAN LITERATURE

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DAVID SEYFORT RUEGG

# THE LITERATURE OF THE MADHYAMAKA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY IN INDIA

OTTO HARRASSOWITZ · WIESBADEN

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# PREFACE

This outline of the philosophical literature of the Indian Madhyamaka school is based on the Sanskrit sources to the limited extent they are now available to us. The major part of this literature is unfortunately not extant in the original and must be presumed lost. However, this loss is at least partly compensated for by the fact that a very large number of important works of this school were translated into Chinese and Tibetan; and for the purposes of the present publication use has been made chiefly of the translations contained in the Peking edition of the Tibetan bsTan-'gyur in the facsimile reprint of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute (Tōkyō-Kyōto, 1958). The fact that we possess few good modern editions of the surviving Sanskrit texts and the very nature of our translated sources inevitably raise important philological and exegetical problems which it has not always been possible to pursue in the space available.

Limitations of space have moreover allowed the inclusion of short and hence selective summaries of only some of the most fundamental texts from the 1000-year history of the Indian Madhyamaka. The majority of the works from this vast literature have had to be mentioned simply by title, with brief indications being given as to the contents of some of the more important ones. A comprehensive historical treatment and systematic analysis of the Madhyamaka in its entirety will thus have to await much larger publications. Here an attempt has of course been made to determine the relative—and whenever possible also the absolute—chronology of the Mādhyamikas; but the same name has not infrequently been borne by more than one person, and in a number of cases the attribution of a work to an author as well as even its precise Sanskrit title remain doubtful and will have to be the subject of future investigation. Because of the paucity of reliable historical materials and disagreements between some of our sources many questions may remain open indefinitely; furthermore, the fact that most of our texts are now available only in translations into Chinese and Tibetan makes certain essential kinds of historical, literary and sometimes even philosophical analysis exceedingly precarious if not quite impossible. Since relatively few texts and masters of the Madhyamaka school have hitherto been the subject of monographic study, the present work will in many cases be a preliminary exploration in well-nigh uncharted territory.

Further research will also be needed in order to establish the relation of the Madhyamaka with other schools of Indian thought, non-Buddhist as well as Buddhist. If this has not been done extensively in the present book (on earlier connexions with non-Buddhist schools see nevertheless p. 6 note 11), this is because of the complex historical and methodological questions posed

by such an investigation and the lack of space to pursue such problems; it is not because we would subscribe to the view that the schools of Indian philosophy are to be kept apart according to the particular religion of their representatives: Buddhist (and Jain) philosophers are surely as much part of the history of Indian philosophy as 'orthodox' Hindu philosophers. It can at least be pointed out here, however, that in his Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya the twelfth-century Vedāntin Śrīharṣa—who admits the *vitaṇḍā* procedure (see § 168; cf. §§ 14—16)—has throughout regularly employed a method of reasoning based on what he terms *khaṇḍanayukti*, which is very close to the Mādhyamika's form of argument in the *prasaṅga*-type of reasoning. At a much earlier period of the Vedānta also the links between the Gauḍapādīya- or Māṇḍūkya-Kārikās (c. 500?) and Buddhist thought are well-known. Moreover, the continuous debates carried on between Brāhmaṇical, Buddhist and Jain thinkers led not only to a sharpening of minds and a refinement of argument on all sides but also to commonly recognized methods in philosophical discussion; but the precise history of these developments still remains to be traced in detail.

In writing a work of this kind there arises the question of the extent to which the secondary literature in Asiatic languages can be included by a single writer and in a limited space. Scholars from East and Central Asia in particular have in fact devoted themselves over the centuries to translating, commenting on and explaining the Madhyamaka literature. (In Tibet for example there has existed for over a millennium a tradition of study of a very considerable portion of Indian literature, including even works that are not specifically Buddhist; and with a view to both translation and exegesis Tibetan scholars developed remarkable philological and interpretative methods that could well justify us in regarding them as Indologists avant la lettre.) The sheer bulk of the secondary literature in Chinese, Japanese, Tibetan, and Mongolian relating to the Madhyamaka is, however, so great that it will have to be the subject of separate publications.[1]

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[1] Although the Tibetan secondary literature to which it has been possible to refer in this book cannot pretend to be representative of all schools, the works used are all of the highest interest. Among historical sources these are mainly the rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ by Tāranātha (born in 1575) edited by A. Schiefner (St. Petersburg, 1868), the well-known Chos·'byuṅ by Bu·ston (1290—1364) in the Žol edition reprinted by Lokesh Chandra (New Delhi, 1971) with page references also to E. Obermiller's incomplete English translation (2 parts, Heidelberg, 1931—32), and the Deb·ther·sṅon·po by 'Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal (1392—1481) in the Kun·bde·gliṅ edition reprinted by Lokesh Chandra (New Delhi, 1976) with page references also to G. N. Roerich's English translation (The Blue Annals, 2 volumes, Calcutta, 1949—53); hagiographies of several Madhyamaka masters are also to be found collected together in the Byaṅ·chub·lam·gyi·rim·pa'i·bla·ma·brgyud·pa'i·rnam·par·thar·pa by Ye·šes·rgyal·mćhan (1713—93) reprinted by Ngawang Gelek Demo (New Delhi, 1970). From the rich mine of Tibetan exegetical and doctrinal literature reference has been made principally to the Legs·bšad·sñiṅ·po (in the lHa·sa edition of the gSuṅ·'bum) and the Lam·rim·chen·mo (in the old bKra·šis·-

The above-mentioned considerations of a philological, bibliographical and material nature will explain why the present work differs in certain respects from many of the other volumes appearing in the same series. Some attempt at a connected account treating this body of literature, however tentative, is clearly a desideratum at the present time.

lhun·po edition, reprinted by NGAWANG GELEK DEMO, New Delhi, 1977) by Ćoṅ·kha·pa (1357—1419); to the sToṅ·thun·chen·mo (in the lHa·sa edition of the gSuṅ·'bum) and the rGyud·sde·spyi·rnam (in the edition by F. D. LESSING and A. WAYMAN, Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras, The Hague, 1968) by mKhas·grub·dGe·legs·dpal·bzaṅ (1385—1438); and to the invaluable doxographical works (Grub·mtha') by 'Jam·dbyaṅs·bžad·pa·Ňag·dbaṅ·brćon·'grus (1648—1722) reprinted by NGAWANG GELEK DEMO (New Delhi, 1973), and by lCaṅ·skya·Rol·pa'i·rdo·rje (1717—86) reprinted by LOKESH CHANDRA (New Delhi, 1977).

As for the extensive and important modern secondary literature from Japan, references have had to be limited mainly to one of the few generally available Japanese publications, the Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist studies, abbreviated IBK). Useful bibliographical surveys of this literature are to be found in the publications listed on p. 4 note 9.

# INTRODUCTION: THE NAME MADHYAMAKA

The Madhyamaka school of Mahāyāna Buddhism goes back to Nāgārjuna, the great Indian Buddhist philosopher who is placed early in the first millennium P.C.[2]

The school derives its name of Madhyamaka, i.e. 'middlemost' (Chinese *chung*, Tibetan *dbu ma*), from the fact that Nāgārjuna and his followers developed a particular theory which avoids the twin dogmatic extremes of eternalism *(śāśvatavāda)* and annihilationism *(ucchedavāda)* rejected by the Buddhist tradition and keeps to a philosophical *via media* in a specific and very interesting manner. While all Buddhists would of course observe the Middle Way *(madhyamā pratipat)* in their theory and practice, the philosophers of this school especially have therefore come to be known as Mādhyamikas or 'followers of the middle' (Tibetan *dbu ma pa*).[3] Similarly, the advocates of the other great Mahāyānist school, the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda, are known as Yogācārins although other Buddhists are of course also practisers of Yoga; and Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka, an early treatise of the Madhyamaka school, indeed makes specific reference in its chapter-colophons to the follower of the Madhyamaka as a Yogācāra. In the Sino-Japanese Buddhist tradition the Madhyamaka is frequently referred to as the Three Treatises (San-lun/Sanron) School after its three basic sources—the Chung-lun (Madhyamakaśāstra),[4]

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[2] On Nāgārjuna's date see below, p. 4.

[3] The use of the terms *madhyamaka(-darśana)* and *mādhyamika* as designations for the school and its followers was *perhaps* a somewhat later development. At least they do not seem to be found in the *body* of early works—e.g. the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (MMK) of Nāgārjuna and the Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva. They appear in the oldest available Sanskrit commentary on the MMK, Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛttiḥ. Buddhapālita's earlier commentary (unavailable in Sanskrit) seems to have also had the title Madhyamakavṛtti; and Bhāvaviveka's great treatise was entitled Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā. The Chinese translations point to a quite early origin for the terms (cf. Chung-lun = Madhyamakaśāstra). As for the title Mūlamadhyamakakārikās, it was adopted by L. de La Vallée Poussin in his classical edition, apparently on the basis of the title given in the Tibetan bsTan-'gyur (Prajñānāmamūlamādhyamakakārikā = dBu ma rca ba'i ćhig le'ur byas pa šes rab ces bya ba); this title has been retained by J. W. de Jong in his new edition (Adyar, 1977). This text is actually available in Sanskrit only in the version embedded in Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛttiḥ; in this commentary no title is in fact indicated (and Candrakīrti occasionally speaks of the *madhyamaka śāstra*, p. 40. 7; cf. p. 548. 5). In the Madhyamakaśāstrastuti (see below, p. 8) this text is referred to as *śāstragadita-kārikās*.

[4] The Chung-lun (Madhyamakaśāstra, Taishō 1564) consists of Nāgārjuna's verses *(kārikā)* together with the commentary of Ch'ing-mu (see below, p. 48).

Nāgārjuna's Shih-erh-men-lun (*Dvādaśamukhaśāstra) and Āryadeva's Pai-lun (Śataśāstra)—which were translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva at the very beginning of the fifth century.

Because of his basic doctrine that all factors of existence *(dharma)* and all entities *(bhāva)* are empty of own being *(svabhāva-śūnya)* and non-substantial *(niḥsvabhāva)*—i.e. not ultimately real substantial entities—the Mādhyamika is also known as a Śūnya(tā)vādin and Niḥsvabhāvavādin.[5] And the Madhyamaka theory is designated as the Śūnya(tā)vāda, Śūnyatādarśana and Niḥsvabhāvavāda.[6]

Over the past half-century the doctrine of the Madhyamaka school, and in particular that of Nāgārjuna, has been variously described as nihilism, monism, irrationalism, misology, agnosticism, scepticism, criticism, dialectic, mysticism, acosmism, absolutism, relativism, nominalism, and linguistic analysis with therapeutic value. With the exception of the first five which are hardly appropriate in any context and become quite misleading when taken in their usual senses, such descriptions no doubt correspond to some aspect of Madhyamaka thought.[7] Also, as the *śūnyavāda par excellence*, the Madhyamaka has

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[5] In the course of the discussion and refutation of it in the MMK and the rest of the Madhyamaka literature, *svabhāva* 'own being, self-nature, aseity' has been defined as some thing unproduced *(akṛtrima)* which is independent of all other things (*nirapekṣaḥ paratra;* see MMK xv. 2 and xxiv. 33); those who postulated a *svabhāva* have indeed conceived of it as not produced through causal conditioning (see i. 3 and xv. 1). Now, the onto-logical correlate of a *svabhāva* is a *parabhāva* 'other being' (cf. i. 3; xv. 3 sq.); and the pair comprised of *svabhāva* and *parabhāva* is then described as necessary for establishing any (postulated) *bhāva* 'substantial thing, entity' having a *svabhāva* or self-nature and distinct from everything else. But according to Nāgārjuna neither really exists; and in their absence there can be no *bhāva* (xv. 4: *svabhāvaparabhāvābhyām ṛte bhāvaḥ kutaḥ punaḥ/ svabhāve parabhāve vā sati bhāvo hi sidhyati*). Nāgārjuna has furthermore stated—paradoxically and perhaps by oxymoron—that whatever exists in dependence *(pratītya)* is still *(śānta)* 'by nature' (*svabhāvataḥ*, vii. 16); it is clear from the doctrinal context that what is so must be precisely without the *svabhāva* postulated by his opponents. Cf. MMK xviii. 10 (below, pp. 38 sq., 43).

[6] The words *śūnyatādarśana*, attested in Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā (PP) xviii. 5 and xxiv. 13, and *śūnyatāvāda* have to be distinguished from the term *śūnyatādṛṣṭi*, which denotes a speculative view that hypostatizes emptiness (see MMK xiii. 8; cf. also the *śūnyatākoṭi* in PP xxiii. 14). The word *śūnyatāvādin* 'maintainer of the philosophy of *śūnyatā*' is found e.g. in Nāgārjuna's Vigrahavyāvartanī 69 and Vaidalyaprakaraṇa 1.

[7] In an article in RO 10 (1934), p. 21 note 1, Th. Stcherbatsky defended his use of the term monism by taking it to mean not a 'monistic reality' *(svabhāva)*, but a single 'Erklärungsprinzip' that excludes any real plurality, in the sense of monistic knowledge. But this usage is hardly usual and employment of the term monism can therefore easily mislead.

As for scepticism (or Pyrrhonism) as a valid description of the Madhyamaka, the term would have to refer to the Sceptics' *epoche* or methodically motivated withholding of judgement and to their aporetic (as opposed to dogmatism and speculative metaphysics). See e.g. S. Schayer, Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prasannapadā (Krakow, 1931), pp. xxx—xxxiii.

been neologistically termed a 'zerology', the reference being to a philosophical rather than to a mathematical feature.[8] Yet, since none of these descriptions defines fully and adequately this school of thought, it will probably be preferable simply to retain the established term *madhyamaka* that came to be used by the school itself; for by emphasizing the theoretical and practical 'middle' on the gnoseological and soteriological levels it fits very well the main concerns of the school.

Considering then all *dharmas* to be as it were 'ciphers' empty *(śūnya)* of substantial own being (*svabhāva* 'self-existence, aseity'), the Mādhyamikas refrain from taking up any speculative or dogmatic position definable in terms of dichotomizing conceptual thinking polarized into binary (e.g. positive/negative, identity/difference) or quaternary (e.g. positive/negative/positive-cum-negative/neither-positive-nor-negative, or conditioned production/non-conditioned production/both/neither) sets of constructs, and from postulating any absolutely *(paramārthatas)* real *bhāva* 'entity' in terms of these positions. Although they did not therefore propound any thesis in support of such views, the Mādhyamikas nevertheless regarded themselves as a philosophical school *(vāda = darśana)* devoted to upholding and explicating what they considered to be the teaching of the Buddha. Accordingly, the Madhyamaka can properly be said to have a philosophical theory *(darśana)*--as distinct from a speculative view or dogmatic opinion *(dṛṣṭi)*—albeit not one founded on any conceptually constructed hypostatizing of some kind of entity, be it positive, negative, both, or neither.[9]

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[8] The expression 'zerology' has been employed by L. Mall, Une approche possible du Śūnyavāda, Tel Quel 32 (Hiver 1968), p. 54 sq.—Although the arithmetical zero and a knowledge of place-value were no doubt current in India in Nāgārjuna's time, there is no evidence to show that he was actually employing the term *śūnya* in its mathematical sense. In Madhyamaka usage *śūnya* refers to the fact that *dharmas* are 'empty' of own being *(svabhāva-śūnya)*; the idea is therefore the philosophical one of the onto-logical *null* value of all *dharmas* as so to speak ciphers without independent and ultimate existence (see below).—*Śūnya* is an epithet of all *dharmas;* and *śūnyatva* designates emptiness as the quality characterizing all *dharmas*. *Śūnyatā* on the other hand is the fact, or truth, of the emptiness of all *dharmas*. Thus the words *śūnya* and *śūnyatva* pertain to the conventional surface level of *saṃvṛti;* while *śūnyatā* is used to indicate or point to the level of ultimate reality *(paramārtha)* (to the extent that this is at all possible in terms of language and discursivity).

The use of the word *śūnya* to designate the arithmetical zero is almost certainly later than Nāgārjuna (at whose time the usual terms seem to have been *kha* and *bindu*); in any case, it is clearly later than the early uses of *śūnya* in the canonical literature of Buddhism, where the reference is to something empty. On this question see D. Seyfort Ruegg, Mathematical and linguistic models in Indian thought: the case of *śūnyatā*, WZKS 22 (1978), p. 174 sq.

[9] For bibliographies of the Madhyamaka see É. Lamotte, Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse (five volumes, Louvain, 1944, 1949, 1970, 1976 and 1980); J. May, Candrakīrti: Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti (Paris, 1959), pp. 23—45; R. H. Robinson, Early Mādhyamika in India and China (Madison, 1967), pp. 321—8; and

# THE EARLY PERIOD: THE FORMATION OF THE MADHYAMAKA SCHOOL

## *Nāgārjuna*

According to a tradition of Indian origin reported by several of the Buddhist historiographers and doxographers of Tibet, Nāgārjuna had as his immediate predecessor and teacher a certain Rāhulabhadra, to whom is ascribed a well-known hymn to the Prajñāpāramitā. But according to another (probably more accurate) tradition known from both Chinese and Tibetan sources, this Rāhulabhadra was a follower of Nāgārjuna.[10] No master is therefore known to have preceded Nāgārjuna at the head of the Madhyamaka school in the strict sense. At all events it is Nāgārjuna who in the present state of our knowledge has to be considered the source or originator of this school; and this is the way he has in fact been regarded by modern historians, as well as by the Mādhyamikas themselves including even those who make Rāhulabhadra his master.

Nāgārjuna is generally believed to have been born and to have worked in South-Central India (South Kosala or Vidarbha ?) early in the first millennium P.C.[11]

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F. STRENG, Emptiness (Nashville, 1967), p. 237 sq. (in which publications most of the Western literature on the subject has been listed). See also K. POTTER, Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies, i (Bibliography). A survey of S. Yamaguchi's important publications is given by J. W. de JONG, IIJ 19 (1977), 99—103. Brief accounts of modern Japanese work on the Madhyamaka are given by H. NAKAMURA, Acta asiatica 1 (1960), p. 56 sq., and G. NAGAO, Acta asiatica 29 (1975), p. 111 sq. A general bibliographical survey of studies on Madhyamaka literature with special reference to Japanese publications is given by H. NAKAMURA, Journal of intercultural studies no. 4 (1977), pp. 77—94, 126—31.

Detailed bibliographies relating to both editions of and studies on Madhyamaka texts are given by Y. EJIMA in the prefaces to: The sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka—bsTan ḥgyur preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo (Deruge-ban Chibetto Daizōkyō, Ronsho-bu, Tōkyō Daigaku Bungaku-bu shozō; Sekai seiten kankō kyōkai, Tōkyō, 1977—79).

[10] On Rāhulabhadra and the question whether he preceded or followed Nāgārjuna see below, p. 54.

[11] Nāgārjuna has been variously placed at the end of the first century P. C. (S. LÉVI, JA 1936, pp. 96, 103 sq.; D. SHACKLETON BAILEY, Śatapañcāśatka of Mātṛceṭa [Cambridge, 1951], p. 9); in the second century (M. WINTERNITZ, History of Indian literature, ii [Calcutta, 1933], p. 342; É. LAMOTTE, Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, i [Louvain, 1944], p. x; T. R. V. MURTI, Central philosophy of Buddhism [London, 1955], p. 87); and in the third century (M. WALLESER, Life of Nāgārjuna, in Asia Major, Hirt Anniversary Volume [1923], p. 423). E. FRAUWALLNER has placed him *c.* 200 (Die Philosophie des Buddhismus [1969], p. 170); but É. LAMOTTE opted for the chronology adopted by Kumārajīva's school which

Nāgārjuna's writings are the first philosophic treatises *(śāstra)* known to us in which an attempt has been made to give a systematic scholastic exposition

places Nāgārjuna and his disciple Āryadeva in the eighth century after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa, i.e. in the third century P. C. (L'enseignement de Vimalakīrti [Louvain, 1962], pp. 74—77; cf. Traité, iii [Louvain, 1970], p. li sq.).

For discussions of the synchronism between Nāgārjuna and a Kaniṣka and also a Sātavāhana monarch, see S. LÉVI, loc. cit.; K. VENKATA RAMANAN, Nāgārjuna's philosophy (Rutland and Tokyo, 1966), pp. 27—30 (who identifies the Sātavāhana as Gautamīputra Śātakarṇi); and the contributions by A. K. WARDER, F. WILHELM et al. in A. L. BASHAM (ed.), Papers on the date of Kaniṣka (1960) (Leiden, 1968), pp. 328—31, 334—6, 342—3, 427—8, 433 (according to Warder, p. 334, the Sātavāhana in question would be Puḷumāyi II [Vāsiṣṭhīputra]; see in addition A. K. WARDER, Indian Buddhism [Delhi, 1970], p. 375, and Indian Kāvya literature, ii [Delhi, 1974], pp. 183—4, 213—14, 230). Cf. also É. LAMOTTE, Sur la formation du Mahāyāna, in Asiatica (Festschrift F. Weller, Leipzig, 1954), pp. 386—8, 391—2, and Traité, iii, p. ix sq.; P. S. SASTRI, IHQ 31 (1955), p. 198; below, p. 26 note 59. In Kalhaṇa's Rājataraṅgiṇī i. 173 the Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna is associated with the Ṣaḍarhadvana (Harwan) in Kāśmīr at the time of the Turuṣka kings Huṣka, Juṣka and Kaniṣka. Even in recent studies the first regnal year of Kaniṣka is variously dated by different scholars between 78 (e.g. G. FUSSMANN) and 238 (R. GÖBL); two recent writers have opted for 200 (H. PLAESCHKE and Th. DAMSTEEGT). For a survey of the problem see Th. DAMSTEEGT, Epigraphical hybrid Sanskrit (Leiden, 1978), p. 10 sq.—On the other hand, in Bāṇa's Harṣacarita (Chapter viii) Nāgārjuna is linked with a Śātavāhana king. A Bhadanta Nāgārjunācārya is furthermore mentioned in an inscription discovered near the Jaggayyapeṭa Stūpa; see J. BURGESS, Notes on the Amarāvatī Stūpa (Madras, 1882), p. 57, and The Buddhist Stūpas of Amaravati and Jaggayyapeṭa (Archaeological Survey of South India, i, London, 1887), pp. 111—12 (who dates the writing of the inscription to *c.* 600; but G. TUCCI, Minor Buddhist texts, ii [Rome, 1958], p. 284, suggests the dating 450—500); T. N. RAMACHANDRAN, Nāgārjunakonda 1938 (Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India 71, Delhi, 1953), pp. 28—29 (who thinks the inscription relates to the Tantrik Siddha Nāgārjuna). Concerning Nāgārjunakonda and its inscriptions see also J. Ph. VOGEL, EI 20 (1929); N. DUTT, IHQ 7 (1931), p. 633 sq.; A. H. LONGHURST, The Buddhist antiquities of Nāgārjunakoṇḍa (Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India 54, 1938).

On the life and legend of Nāgārjuna see, e.g., S. BEAL, Si-yu-ki: Buddhist records of the western world (London, 1906), ii, p. 210; T. WATTERS, On Yuan Chwang's travels in India, ii (London, 1905), p. 200 sq.; J. TAKAKUSU, Record of the Buddhist religion by I-tsing (Oxford, 1896), p. 158 sq. (on *Jantaka/*Jetaka and Sātavāhana); M. WALLESER, The life of Nāgārjuna from Tibetan and Chinese sorces, Asia Major, Introductory Volume (Hirth Anniversary Volume, Leipzig, 1923), pp. 421—55; P. DEMIÉVILLE, Sur un passage du Mahāmeghasūtra, BEFEO 1924, pp. 227—8; G. TUCCI, JPASB 26 (1930), p. 138 sq. (= Opera minora, i [Rome, 1971], p. 209 sq.); S. K. PATHAK, Life of Nāgārjuna, IHQ 30 (1954), pp. 93—95; P. S. SASTRI, Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, IHQ 31 (1955), pp. 193—202; K. VENKATA RAMANAN, Nāgārjuna's philosophy as presented in the Mahā-Prajñāpāramitā-Śāstra (Rutland and Tokyo 1966), p. 25 sq.; R. H. ROBINSON, Early Mādhyamika in India and China (Madison, 1967), p. 21 sq.; D. SEYFORT RUEGG, Le Dharmadhātustava de Nāgārjuna, in Études tibétaines dédiées à la mémoire de Marcelle Lalou (Paris, 1971), p. 448 sq.; J. FILLIOZAT, Yogaśataka (Pondicherry, 1979), pp. iv—xix (who proposes, p. xviii, explaining I-ching's Shi-yen-te-ka/*Jantaka as *Sā(ṃ)taka(ṇi), i.e. Sātakaṇi/Śātakarṇi).

On the relation between the Madhyamaka and the great philosophical Sūtras of

of the theory of emptiness *(śūnyatā)* and non-substantiality *(niḥsvabhāvatā)* not only of the self *(ātman)* or individual *(pudgala)* but also of all factors of existence *(dharma)*, one of the most fundamental ideas of the Mahāyānasūtras. In Buddhist tradition Nāgārjuna is linked especially closely with the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, the Mahāyānist scriptures that devote much space to this theory; and he is indeed credited with having rescued parts of them from oblivion.[12]

Nāgārjuna has accordingly been regarded by the Buddhist traditions, and also by most modern scholars, as one of the very first and most original thinkers of the Mahāyāna.[13] A verse of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (MMK xiii. 8) appears clearly to presuppose a section of the Ratnakūṭa collection, the Kāśyapaparivarta; and Nāgārjuna's doctrine based on the analysis of dichot-

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the Brahmanical tradition, see the older discussion by H. Jacobi, JAOS 31 (1911), pp. 1—29. Concerning the relation between Nāgārjuna (and the early Mādhyamikas) and other schools of Indian philosophy see more recently, for the Sāṃkhya, W. Liebenthal, Satkārya in der Darstellung seiner buddhistischen Gegner (Stuttgart, 1934); E. H. Johnston, Early Sāṃkhya (London, 1937), pp. 66—67; N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Sino-Indian studies 4 (1951), pp. 47—50; and E. Frauwallner, WZKSO 2 (1958), p. 131. For the Nyāya see W. Ruben, Die Nyāyasūtras (Leipzig, 1928); S. Yamaguchi, JA 1929, ii, p. 62 sq.; G. Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist texts on logic (Baroda, 1929), p. xv sq.; E. H. Johnston and A. Kunst in the introduction to their edition of the Vigrahavyāvartanī, MCB 9 (1951), p. 106; G. Oberhammer, WZKSO 7 (1963), p. 64 sq.; B. K. Matilal, Epistemology, grammar and logic in Indian philosophical analysis (The Hague, 1971); K. Bhattacharya, Journal of Indo-European studies 5 (177), p. 265 sq., and The dialectical method of Nāgārjuna (Delhi, 1978). For the Vaiśeṣika see G. Tucci, op. cit., pp. xxiv—xxvii; G. Oberhammer, loc. cit., p. 70. The relation between Nāgārjuna on the one hand and on the other the Carakasaṃhitā, the Vaiśeṣikasūtras and the Nyāyasūtras and Bhāṣya has been touched on by A. K. Warder in A. L. Basham (ed.), Papers on the date of Kaniṣka (Leiden, 1968), p. 330—1. With reference to the Ta-chih-tu-lun see E. Lamotte, Traité, iii, p. xxv—xxvii; K. Venkata Ramanan, op. cit., passim. See also P. S. Shastri, IHQ 31 (1955), p. 199—201; R. H. Robinson, Early Mādhyamika, p. 68 sq.—On parallels between Mādhyamika thought and Bhartṛhari (fifth century), see H. Nakamura, Journ. Ganganath Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha 29 (1973), p. 367 sq.

[12] See for example Candrakīrti, PP i, p. 2—3. Cf. R. H. Robinson, Early Mādhyamika, pp. 61—63, 177—80.—Contra: A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism, p. 388—9.

[13] Recently it has been suggested that Nāgārjuna was not a Mahāyānist in the strict sense since his MMK and the other most closely related works nowhere mention the Mahāyāna and make no explicit reference to Mahāyānist texts; see A. K. Warder in M. Sprung (ed.), The problem of the two truths in Buddhism and Vedānta (Dordrecht, 1973), p. 78 sq.—It is indeed true that no Mahāyānist text has been mentioned explicitly in the MMK—the only text named therein (xv. 7) being the Kātyāyanāvavāda, a text of the Saṃyuktāgama (cf. Saṃyuttanikāya, ii, p. 17) that deals with the two extreme views of eternalism and annihilationism— and that the MMK allude, in order to criticize them, chiefly to Ābhidhārmika doctrines. However, given the implicit reference to the Ratnakūṭa (see below) as well as the elaboration of doctrines characteristic of the Mahāyāna in the MMK and the related works, this view seems extremely difficult to maintain. The Ratnāvalī as well as several other works ascribed to Nāgārjuna refer at length to the Mahāyāna.

omously opposed pairs of concepts is characteristic of this work also. In sum, in view of his place in the history of Buddhist thought and because of his development of the theory of the non-substantiality and emptiness of all *dharmas*, it seems only natural to regard Nāgārjuna as one of the first and most important systematizers of Mahāyānist thought.

Nāgārjuna at the same time explored philosophical topics known to the old Canon as well as to the schools of the Śrāvakayāna.[14] In particular, he was well acquainted with doctrines taught by the Sarvāstivādins.[15] And even the doctrine of *dharma-nairātmya* and emptiness which Nāgārjuna contributed so much to explicating was certainly not unknown to the canonical texts and treatises of the Śrāvakayāna.[16]

The Mahāyānist canonical sources of the Madhyamaka school are chiefly (if not exclusively) the Prajñāpāramitā, Ratnakūṭa and Avataṃsaka literature. And the Ta-chih-tu-lun (*Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa), which is ascribed to (a) Nāgārjuna and is formally a commentary on the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, cites among other scriptures the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, the Śūraṃgamasamādhi, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, the Daśabhūmika, the Akṣayamatinirdeśa, the Tathāgataguhyaka, and the Kāśyapaparivarta. Most of these Sūtras continued to be regularly quoted by the later Mādhyamikas. In two works by Candrakīrti (seventh century) for example, the Prasannapadā and the Madhyamakāvatāra, among Sūtras cited in addition to the Prajñāpāramitā (Aṣṭasāhasrikā, Dvyardhaśatikā and Vajracchadikā) we find the Akṣayamatinirdeśa, Anavataptahradāpasaṃkramaṇa, Upāliparipṛcchā, Kāśyapaparivarta, Gaganagañja, Tathāgataguhya, Daśabhūmika, Dṛḍhādhyāśaya, Dhāraṇīśvararāja, Pitāputrasamāgama, Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā, Ratnakūṭa, Ratnacūḍaparipṛcchā, Ratnamegha, Ratnākara, Laṅkāvatāra, Lalitavistara, Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, Śālistamba, Satyadvayāvatāra, Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, Samādhirāja (Candrapradīpa), and Hastikakṣya.

[14] See L. de La Vallée Poussin, MCB 2 (1932—33), pp. 10—12; T. R. V. Murti, Central philosophy of Buddhism, p. 50 sq.; K. Venkata Ramanan, Nāgārjuna's philosophy, p. 46 sq. Cf. also A. Bareau, L'absolu en philosophie bouddhique: Évolution de la notion d'asaṃskṛta (Paris, 1951), pp. 174—86.—On 'proto-Mādhyamika' elements in the Pali canon see L. Gómez, PEW 26 (1976), p. 137 sq.

[15] The relation between the author of the Ta-chih-tu-lun (*Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, attributed to Nāgārjuna) and the Sarvāstivāda has been studied in some detail by K. Venkata Ramanan, Nāgārjuna's philosophy, pp. 28 sq. and 57 sq., and by É. Lamotte, Traité, iii, p. xiv sq. But on the question of the authorship of this treatise see below, p. 32.

[16] The Mādhyamikas do not themselves claim that the *dharmanairātmya* was their own discovery and that it was unknown to the Śrāvakas. See for example Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā on MMK xviii. 5 and Madhyamakāvatāra i. 8 (below, p. 74).—For the canonical formula *sabbe dhammā anattā* see Majjhimanikāya i, p. 227—8; Saṃyuttanikāya iii, p. 132—4, and iv, p. 401; Aṅguttaranikāya i, p. 286. Compare Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣya vi. 14d. This formula is one of the 'characteristics' or 'seals' of the Dharma (together with *sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā*, and in Aṅguttaranikāya i, p. 286 *sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā*). See also Bodhisattvabhūmi, Chapter xvii (p. 276—7).

Any attempt to trace the history of the Madhyamaka school is beset by the numerous problems that result from the obscurity in which the lives, work and chronology of so many of its masters remain shrouded. Only if this obscurity can be dispelled by the extensive historical, philological and philosophical study that is still required will it eventually become possible fully to elucidate these problems. Of primary importance is the still embroiled question of the figure of Nāgārjuna as a person and the author of certain works, and of the relationship between the various compositions ascribed to the masters who have borne this great name; for it is hardly to be doubted that there lived in India more than one person having this name and belonging to different periods in the history of the Madhyamaka.[17]

The Madhyamakaśāstrastuti attributed to Candrakīrti has referred to eight works by Nāgārjuna: the (Madhyamaka)kārikās, the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā, the Śūnyatāsaptati, the Vigrahavyāvartanī, the Vidalā (i.e. Vaidalyasūtra/Vaidalyaprakaraṇa), the Ratnāvalī, the Sūtrasamuccaya, and Saṃstutis.[18] This list covers not only much less than the grand total of works ascribed to Nāgārjuna in the Chinese and Tibetan collections, but it does not even include all such works that Candrakīrti has himself cited in his writings. It is of particular interest also to note that Saṃstutis or hymns are included in this list since some at least of the hymns ascribed to Nāgārjuna pose difficult problems of authorship owing to the fact that their doctrines sometimes appear to differ appreciably from those of the theoretical scholastic treatises; unfortunately, however, this list does not give the titles of the hymns its author had in mind, but quotations from at least some hymns ascribed to Nāgārjuna are to be found in Candrakīrti's works (see below, p. 31).

The first six works enumerated above correspond to the six well-known theoretical scholastic treatises of Nāgārjuna—the so-called Yukti-corpus *(rigs ćhogs)* of the Tibetan tradition (except that for the Ratnāvalī a certain non-extant *Vyavahārasiddhi is often substituted). Beside them the Tibetan sources place a collection of hymns—the Stava-corpus *(bstod ćhogs)*—as well as a body of tracts and epistles—the Parikathā-corpus *(gtam ćhogs)*—which includes the Suhṛllekha, sometimes the Rājaparikathā-Ratnāvalī, and some minor works.

In view of the above-mentioned opacity and confusion in the records as well as the uncertainty concerning the authorship of several works ascribed to Nāgārjuna, it will be convenient for the historian of the Madhyamaka to take as his point of departure the treatise universally considered as the Madhyamaka-

[17] It is important to observe that even if the Tibetan historiographers and doxographers have ascribed a variety of doctrinally distinct works to Nāgārjuna, they generally differentiate clearly between different phases in his doctrines, assigning these works to distinct periods in a miraculously long life. See D. Seyfort Ruegg, Le Dharmadhātustava, in Études tibétaines dédiées a la mémoire de M. Lalou (Paris, 1971), pp. 448—53.

[18] Edited by J. W. de Jong, OE 9 (1962), p. 49 sq.

śāstra *par excellence*—namely the MMK—together with any other texts ascribable to the same author that are doctrinally related, and to regard this textual corpus as a standard of reference when describing Nāgārjuna's philosophy. In this way a relatively homogeneous body of literature can be used as the basis for the discussion of the earliest period of Madhyamaka thought and also as one criterion for determining what other texts might be attributed to Nāgārjuna, the originator of the Madhyamaka school.

## The Mūla-Madhyamakakārikās

The extant Sanskrit text of the MMK is embedded in the Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛttiḥ, a commentary written by Candrakīrti perhaps half a millennium after the time of Nāgārjuna. This work is now available to us in three manuscripts—all mediocre copies of an original which was apparently not faultless—used by L. de La Vallée Poussin for his edition of 1903–13 and in a fourth manuscript used by J. W. de Jong for his edition of 1977. This text of the MMK has to be compared with the text contained in other commentaries on the MMK, which are now accessible only in Chinese and Tibetan, and in quotations in the exegetical literature of the Mahāyāna.[19]

Our MMK number 447 or 449 verses according to whether the two introductory stanzas to the Awakened One, the best of philosophers who taught origination in dependence *(pratītyasamutpāda)* free of eight limiting qualities, are included or not in the count. These verses are divided into 27 chapters.

The first chapter of the MMK takes up the topic of the dependent origination of things in the process of conditioning.[20] Things (*bhāva* 'entity'), Nāgārjuna states, are never found anywhere produced from themselves, from others, from both themselves and others, or from no cause at all (1). Now, in principle, the production of things would have to take place in dependence *(pratītya)* on conditions *(pratyaya)*; and Nāgārjuna enumerates the four kinds of condition known to Abhidharma philosophy, namely the causal condition *(hetu)*, the objective one *(ālambana)*, the immediately preceding one *([sam]anantara)*, and the governing one *(adhipati)* (2). However, it is not to be supposed that in these conditions a specific and independent nature (*svabhāva* 'own being, aseity') of the thing is to be found; and in the absence of such own being the correlative and complementary category of 'other being' (*parabhāva* 'alterity') cannot exist either (3).[21] Moreover, mention has been made of conditions on

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[19] For a brief comparison of the Sanskrit version of the MMK with the Chinese see R. H. Robinson, Early Mādhyamika, p. 30–31. On the title 'Mūlamadhyamakakārikā' see above, note 3.

[20] In the following résumé, the chapter titles of the MMK as found in Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā have been t ken as a basis. In the Tibetan translations of Buddhapālita's and Bhāvaviveka's commentaries on the MMK, the chapter titles differ in some places.

[21] See also MMK, Chapter xv.

the ground that we speak of production in dependence on them; but as long as no entity is actually produced, in the last analysis one must allow that no conditioning entities exist either (5). In fact, for either a real or a non-real thing no condition is possible; that is, an existent thing *(sat)* needs no additional condition to make it what it already is by definition, whereas no condition could effectively relate to a non-existent thing *(asat)* (6). If no factor *(dharma)* is produced as real, non-real or a combination of both, there can then be no cause producing it *(nirvartako hetuḥ)* (7); and the same holds, *mutatis mutandis*, for the other three kinds of *pratyaya* (8–10). Finally, when a product is not present in conditions taken either singly or all together, what is not present in conditions could not be produced from them (11). Now, were a non-existent *(asat)* product to proceed from conditions, why, being non-existent, should it not proceed equally from non-conditions (12)? A product is by definition a result of its conditioning factors, whereas conditions are not made up of themselves; but a product supposed to be made up of such (in fact non-substantial) conditions could not in fact really be their product (13). Here Nāgārjuna's critique is intended to reveal the antinomies and paradoxes in a notion of causation that presupposes the existence of a number of substantial and self-existent entities; and it thus covers both the Ābhidharmika concept of origination in dependence *(pratītyasamutpāda)* of *dharma*s as factors each possessing a specific characteristic property, and also doctrines such as those of the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika. And the conclusion then is that there exists no substantive product issuing from a real causal nexus with substantive conditions (or, indeed, non-conditions, 14), each conceived of as an entity *(bhāva)* possessing a positive (or even a negative) own being *(svabhāva)*. Nāgārjuna's analysis thus serves to relativize and deconstruct our artificially posited entities with their respective conditions, which are thus annulled ('zeroed') both as substantial entities and ulimately valid philosophical categories.

Chapter ii is devoted to a critique and deconstruction of the category of movement over space in time, as situated in either the two aspects of traversed/past *(gata = soṅ ba)* and untraversed/future *(agata = ma soṅ ba: anāgata)* space-in-time *(: adhvajāta)* or in a third aspect apart from (and between) these two which might be supposed to be in process of being moved over *(gamyamāna = bgom pa)* (1).[22] Now going *(gati)* cannot in fact attach to the

[22] For a discussion of the philosophical problem taken up in Chapter ii of the MMK, see M. Siderits and J. D. O'Brien, Zeno and Nāgārjuna on motion, PEW 26 (1976), pp. 281–99, who propose a 'mathematical' interpretation of Nāgārjuna's analyses in addition to the 'conceptual' interpretation. The authors draw a parallel with Zeno's paradoxes on the grounds that Nāgārjuna was arguing against a concept of motion that postulated spatial and temporal minims ('atoms' and 'instants') in the frame of a theory that reified the terms analysed and assumed a language-reality isomorphism and a correspondence theory of truth.

The commentary on this chapter of the MMK in Ćoṅ·kha·pa's Rigs·pa'i·rgya·mćho has been translated into English by J. Hopkins and Ngawang Lengden, Chapter

first two aspects because there is no movement *(ceṣṭā)* in them (2). Nor can it be superadded, as an additional action of going, to the third aspect mentioned above because movement in process devoid of movement *(vigamana)* to begin with does not apply (3). Also, when going *(gamana)* is postulated for this third aspect there would ensue *(prasajyate)* the existence of movement in process without an agent (*gantṛ* 'goer') (4). Since in the absence of a goer there is in fact no going, the occurrence *(prasaṅga)* of two *gamanas* would entail the occurrence of two goers for each movement, something that does not apply (6). It is moreover pointed out that there is neither going of an independent goer nor going of a non-goer *(agantṛ)*; but there exists no third possibility (*tṛtīya*, tertium non datur) (8; cf. 15). A proposition *(pakṣa)* asserting: 'the goer goes' and involving *gamana* and *gantṛ* as two distinct entities would entail *(: prasajyate)* for him who maintains it a goer without movement (10), something that has been seen not to apply (9). Since no undertaking *(ārambha)* of going can be found located in any of the three spatio-temporally defined phases of movement, the latter are nothing but the product of dichotomizing conceptualization (*vikalpa*, 14). Thus, through conjoined linguistic and conceptual analysis, the category of movement is relativized and annulled ('zeroed') with respect to its conceptually interrelated and imaginarily constructed components—viz. the action of going *(gati, gamana)* and its agent *(gantṛ)*—and also with respect to its opposed correlate *(pratipakṣa)* of stationariness and one who stands (i.e. desists from movement) (15–17). In addition, it is shown that (the categories of) the action and agent of going cannot ontologically stand in a relation of either oneness *(ekībhāva)* or difference *(nānābhāva)* (18–21); they are merely the product of dichotomizing conceptualization (20). Agent and action of movement cannot then be hypostatized as independent entities having the ontological status of real, unreal or both-real-and-unreal (24). It is therefore concluded that the posited factors making up the triad of agent, action and object *(karman*, i.e. *gantavya)* of movement do not exist *per se* (25cd; cf. Prasannapadā ii. 6). It is to be noted that Nāgārjuna's analysis here lends itself to interpretation in terms of grammatical categories; and Candrakīrti in fact introduces the concept of *sādhana* or *kāraka* as a *śakti* in his comment (PP ii. 6).

In its method of argument founded on dialectical cancellation and analytical deconstruction of the concepts and categories of discursive thinking and ordinary language through *prasaṅga*-type reasoning, Chapter ii of the MMK serves as a model for the discussion of other concepts and categories in the sequel. Since such discussion is essentially analytical and seeks to deconstruct dogmatically posited conceptual entities issuing from dichotomizing construction, Nāgārjuna's procedure can hardly be regarded as mere sophistical argu-

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two of the Ocean of Reasoning (Dharamsala, 1974); an English translation of MMK ii with the Prasannapadā has also been made by them: Analysis of going and coming (Dharamsala, 1976).

ment employing deceptive devices or fallacious means to construct some (counter)dogma.

Chapter iii subjects to a critique the category of the sense faculties *(indriya)* —viz. the five internal sensory bases of the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile, and the mental base[23]—founded on the idea of a triad of factors comprising a sensory function (e.g. sight), an agent (e.g. the seer) and an object (e.g. a visible thing). All are shown by Nāgārjuna to be interdependent conceptual factors, not substantial and independent entities having own being *(svabhāva)* as was supposed by other schools of thought.

Subsequent chapters are devoted to similar analyses of other categories (the succeeding one, according to Candrakīrti, often being introduced by an opponent in the belief that it presupposes and therefore establishes the reality of the preceding category that had just been criticized). In every case Nāgārjuna demonstrates that each new category is itself an unreal construct having only a limited conventional and transactional validity on the surface level without, however, constituting an entity having own being.

The following concepts/categories are thus analysed and the antinomies involved in their postulation are revealed. (iv) The five groups (*skandha*, i.e. the physical and mental factors, which entail the existence of the *indriya*s because, if the *skandha*s in which they are included exist, the *indriya*s must exist). In this chapter *śūnyatā* is referred to together with some fundamental principles of Madhyamaka thought in connexion with problems raised in philosophical argument and explication. Thus: 'When a disputation is conducted by means of *śūnyatā*, should [an opponent] state a reply *(parīhāra)* nothing will serve him as a reply: there emerges a sameness with what is to be established *(samaṃ sādhyena);* when an explication is made by means of *śūnyatā*, should someone [a quasi disciple *(śiṣyadeśīya)* according to Candrakīrti] state an objection *(upālambha)* nothing will serve him as an objection: there emerges a sameness with what is to be established' (8–9). That is, the substantial reality of *vedanā* or whatever other thing is adduced as a counter-instance in a reply or objection intended to establish the reality of e.g. *rūpa*—the *sādhya*—inevitably itself falls within the scope of *śūnyatā;* and it cannot therefore be used to invalidate the emptiness of own being of any *dharma* (*rūpa*, etc.).[24]—(v) The elements *(dhātu)*—earth, water, fire, air, *ākāśa*, and *vijñāna*—are next introduced (on the supposition that since they at least have not been negated they would have the ontological status necessary to establish the preceding category by analogy). The discussion excludes the idea that these elements could really be characterized things (*lakṣya* 'marked', i.e. *bhāva*s) in relation to their (supposed) characteristics (*lakṣaṇa* 'mark' or specific prop-

[23] In Buddhapālita's and Bhāvaviveka's commentaries and the *Akutobhayā, Chapter iii is entitled *āyatana*.

[24] Cf. Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka viii. 16: *bhāvasyaikasya yo draṣṭā draṣṭā sarvasya sa smṛtaḥ/ ekasya śūnyatā yaiva saiva sarvasya śūnyatā//*—On *sādhyasama* cf. below, note 49.

erty).—(vi) Passion and the subject of passion *(rāga-rakta)* (presupposing the existence of the *skandha*s, *āyatana*s and *dhātu*s as the basis of such *saṃkleśa*). The discussion involves in particular an examination of the applicability here of the relational concepts of oneness *(ekatva)* and difference *(pṛthaktva)*—the two conditions under which any real entity might be supposed to exist—which constitute fundamental modes of analysis employed by the Mādhyamika to show that an entity having own being can exist under neither of these conditions.[25]—(vii) Production, insofar as it is conditioned *(saṃskṛta)*, has three phases, namely origination, duration with change, and decay (i.e. the three characteristics of the conditioned—*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*—which might be thought to belong to, and hence entail the existence of, the *skandha*s, *āyatana*s and *dhātu*s).[26] But when applied to a conditioned entity, precisely, these three *lakṣaṇa*s are shown to involve the fault of infinite regress (*anavasthā*, 3).[27] If on the other hand production were unconditioned, it could present no *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*. Here are also discussed problems arising from the notions of the dependently produced (*utpādyamānaṃ pratītya*, 15) and the production of an already existing entity, a non-existing one, and one that is both (20), as well as from the notions of duration (22) and destruction (26). In sum, because production, duration and decay are not themselves to be established as real, the conditioned *(saṃskṛta)* cannot exist. And being complementary to the *saṃskṛta* how then could an unconditioned *(asaṃskṛta)* thing be established? (33) The three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*s are thus like illusions (34).—(viii) Action and its agent *(karma-kāraka)* (the 'causes' entailing the existence of *vijñāna* and the other conditioned factors).—(ix) The pre-existent *(pūrva)* (i.e. the appropriating subject, or *upādātṛ*, supposed to be the precondition for perceptions and sensations, and assumed under the name of *pudgala* by the Sāmmatīyas amongst the Buddhists).[28]—(x) Fire and fuel, the relation between

[25] See below, p. 38 sq.

[26] The three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*s—*utpāda* 'origination', *sthiti* 'duration' (or *sthityanyathātva* 'alteration in duration': Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā vii. 11) and *vyaya* = *bhaṅga* 'decay'—are referred to in the title of Chapter vii as found in Buddhapālita's and Bhāvaviveka's commentaries, as well as in the *Akutobhayā. For the three (or four) *lakṣaṇa*s of the conditioned, see Vasubandhu's discussion in his Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ii. 45.

[27] For an example of this *anavasthā* 'regressus in infinitum', see MMK vii. 18—19 on the production of production of . . . production. In other words, if origination as an entity is assumed, then the origination of the entity origination has also to be assumed, and so on *ad infinitum*. See also Nāgārjuna's Vigrahavyāvartanī 32, where the problem of infinite regress is shown to arise in connexion with the establishment of an object of correct knowledge *(prameya)* by means of something else known as the means of correct knowledge *(pramāṇa)*, which then itself requires to be established by still another *pramāṇa*, and so on infinitely.— The *aparyavasānadoṣa* 'fault of infinite regress' is noticed by Candrakīrti (Prasannapadā vii. 3), as well as by Vasubandhu (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ii. 45—46) who, following the Sautrāntika view, points out the problem posed by the notion of *jātijāti*, etc.

[28] The *upādātṛ* and *upādāna* are mentioned in the title of Chapter ix in Buddhapālita's and Bhāvaviveka's commentaries, and in the *Akutobhayā.

which is analysed in terms of that between an appropriator *(upādātṛ)* and the appropriated *(upādāna)*. This relation raises the question of oneness or difference and of the five forms of relation between fire as appropriator and the appropriated fuel.[29]

The next chapters take up the Buddhist's own soteriological and gnoseological categories of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* and their putative experiencing subjects. Thus we have critiques of the following topics. (xi) The prior and posterior limits *(koṭi)* of *saṃsāra*[30] (the existence of which might be thought to entail the existence in it of some transmigrating experiencer *[saṃsartṛ]* or appropriating self *[ātman]*).—(xii) Suffering (*duḥkha*, the existence of which might be thought to entail the existence of an *ātman* or *pudgala* to experience it). It is shown how an experiencing entity cannot serve as a base for the experience of suffering.—These points are reinforced by a critique of (xiii) the conditioned *(saṃskāra = saṃskṛta)*, defined as false and delusive (1).[31] Now an opponent might hold that *bhāvas* are not without own being because of their *śūnyatā* (3). But: 'Were there some thing not empty *(aśūnya)* there might be some thing empty; since there is nothing that is not empty how could there be some thing empty?' (7, a reasoning founded on the interrelatedness of all dichotomously opposed but still complementary categories and concepts which serves to do away with the idea that there might exist some *thing* qualifiable as empty).[32] *Śūnyatā* is in fact release from (or: the expeller of, *niḥsaraṇa*) all speculative views *(dṛṣṭi)*; and it is not to be resorted to as a surrogate third dogma or speculative position replacing the binary set of extremes that have been rejected (8).—(xiv) The conceptual category of contact (*saṃsarga*, e.g. between the object seen, the seer and sight, contact between which might be thought to entail the existence of these factors as entities having own being). This discussion raises the question of the ontological and logical status of otherness *(anyatva)* in the frame of the principle of origination in dependence.—(xv) Own being (*svabhāva*, 'aseity', which would be entailed by the causality of *hetu-pratyayas*). This notion is subjected to a critique showing that it is not compatible with the idea of production by causes and conditions because by definition *svabhāva* should be independent of any other thing causing or conditioning it; it is therefore not produced.[33] Nor can there be 'other being' *(parabhāva)* since this would involve an own being in relation to which it is to be established. This being so, how could there be any kind of entity *(bhāva)*? And in the absence of *bhāva* there can be no 'non-entity'

[29] x. 14. This investigation *(vicāra)* concerns five points, on which see below, p. 40.

[30] *Saṃsāra* is the title of Chapter xi in Buddhapālita's and Bhāvaviveka's commentaries, and in the *Akutobhayā.

[31] *Tattva* is the title of Chapter xiii in Buddhapālita's and Bhāvaviveka's commentaries, and in the *Akutobhayā.

[32] Cf. Āryadeva, Catuḥśataka xvi. 7.—This does not seem to be the case of the logical error of negation of the antecedent since we do not in fact have a hypothetical syllogism here.

[33] On MMK xv. 1—2 cf. Candrakīrti, Madhyamakāvatāra vi. 181—183a.

*(abhāva)* either.[34]—(xvi) The twin categories of bondage and release (*bandhana-mokṣa*, the existence of bondage—or *saṃsāra*—entailing the existence of some *svabhāva* in things and of a transmigrating *pudgala*, as well as the idea that the correlative category of release—or *nirvāṇa*—is an opposed entity in a binary set).—(xvii) Action and its result (*karma-phala*, which would entail the existence of an entity termed '*saṃsāra*').—(xviii) The category of a self *(ātman)* as the appropriating subject to which actions, their fruits and the associated defilements attach as things belonging to it *(ātmīya)*; whereas once appropriation *(upādāna)* has ceased birth, etc. also come to a stop (4).[35]—(xix) Time present, past and future (the existence of which might be thought to presuppose the own being of things that, in their various states of temporal being, make time knowable since it is their support).—(xx) The complex aggregate *(sāmagrī)* of causes and conditions (which would together bring about, in a subsequent moment of time, the production of a result whereby the existence of time as a cooperating cause—*sahakārikāraṇa*—might be supposed to be established). The discussion here raises once more the question of the two conditions—oneness *(ekatva)* and difference *(anyatva)*—in which a cause might be supposed to stand in relation to its putative effect if they are conceived of as entities (19).[36]—(xxi) Production and destruction (*sambhava-vibhava*, which might also be thought to presuppose time as the continuum in which they would successively take place). As entities they are shown to be in fact inapplicable categories.—(xxii) The *tathāgata* (in virtue of whose continuing existence through aeons a continuity of existence—*bhavasaṃtati*—in time might be entailed). The discussion includes an investigation of five modes of relation between a *tathāgata* and 'his' appropriated *skandhas*.[37]—(xxiii) Error *(viparyāsa)* and defilement (*kleśa*, viz. passion, hate and confusion) (which might entail a continuity of existence in time by being its ultimate cause). Special consideration is here given to the *kleśas* (passion and hate proceed from erroneously grasping something as agreeable or disagreeable, and confusion proceeds from erroneously taking something to be what it is not—e.g. the impermanent as permanent). In the absence of any *ātman* it then appears that the *kleśas* are themselves not things which could be regarded as real entities to be eliminated (3). And just as there is no entity called error and hence nothing real to be eliminated, there is no correlative non-error to be grasped (16), the binary category of error and non-error as well as ignorance *(avidyā)* and the *saṃskāras* (23) being thus annulled. Indeed, there could be no real elimination of defilements that are either existent (*bhūta* 'real', 24) or non-existent (*abhūta*, 25).

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[34] *Bhāvābhāva* is the title of Chapter xv in Buddhapālita's and Bhāvaviveka's commentaries, and in the *Akutobhayā.

[35] In this chapter the relation of an *ātman* to the *skandhas* is discussed in terms of the investigation *(vicāra)* in five points. See below, p. 40.

[36] *Hetuphala* is the title of Chapter xx in Buddhapālita's and Bhāvaviveka's commentaries, and in the *Akutobhayā.

[37] See below, p. 40.

When an investigation of the above-mentioned categories has revealed the paradoxes and antinomies that attach to their (postulated) existence, and once they have been relativized and 'zeroed'—both as entities through the principle of origination in dependence *(pratītyasamutpāda)* as understood by the Mādhyamika, and as logical categories through a process of analysis and deconstruction that shows them to have as their foundation nothing but pairs of dichotomously opposed complementary concepts—and have been seen to be empty of own being, such basic principles of Buddhism as the four noble truths *(āryasatya)*—namely suffering which is to be known, its origination which is to be eliminated, its cessation which is to be realized, and the path to cessation which is to be cultivated—are themselves relativized; for it becomes plain that they belong not to ultimate reality *(paramārtha)* but, semantically, to the surface level of dichotomizing conceptualization and, pragmatically, to transactional usage. Moreover, in the absence of the four noble truths the four fruits of sainthood would also not exist as real entities, so that there could be no saints *(ārya)*, and hence no community *(saṃgha)*, no *dharma* and no *buddha* existing as real entities. The question then arises: Have these basic principles of Buddhist thought been rejected or abolished by Nāgārjuna (either by inadvertence and a failure to foresee the power of the critical analysis he was employing, or intentionally out of a bent towards nihilism)? In his considered and acute reply in Chapter xxiv, Nāgārjuna sets out several of the key principles of the Madhyamaka. To begin with, it is observed that an opponent who raises the above question merely reveals his own ignorance of the sense of emptiness (*śūnyatā*, 7). One must first distinguish between the two levels to which the Buddha's teachings relate: the 'worldly surface truth' *(lokasaṃvṛtisatya)* and truth as ultimate reality (*satyam ... paramārthataḥ*, 8); for the person who cannot distinguish between them simply does not understand the deep reality *(tattva)* of the teaching (9). Now, there can be no communication of ultimate reality *(paramārtha)* without resorting to transactional usage *(vyavahāra)*; and without comprehending the *paramārtha*, *nirvāṇa* is not to be attained (10).[38] Emptiness may then be likened to a dangerous serpent because it destroys foolish people who do not grasp it correctly; and this indeed accounts for the Teacher's initial hesitation to teach (11—12). Nāgārjuna furthermore observes that the criticism levelled against *śūnyatā* by the opponent does not fault it because this criticism has no applicability to the empty: the opponent is in fact only attributing his own errors to another (13, 15). In the Madhyamaka the word *śūnyatā* is used as a term for origination in dependence *(pratītyasamutpāda)*, and it is a conditional (pragmatic) designation *(prajñaptir upādāya)*; this is the middle way (*pratipat madhyamā*, which

[38] *anāgamya* is rendered here as 'without comprehending' following Candrakīrti, who glosses *anadhigamya*, and the Tibetan translation. The word is sometimes also understood as meaning 'without having recourse to', as in the Tibetan translation *(ma brten pas)* of this verse as quoted in the Madhyamakāvatāra vi. 80. And in MMK xxvi. 3 *āgamya* certainly means 'in dependence on' *(brten nas)*.

falls neither into annihilationism by denying what originates in dependence, nor into eternalism by hypostatizing as real what are constructs and designations originating in dependence and, consequently, empty of own being) (18).[39] Indeed, only when *śūnyatā* is found to be applicable does everything become applicable ('fitting') (14);[40] were everything on the contrary non-empty nothing could either arise or cease, and it is this (rather than the theory of *śūnyatā*) that has as its undesired consequence the non-existence of the four noble truths (20). For how could there be suffering if a thing were independently produced, since the impermanent which by definition is painful would not be present when something has own being in virtue of its own independent existence (21)? With respect to the second noble truth, to deny *śūnyatā* involves one in a position where origination could never take place because anything existing by own being will clearly not require to be produced in order to exist (22).[41] Nor could there be cessation *(nirodha)* of suffering existing by own being, so that it is just by holding to own being that one rejects the third noble truth (23). Finally, were the path to possess own being its cultivation would not be possible (24). And if the first three noble truths did not exist, what kind of path is it that would have the function of leading to attainment in virtue of the fact of the cessation of suffering (25)? Moreover, even actions can appertain only to the empty—i.e. to what is without own being—because nothing is to be effected for any thing that is not empty; own being is not effected (33). To reject *śūnyatā* residing in the principle of origination in interdependence[42] is therefore to reject all worldly transactional usages *(vyavahāra,*

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[39] The pronoun *sā* in MKK xxiv. 18c might refer either to *pratītyasamutpāda* in the first quarter, or to *śūnyatā* in the second quarter; and Candrakīrti gives an explanation that in fact takes into account both these possibilities.—Bhāvaviveka (za, fol. 287b6) speaks of *śūnyatā* called *pratītyasamutpāda* which is *upādāya prajñaptiḥ* and also (fol. 288b3) *madhyamā pratipat*. In Buddhapālita's commentary (tsa, fol. 306b) the pronoun would seem to refer only to *pratītyasamutpāda* (but the Sanskrit construction naturally does not come through altogether unambiguously in the Tibetan translation).

Compare the expression *pratītyasamutpādaśūnyatā* in MMK xxiv. 36c. See also PP xxiv. 13 (*śūnyatārtha* is *pratītyasamutpādārtha*), 40 *(sarvadharmapratītyasamutpādalakṣaṇā svabhāvaśūnyatā)*, and xxvi. 1 (p. 542. 6). In Nāgārjuna's commentary on his Vigrahavyāvartanī 70 there is the verse:

*yaḥ śūnyatāṃ pratītyasamutpādaṃ madhyamāṃ pratipadaṃ ca|*
*ekārthāṃ nijagāda praṇamāmi tam apratimabuddham||*

See also Vigrahavyāvartanī 22.

[40] *yujyate* = Tib. *ruṅ ba*. Cf. Vigrahavyāvartanī 70:

*prabhavati ca śūnyatêyaṃ yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvārthāḥ|*
*prabhavati na tasya kiṃcin na prabhavati śūnyatā yasya||*

where *prabhavati* is translated into Tibetan by *srid pa*. For the idea see also MMK xxiv. 36; and below, p. 23 with note 51.

[41] See also Chapters i and xv, and below, p. 60.

[42] *Pratītyasamutpāda-śūnyatā*, an appositional *(karmadhāraya)* compound. See also above, note 39.

36). He who recognizes *pratītyasamutpāda* according to the Madhyamaka—that is, in the perspective of *śūnyatā* (18)—alone really recognizes the four noble truths (40).

Chapter xxv then turns to the unconditioned *(asaṃskṛta)* par excellence—*nirvāṇa*—and examines its status both ontologically and logically. Earlier it was said that, to the extent that an *asaṃskṛta* is posited as an entity in relation to its complementary opposite *(saṃskṛta)*, it cannot be established because the *saṃskṛta* is not established (vii. 33). It is now shown that if *nirvāṇa* is no thing (*bhāva* 'existence') it is equally not no thing (*abhāva* 'non-existence'); it cannot be posited ontologically or logically in terms of any of the four imaginable positions of the 'tetralemma' *(catuṣkoṭi)*, viz. *bhāva*, *abhāva*, both *bhāva* and *abhāva*, and neither *bhāva* nor *abhāva*. It is no empirical or conceptual entity, existent or non-existent, and relatable to a person thought of as attaining it (17–18; cf. xvi. 4 sq.). Given the fact that *nirvāṇa* as well as all the factors *(dharma)* pertaining to *saṃsāra* are accordingly empty of own being, it may be said that there is no differentiating property *(viśeṣaṇa)* between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* (19; cf. 9). And there is nothing whatsoever between the terminal (*koṭi* 'limit') of *saṃsāra* and the terminal of *nirvāṇa* (20). In the final analysis, then, no *dharma* has ever been communicated anywhere to anybody by a Buddha; such is the stilling of all objectification *(saropalambhopaśama)*, the peaceful stilling of all discursive development *(prapañcopaśama)* (24). As observed earlier by Nāgārjuna, the object of designation *(abhidhātavya)* comes to a stop as the domain of thinking *(cittagocara)* comes to a stop, *dharmatā* like *nirvāṇa* being unproduced and undestroyed (xviii. 7); and the characteristic of reality *(tattva)* is to be not dependent on another (i.e. not to be communicated), still, not discursively developed through discursive developments *(prapañca)*, without dichotomizing conceptualization *(vikalpa)*, and free from differentiation (xviii. 9).

The last two chapters of the MMK deal with the twelve members *(aṅga)*—viz. the conditioning 'occasions' *(nidāna)*—of origination in dependence (xxvi) and the sixteen speculative views *(dṛṣṭi)* that stand in the way of the correct understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda* and *śūnyatā* (xxvii), the good *dharma* being taught with a view to eliminating all such views (30). Although these two chapters add little that is philosophically essential to Madhyamaka doctrine as expounded in the preceding chapters of the MMK, they deal with topics that are traditionally of importance in the history of Buddhist thought.

Together the chapters of the MMK explicate the terms and ideas mentioned in the two introductory verses placed at the head of the treatise: 'I pay homage to the best of teachers, the perfectly awakened one *(sambuddha)* who has taught origination in dependence *(pratītyasamutpāda)*, the stilling of discursive development *(prapañcopaśama)* and peaceful *(śiva)*, which is without destruction and production, not annihilated and not eternal, neither undifferentiated nor differentiated, and without both coming and going'.

## Nāgārjuna's 'Minor' Treatises and Commentaries

About five other works, four of which are more or less minor at least with respect to their extent when compared with the MMK, may be regarded as belonging to the same category of scholastic texts as Nāgārjuna's great Madhyamaka-Śāstra.

The Yuktiṣaṣṭikā, a verse-text taking its name from the principle of reasoning *(yukti)* applied in the Madhyamaka, deals with the non-apprehension *(anupalambha)* of both positive and negative entities, and with the understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda* free from the twin extremes of existence and non-existence which leads to final release.[43] Once the idea of nihilistic non-existence, the source of all faults, has been eliminated—for in the search for reality *(tattva)* one has in fact to start with the principle 'All exists' (*sarvam asti*, 31) even though it is certainly not to be made the object of conceptual attachment (41)—this *yukti* is specified as that by which existence also is excluded (3). Release is then to be defined in terms of neither existence nor non-existence of any entity whatsoever (5); it is rather stoppage of all impurities (10). All *dharmas* are in fact to be realized as empty *(śūnya)*, non-substantial *(anātman)* and 'isolated' (*vivikta*, 26) (cf. 31–32, 57, 60). Thorough penetration *(parijñāna)* of existence is indeed termed '*nirvāṇa*' (7); and this involves comprehending the cessation *(nirodha)* of what appeared, in the way of an illusion *(māyā)*, as production of an entity (8). Ignorance *(avidyā)* is the origin of all; but through exact knowledge *(samyagjñāna)* no birth and destruction whatsoever is apprehended (11). This is then what is known as *nirvāṇa* in the present *(dṛṣṭadharma)* (12). Whereas in truth neither birth nor destruction of an entity is found, references in the teaching to birth and destruction have as their motivation the fact that through knowing birth one comes to know destruction, through knowing the latter one comes to know impermanence, and through knowing the latter one will understand the Law *(dharma)* (22–23). However, in truth *pratītyasamutpāda* excludes the real birth or destruction of any thing; and knowing this one crosses the ocean of existences (24). Ordinary worldlings *(pṛthagjana)* assuming the existence of substantial entities fall into error concerning existence and non-existence; and being under the influence of *kleśa* they are deceived by their own minds (25). Not only the teaching concerning the results of acts *(karmaphala)* and states of existence *(gati)* (33), but also its references to a self *(ātman)* and what belongs to a self *(ātmīya)* as well as to the *skandhas*, *dhātus* and *āyatanas* are all well-motivated (34). Still, *nirvāṇa* alone is true (36). Entities originating in dependence are like

[43] The numbering of the verses of the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā here follows the Tibetan version in the bsTan-'gyur. For a translation of Shih-hu's Chinese version see P. SCHAEFFER, Yukti-ṣaṣṭikā, die 60 Sätze des Negativismus (Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus 3, Heidelberg, 1924). A very few fragments of the Sanskrit text survive in quotations. See also S. YAMAGUCHI, Chūgan bukkyō ronkō (Tōkyō, 1965), p. 29 sq.

the moon reflected in water, i.e. neither real nor altogether unreal; knowing this one is not carried away by dogmatic views (46). The postulating of entities is in fact the cause of holding to dogmatic views that entail attraction, repulsion and disputes (47); whereas in the absence of dogmatic views no *kleśa* will occur (48). Attachment is the source of grasping the untrue as true and of disputing about it, under the influence of false knowledge *(mithyājñāna)* (50). But those who give up disputes maintain no unilateral thesis (*pakṣa*, i.e. one seeking to establish some kind of thing as ultimately true); consequently, being without a thesis of their own, they do not lay themselves open to another counterthesis *(parapakṣa)* (51). It is, then, by freeing the mind from fixation on any unilateral position with all the accompanying *kleśa* that release is attained (52 sq.). And since a great being (*mahātman*, cf. 5) sees with the eye of gnosis *(jñānacakṣus)* that entities are like mere reflections *(pratibimba)*, he does not stick in the mire of sense objects *(viṣaya)* (55). Beings can be divided into three classes: the childish *(bāla)* who are attached to sense objects such as visible form *(rūpa)*, the middling who become free from passion in this respect, and those of superior intelligence who are released through knowledge of the nature of *rūpa* (56). The first class remains attached to what it finds attractive, the second frees itself from this attachment, and the third sees that things are *vivikta*, like a man projected in a magical show *(māyāpuruṣa)* (57).[44]

The Śūnyatāsaptati, a treatise in verse accompanied by a prose commentary ascribed to Nāgārjuna himself, establishes emptiness on the ground of *pratītya-samutpāda*, the principle of origination in dependence that excludes the idea of any independent substantial entity. In particular, it discusses the non-substantiality of the twelve members of origination in dependence (*avidyā*,

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[44] The Yuktiṣaṣṭikā contains a verse (35) stating that the four elements *(mahā-bhūta)* are contained in *vijñāna*: *byuṅ ba che la sogs bšad pa| |rnam par šes su yaṅ ḍag 'du| |de šes pas ni 'bral gyur na| |log par rnam brtags ma yin nam||* (The Sanskrit of this verse seems to be equivalent to Jñānaśrīmitra, Sākārasaṃgrahasūtra 3. 27 [p. 545]: *mahābhūtādi vijñāne proktaṃ samavarudhyate| tajjñāne vigamaṃ yāti* [read: *yadi*] *nanu mithyā vikalpitam||*). Later advocates of a Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis have cited this verse in support of their doctrine; see e.g. Śāntarakṣita, Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti 92 (fol. 79b); and Ratnākaraśānti, Prajñāpāramito-padeśa, fol. 161b—162a, 169b.

Just before this verse, and after a quotation from the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (x. 256 sq.), Śāntarakṣita has quoted a verse that seems to correspond to Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 22, except that the Tibetan translation has *šes pa* (instead of *dgos pa* as in the text of the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā): *'di la skye ba ci yaṅ med| |'gag par 'gyur ba ci yaṅ med| |skye ba daṅ ni 'gag pa dag| |šes pa 'ba' žig kho na'o||* (Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti 92, fol. 79b). And Ratnākaraśānti has then cited this verse together with verse 35 in favour of his 'Vijñapti-Madhyamaka' theory (see below, Appendix II). However, Kamalaśīla evidently considers this verse to be taken from the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (see his Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā ad loc., fol. 138a—b); cf. also Vidyākaraprabha, Madhyamakanayasārasamāsaprakaraṇa, fol. 52a 1. Ratnākaraśānti's interpretation has been criticized by Ćoṅ·kha·pa, Legs·bšad·sñiṅ·po, fol. 56a.

*saṃskāra*, etc.), as well as *kleśa*, *karman*, agency, and the four erroneous conceptual inversions *(viparyāsa)*. The canonical statement 'Everything is impermanent *(anitya)*' shows that all (conditioned) things are impermanent; but it is not to be interpreted as admitting entities having the property of impermanence (58). *Paramārtha* is then nothing but *pratītyasamutpāda;* still, having recourse to worldly transactional usage *(vyavahāra)*, the Buddha has given a true construction of the world of manifoldness (69). Thus the teaching of a *dharma* on the worldly level has not been simply destroyed, but in truth no *dharma* at all is taught; those who fail to comprehend this teaching, however, fear the Buddha's faultless declaration (70). The worldly principle 'This arises in dependence on that' is accordingly not simply cancelled (71). A person endowed with clear receptivity of mind (*śraddhā* 'faith') who searches for reality *(tattva)* will investigate through correct analytic reasoning *(yukti)* the principle of dependent origination; and having thereby eliminated the idea of any positive or negative entity he achieves tranquillity (72).[45]

The Vaidalya-'Sūtra' with its accompanying Prakaraṇa is a prose work dealing with eristic *(vāda)*. It subjects to a critique the sixteen categories *(padārtha)* accepted by other philosophers who maintain the substantive reality of a self and of entities in the world.[46]

The Vigrahavyāvartanī, a work in seventy verses accompanied by an autocommentary, contains a very important discussion of the objections raised against the Madhyamaka theory of the non-substantial *(niḥsvabhāva)* and hence empty *(śūnya)* character of all *dharmas* together with Nāgārjuna's replies, a searching critique of the opponents' own logical and epistemological assumptions, and a demonstration of the validity of the Mādhyamika's theory

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[45] The verses of the Śūnyatāsaptati are to be found in the bsTan-'gyur in three separate, and often diverging, versions, viz. the *kārikās* alone, the verses with a commentary ascribed to Nāgārjuna, and the verses with Candrakīrti's Vṛtti; the variations between these versions pose a number of philological and historical problems. On the Tibetan tradition of this text see 'Gos-gŽon-nu-dpal, Deb-ther-sṅon-po, cha, fol. 7b.—The version accompanying the Tibetan translation of Candrakīrti's commentary, and hence this commentary itself, differs from the version accompanying the commentary ascribed to Nāgārjuna; and the question arises as to whether Candrakīrti knew this commentary or recognized it to be by Nāgārjuna. The Śūnyatāsaptati is not included in the Chinese canon. On it see S. Yamaguchi, Bukkyōgaku bunshū, i (Tōkyō, 1972), p. 5 sq.

[46] The sixteen *padārthas* of Indian philosophy are: *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, *saṃśaya*, *prayojana*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *siddhānta*, *avayava*, *tarka*, *nirṇaya*, *vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā*, *hetvābhāsa*, *chala*, *jāti*, and *nigrahasthāna;* cf. e.g. Nyāyasūtra I. i. 1.

Amongst the philosophers referred to in the Prakaraṇa (section 8) we find Kapila, Maṭhara, Ulūka, and Vyāsa.—On the Vaidalya see S. Yamaguchi, Chūgan bukkyō ronkō (Tōkyō, 1965), p. 111 sq.; Y. Kajiyama, Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia 6–7 (1965), p. 134 sq., and IBK 5/1 (1957), pp. 192–5; P. Williams, JIP 6 (1978), p. 287 sq.

and method.[47] This treatise is especially noteworthy for its critique of the forms of correct knowledge (*pramāṇa*, viz. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *āgama*, and *upamāna*) current at the time and of their objects *(prameya)* (30–51). Attention is called in particular to the infinite regress *(anavasthā)* involved in attempting to establish *prameyas* by means of *pramāṇas*, which would then require further *pramāṇas* to establish them, and so on *ad infinitum* (32 sq.). Nāgārjuna explains furthermore that it is not the Mādhyamika's statement *(vacana)* 'All things *(bhāva)* are without own being' that makes things so; the statement simply serves to make it known that they are empty (64). Thus the opponent's contention that, on the assumption of *śūnyatā*, the Mādhyamika's own statements will be as empty as everything else and hence unable to establish the non-substantiality of things merely reveals the opponent's failure to understand the sense of *śūnyatā* and his misapprehension concerning what the Mādhyamika is in fact about (21 sq.); and it cannot be used as an argument to invalidate the communicative *(jñāpaka)* function of the statement in philosophical practice (cf. 64).[48] The Madhyamaka, based as it is on the *śūnyatā* theory and the *prasaṅga* method, is indeed unassailable; for not only does a Mādhyamika restrict himself to a kind of philosophical deconstruction—and therapeutic dehabituation—with respect to dichotomizing conceptualization while refraining from propounding any propositional thesis (*pratijñā*, 29 and 59) of his own, but any argument adduced to combat and refute the theory of *śūnyatā* is devoid of cogency, and falls into line with and reinforces the Madhyamaka theory, since all things can be shown to be equally non-substantial (28).[49] Accordingly, just as the Mādhyamika is not adopting an antiphilosophical stance when he states that he has no thesis, so he is not taking up an antirational position when he observes that Madhyamaka theory is immune from refutation. In sum, while the Mādhyamika's statement *(vacana)* is not supposed to establish some entity

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[47] See K. Bhattacharya, The dialectical method of Nāgārjuna (Delhi, 1978), for an English translation of the verses and autocommentary. The Sanskrit text has been edited by E. H. Johnston and A. Kunst, MCB 9 (1949–51), pp. 108–51, reprinted in K. Bhattacharya's book just cited. See also S. Yamaguchi, Bukkyōgaku bunshū (Tōkyō, 1972–3), i, pp. 1–86; ii, pp. 5–33.

[48] Elsewhere it is explained that *śūnyatā* does not have the function of *making dharmas* empty since this is what they *are;* a sentence concerning *śūnyatā* therefore serves to make this fact known (see Kāśyapaparivarta §§ 63–64; cf. Candrakīrti, PP xiii. 8 and Madhyamakāvatāra vi. 34). Candrakīrti (PP iv. 8) has also referred to *śūnyatā* as an instrument *(karaṇa)* revealing that *rūpa* is *niḥsvabhāva*. (Cf. the notion of the *vyañjaka-hetu*). See also Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā (ed. N. Dutt), p. 37–38.

[49] Here the word *sādhyasama* apparently does not refer to the logical fault of circularity or *petitio principii* so named. On *sādhyasama* see also Vigrahavyāvartanī-Vṛtti 69, and MMK iv. 8–9 (above, p. 12).—Moreover, the fault that an opponent may allege with respect to *śūnyatā* does not touch the Mādhyamika since, in the case of what is empty, it simply does not apply (MMK xxiv. 13; above, p. 13); cf. Vigrahavyāvartanī 59 (and Āryadeva, Catuḥśataka xvi. 25).—On *sādhyasama* as a fallacy in Nyāya and in Buddhist usage cf. B. K. Matilal, JIP 2 (1974), pp. 211–24, and K. Bhattacharya, ibid., pp. 225–30.

as being non-substantial in the manner of either a syllogism or a propositional thesis with probative force, it retains its function as a sentence and statement having communicative *(jñāpaka)* force; and the Mādhyamika does not hesitate to uphold it as expressing a doctrine of Buddhism. As for the immunity of Madhyamaka theory against refutation, it evidently stems from the fact that, once the concept of an entity endowed with own being has been criticized and deconstructed through the understanding of non-substantiality and emptiness, not only is no position postulating such an entity to be maintained by the Mādhyamika himself, but also no refutation from a counterposition can be successfully made by an opponent in the frame of any of the current philosophical positions based on the postulation of some sort of entity. The Mādhyamika does not therefore turn out to be trying to devise a strategy of immunization to make his theory empirically and logically unassailable; for the immunity of Madhyamaka theory is the consequence of the annulment ('zeroing') of all hypostatized and dichotomously structured concepts, and it pertains only to the domain of an entity conceived of in terms of a conceptual dichotomy: the Mādhyamika simply postulates no entity which could become the object of conceptualisation involving alternative speculative views and hence of debate. But, as already noted, the Mādhyamika still does have a theory and doctrine—a *darśana* and *vāda*—which he takes to be that of the Buddha (see above, pp. 2–3); and his doctrine then requires validation and eventually defence against attempts to falsify and refute it, something that the successive masters of the Madhyamaka have sought to supply.[50] The VV then concludes with the observation that for someone for whom *śūnyatā* applies all applies, whereas nothing can apply for someone for whom *śūnyatā* does not apply (70).[51] Although basically concerned with the logical and epistemological implications of the *śūnyatā* theory, this work does not fail to say something also about soteriology and the religious life *(brahmacarya)* (54–56, 70).[52]

The Ratnāvalī, a treatise in some 500 verses divided into five chapters, has also been customarily regarded as a minor work of Nāgārjuna despite the fact that it is actually longer than the MMK; this is probably because it is somewhat less philosophically incisive and comprehensive than the latter treatise.[53] It

[50] Absence of thesis and immunity from refutation as twin features of Madhyamaka theory require further historical study and philosophical analysis.

[51] Compare MMK xxiv. 14 (above, p. 17), where the correlative pronouns *yasya . . . tasya* could grammatically be interpreted as referring not to a person but to a thing. However, the gloss to the PP which equates *yujyate*, *rocate* and *kṣamate* can apply only to a person. The purport of Candrakīrti's explanation supports this interpretation also; and Bhāvaviveka in his Prajñāpradīpa (za, fol. 285a–286b) indicates that the pronouns in the first hemistich refer to persons, namely those Buddhists who do not accept *śūnyatā*.

[52] Compare the first part of Chapter xxiv of the MMK.

[53] It has not been included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan-'gyur but in the sPriṅ-yig section of epistles etc. On its inclusion in the Parikathā-corpus see above, p. 8.

takes the form of a partly paraenetic discourse addressed to a king, usually identified as a Sātavāhana monarch, whence its subtitle of *rājaparikathā*.[54] The first two chapters are concerned chiefly with the temporal good *(abhyudaya)* to be gained through salutary deeds and with the *summum bonum (naiḥśreyasa)* achieved through knowledge; they accordingly deal with ethics (e.g. the ten salutary *karmapatha*, i. 8–24) and discriminative understanding *(prajñā)*. *Prajñā* is supreme and through it one understands reality *(tattva)*; but faith *(śraddhā)* is a necessary preliminary by which one as it were 'participates' *(bhaj-)* in *dharma* (5; cf. ii. 27). Philosophical egoism (*ahaṃkāra* 'self-grasping') along with the positing of things belonging to the self *(mama)* are founded on error and are eliminated by exact knowledge (*yathābhūtaparijñāna*, 28); so long as they have not yet been removed they are the source of acts *(karman)* binding one to the round of existences and hence to birth (35–37; cf. ii. 24). The five psycho-somatic groups *(skandha)* proceed from *ahaṃkāra* (29), which is itself perceived on the basis of the *skandhas* (32ab); but in truth *ahaṃkāra* has no reality and is like a reflection *(pratibimba)* in a mirror (32cd–33). Knowing the *skandhas* to be ultimately not true *(asatya)* one eliminates *ahaṃkāra*, and as a consequence the *skandhas* do not arise again (30). The round of existences proceeding from mutual causal conditioning has no more substance than a wheel of flames formed by a rotating firebrand (*alātamaṇḍala*, 36). As for *nirvāṇa*, while it is absence of all that makes up *saṃsāra* it is not to be regarded as either non-existence or existence: it is cessation of the postulation of both existence and non-existence *(bhāvābhāvaparāmarśakṣaya)* (42). Yet, as an ethically valid theory, *astitādṛṣṭi* consists in accepting that acts bear fruit; and this leads to favourable states of existence *(sugati)* (44). By the stilling *(śānti)* of the ideas of existence and non-existence in gnosis both sin and merit are transcended *(pāpapuṇyavyatikrama)*, and there is release from good and evil states of existence (of which five are enumerated in 23) (45). Knowing conditioned production one goes beyond nihilism *(nāstitā)*, and understanding arrest *(nirodha)* one does not become involved in existence *(astitā)* (46). A cause that is either antecedent or simultaneous in relation to its effect is in fact no cause at all;[55] and production (*utpatti*, of self-existent entities) is accordingly not understandable in terms of either conventional designations *(prajñapti)* or ultimate reality *(tattva)* (47). The canonical formula for conditionship 'This being that is' *(asmin satîdaṃ bhavati)* does not then imply self-existence *(svabhāva)*; it refers rather to conditioned relation, as between the long and the short (48–49; cf. 92, 95). The same applies to the canonical formula for a causal relation, e.g. between a lamp and light (48–49). Because he resorts to neither existence nor non-existence he who is not fixed in duality

[54] The identification with King bDe·spyod is made by the commentator Ajitamitra, whose work is contained in the bsTan·'gyur. Cf. below, note 59.

[55] Because an antecedent cause could not enter into immediate connexion with its supposed effect, and a cause existing simultaneously with its supposed effect would be redundant.

*(advayaniśrita)* is released (51, 57). On the contrary, if one erroneously takes the world —which is at the same time causally conditioned and mirage-like *(marīcipratima)*—to be either existence or non-existence of some thing (like water in a mirage), one is not released (55–56).[56] Moreover, by the denial of existence non-existence would be implied *(ākṣip-)*, and *vice versa* (58–59). But for those taking recourse in *bodhi*, there is really no propositional thesis *(pratijñā)*, no conduct, no *citta* relating to nihilism; and one cannot therefore speak in this case of nihilists (60, i.e. persons bound for a *durgati*, 57, the *nāstitādṛṣṭi* consisting besides in denying that deeds bear fruit, 43). The follower of the Madhyamaka differs from such people as the Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika(?) and Nirgrantha, as well as from a Pudgalavādin, by transcending all positions based on existence opposed to non-existence (61): the quintessence of the Buddha's teaching lies precisely in the fact that it transcends any such position (62). The idea of a thing being either permanent or momentary is illogical too (66–70); and the idea of an atomic substance is antinomic (71). A thesis *(pakṣa)* implies a counter-thesis *(pratipakṣa)*, but neither obtains in fact (ii. 4; cf. i. 72); this world is thus in truth *(paramārthataḥ)* beyond truth and falseness *(satyānṛtātīta)*, and neither existence nor non-existence really applies (5). Now, since anything that is altogether 'not so' *(nêti)*[57] cannot be stated (in some determinate manner in terms of a logico-ontological position) by the omniscient Sage, the teacher has refrained from stating that the world *(loka)* has a (posterior) limit, does not have one, both has and does not have one, and neither has nor does not have one (6).[58] That the world is like a magical show *(māyā)* is indeed the quintessence of the Buddha's teaching (9). An end of birth there may be, just as the magician's magically projected elephant comes to an end; but at no stage is it some thing that is real (10–11). To maintain that some thing is or is not is then nothing but transactional usage *(vyavahāra)* (14). Hence the four conceivable positions (within a *catuṣkoṭi*) relating to the end of the world have been left unexplicated *(avyākṛta)* by the Buddha (15) (cf. i. 73 on the silence of the Buddha). And it is this very subtlety and profundity of the *dharma* realized by him that accounts for the Buddha's initial hesitation to teach (18). Rejection and nihilism are to be avoided (23). So long as the *dharma* putting a stop to *ahaṃkāra* has not been fathomed, one must observe the *dharma* that consists in liberality, ethics and patience (25). Truth *(satya)* lies not in agreement (or correspondence: *avisaṃvādavat*) but in total altruism *(paraikāntahita)*; and the false *(mṛṣā)* is comprised of non-beneficialness *(ahitatva)* (35). Truth, liberality, tranquillity, and discriminative understanding also make up the four virtuous qualities of a king (39). This chapter also contains a section on the impure nature of the body of a woman (a theme developed in Chapter iii of Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka) and by the same

[56] Cf. Vigrahavyāvartanī 65–68 for the *mṛgatṛṣṇā* simile, and also MMK xviii. 8–9.

[57] Cf. MMK xviii. 8.

[58] Cf. MMK xxii. 12 and xxv. 21–23.

token of that of a man (48–70); and a section on the 32 marks and 80 signs common to the Cakravartin and the Buddha (77 sq.), although there is really no commensurability between these two beings (99–100). Chapter iii is devoted to the collections *(sambhāra)* of merit and gnosis, from which proceed respectively the *rūpakāya* and *dharmakāya* (10–12). Chapter iv is entitled 'An instruction on the conduct of a king', the maintainer of the *dharma*, on whom rest in large part the economic and political dimensions of a religious foundation *(dharmāspada)*. In addition this chapter deals with the senses, their objects and the mind (50–65), the two *sambhāras* (66 sq.) and the six *pāramitās* (80 sq.). It includes also a defence of the Mahāyāna which—though not incompatible with the Vehicle of the Auditors *(śrāvakayāna)* (cf. 86 c d and i. 40–41)—differs from it by expounding the vow *(praṇidhi)* and conduct of the Bodhisattva and his dedicatory transfer of conduct *(caryāpariṇāmanā)* (cf. v. 84), so that only in the Mahāyāna does the Bodhisattva ideal come to realization (90–91). Furthermore, whereas for others *śūnyatā* may be destruction of some thing, in the Mahāyāna it is rather non-production *(anutpāda)* (86 a b). As between the teaching of the one Vehicle *(ekayāna)* and of three Vehicles one has to guard oneself with impartial equanimity *(upekṣā)*, for no demerit accrues from this equanimity while evil results from aversion; indeed, it is not easy to penetrate the intentional utterances *(abhisamdhyoktāni)* of the Tathāgata (88–89). The question further arises as to how the fruit of buddhahood is supreme if it comes from a path that is entirely common with the Śrāvaka's (92); but the difference lies in the Mahāyāna's proclamation of the Bodhisattva's ideal (93). Finally, because of the harsh injustice *(vaidharmya;* Tib. *mi bsrun)* prevailing in the world (whereas *dharma* is essentially compassion, 99), it is truly hard for a king to exercise his rule according to *dharma;* hence, with a view to *dharma* and glory *(yaśas)*, he may enter the life of religion *(pravrajyā)* (100). While still a householder *(gṛhastha)* one remains characterized mainly by liberality, ethical discipline and patience (99, qualities which permit one to achieve one's own and others' benefit, 81). Chapter v treats of renunciation and the religious life, and especially the ethical practices and the ten stages *(bhūmi)* of the Bodhisattva, the Buddha-stage, and the Bodhisattva's vow. It is observed that the precepts taught in the Ratnāvalī are useful not only to a king but to all beings (98).

These five works represent, together with the fundamental MMK, Nāgārjuna's above-mentioned theoretical scholastic treatises that have been referred to by both Candrakīrti and the Tibetan lists of the Yukti-corpus (*rigs ćhogs*, where the Ratnāvalī is, however, often replaced by the now unvailable *Vyavahārasiddhi).

The Suhṛllekha is also reported to have been addressed by Nāgārjuna to a king, just like the Ratnāvalī.[59] A homily dealing largely with ethical matters,

[59] In verse 14 the king's name is given as bDe·byed. The Suhṛllekha is

it touches on some basic philosophical topics too; and it refers to Amitābha and his pure field. Evidently intended to be a compendium of the ethico-philosophical ideas common to the Buddhist traditions, it contains little of what may be regarded as Nāgārjuna's particular contribution to the explication of Buddhist philosophy.[60]

Three collections of stanzas on the virtues of intelligence and moral conduct ascribed to Nāgārjuna are extant in Tibetan translation. Included in the section of the bsTan·'gyur containing works on good conduct and polity *(nīti)*, they are entitled Prajñāśatakaprakaraṇa, Nītiśāstra-Jantuposaṇabindu and Nītiśāstra-Prajñādaṇḍa.[61] In Buddhist tradition Nāgārjuna has indeed been reckoned as one in a group of 'ascetics concerned with affairs of the realm' *(yatayo rājyavṛttinaḥ)*; but it is uncertain which of these works, if any, are actually by the author of the MMK.

Another important text ascribed to Nāgārjuna is the Shih-erh-men-lun or 'Twelve-topic treatise' (*Dvādaśanikāya° or *Dvādaśamukha-śāstra?); one of the three basic treatises of the Chinese Madhyamaka school, it is extant only

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connected with King bDe·spyod (cf. above, p. 24 note 54) by the commentator Mahāmati, whose work is included in the bsTan·'gyur. Cf. S. Lévi, JA 1936, pp. 103—10; É, Lamotte, Traité, iii, p. liii—liv (referring to Udayana and *Jantaka!), and i, p. xii—xiv (referring to Yajñaśrī). The name bDe·spyod (bzaṅ·po) has been identified with Udayana(bhadra) ~ Sātavāhana (or Śāta°) ~ *Antivāhana/mThar·'gro·žon; see e.g. P. Cordier's Index to the Peking bsTan·'gyur, mDo·'grel, vol. gi, no. 32 (Suhṛllelka), and vol. ṅe, nos. 27 and 35 (Suhṛllekhaṭīkā); Bu·ston, Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 100b (ii, p. 127); Tāranātha, rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, pp. 55—60, and bKa'·babs·bdun·gyi·rnam·thar, fol. 181b sq. Cf. also Bāṇa, Harṣacarita, Chapter viii as well as Kutūhala, Līlāvaī 1008, and the later Jaina tradition; J. Takakusu, Record of the Buddhist religion by I-tsing (Oxford, 1896), p. 158; A. K. Warder, Indian Kāvya literature, ii (New Delhi, 1974), pp. 183, 213—14; J. W. de Jong, IIJ 20 (1978), p. 137; above, p. 5 note 11.

[60] On the concept of the Pure Land in Nāgārjuna's doctrine see S. Yamaguchi, EB 1 (1966), pp. 34—47 (with special reference to the Daśabhūmikavibhāṣāśāstra, on which see below, p. 29). Both the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (x. 166) and the Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa (liii. 451) mention that Nāgārjuna is to be reborn in the Sukhāvatī. (On Amitāyus in the Dharmadhātustava see below, p. 32). A link between the doctrine of *śūnyatā* and Amitābha is to be found in the Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthitasamādhisūtra for example.

English translations of the Suhṛllekha have been made from the Tibetan version by H. Wenzel, JPTS 1886, pp. 1—32, S. Beyer, The Buddhist experience (Encino and Belmont, California, 1974), pp. 10—18, and L. Kawamura, Golden Zephyr (Emeryville, 1975); and from the Chinese version by S. Beal, The Suhṛillekha (London, 1892).

[61] The Prajñādaṇḍa (Lugs·kyi·bstan·bcos·šes·rab·sdoṅ·bu/po) was published and translated by W. L. Campbell, She-rab Dong-bu or Prajnya Danda (Calcutta, 1919). As for the Prajñāśatakaprakaraṇa, it is included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan·'gyur also.

in Kumārajīva's Chinese translation (Taishō 1568).[62] It has a number of verses in common with the MMK. This treatise deals with twelve topics: origination in dependence (*pratītyasamutpāda*, understood as the 'outer' co-operating *hetu-pratyaya*s in conditionship as well as the twelve 'inner' members or *aṅga*s beginning with *avidyā*), the theory of the pre-existence of an effect in its cause *(satkārya)* and the opposite *(asatkārya)* theory, conditions *(pratyaya)*, the characteristics of conditioned things, the characterized and uncharacterized, oneness and difference, existence and non-existence, own being *(svabhāva)*, cause and effect, the agent, the three times (viz. past, present and future), and birth. The commentary on this work, also available in Chinese only, is ascribed sometimes to Nāgārjuna himself and sometimes to Ch'ing-mu.

Also attributed to Nāgārjuna are the Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikās with a Vyākhyāna, which deal with the twelve members *(aṅga)* of origination in dependence divided into the categories of *kleśa* (comprising *avidyā*, *tṛṣṇā* and *upādāna*), *karman* (comprising *saṃskāra* and *bhava*), and *duḥkha* (i.e. *vipāka*, comprising the remaining seven members). All these factors are shown to be empty of own being, so that in reality there is no *sattva*. The final verse (7) has a parallel in the Ratnagotravibhāga (i. 154) and the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (v. 21), and partially in Aśvaghoṣa's Saundaranandakāvya (xiii. 44).[63] The basic text and commentary take up the question of transfer *(saṃkrānti)* from one existence to another and deny any real transmigration of a being at the time of reconnexion *(pratisaṃdhi)* of the *skandha*s.

The Bhavasaṃkrānti, another short treatise ascribed to Nāgārjuna, does not actually deal with this transfer despite its title. It treats five topics: (i) the absence of birth of entities and *dharmatā;* (ii) *vikalpa* as the source of the *loka* and thinking *(citta)*, which is by nature without *vikalpa*, and the emptiness of the five *skandha*s; (iii) the non-existence of the *dharma*s given the ultimate non-existence of *citta*, non-duality *(advaya)* and *prajñā;* (iv) the *pāramitā*s as means; and (v) the twin principles of *upāya* and *prajñā*, the fact that things are 'mere designation' (*nāmamātra*, the division between expressions and what

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[62] See N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Visvabharati Annals 6 (1954), pp. 165—231; R. H. Robinson, Early Mādhyamika, pp. 32—33; R. Gard, IBK 2/2 (1954), p. 717.

A text entitled sTon·pa·ñid·kyi·sgo·bcu·gñis·pa is listed in the lDan·dkar·ma Catalogue (no. 595), but it is not found in the existing editions of the bsTan·'gyur. Bu·ston in fact notes that the sTon·pa·ñid·kyi·sgo·bcu·gñis·pa·rća·'grel were not available to him (Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 159a7).

[63] See L. de La Vallée Poussin, MCB 1 (1931—2), p. 394—5; D. Seyfort Ruegg, La théorie du *tathāgatagarbha* et du *gotra* (Paris, 1969), pp. 313—36.— Kārikā 5 is quoted and ascribed to Nāgārjuna-pāda in the Prasannapadā xxi. 21 and xxvi. 2 (both passages are missing in the Tibetan translation of the PP).—See V. V. Gokhale, Studia Indologica (Festschrift W. Kirfel, Bonn, 1955), pp. 101—6; C. Dragonetti, WZKS 22 (1978), pp. 87—93 (who argues against Nāgārjuna's authorship).

they express being merely conventional), and the two truths.[64] — On this work there is a commentary by the Paṇḍit Maitreyanātha, who quotes Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra.

Causation and the twelve 'inner' *aṅgas* are also explained briefly in the Śālistambakārikās ascribed to Nāgārjuna, who is in addition credited with a Ṭīkā on the Śālistamba(ka)sūtra.[65]

Works on Madhyamaka practice and the path of the Bodhisattva are also ascribed to Nāgārjuna. The *Bodhisambhāra-śāstra treating of the Bodhisattva's equipment conducive to Awakening *(bodhi)* was translated into Chinese by Dharmagupta in the early seventh century (Taishō 1660), this being the only version of the work now extant. It is quoted by Candrakīrti in his commentary on the Catuḥśataka.[66]

An important commentary on the Daśabhūmikasūtra dealing with the stages *(bhūmi)* of the Bodhisattva is attributed to Nāgārjuna. It contains quotations from the *Bodhisambhāra-śāstra, on which it appears to be based.[67]

Nāgārjuna is furthermore credited with an extensive anthology of canonical texts, the Sūtrasamuccaya. As already noticed above, it is included in the Madhyamakaśāstrastuti's list of the master's works.

Certain other minor works attributed to him by the Chinese or Tibetan traditions are of uncertain authorship in view of their doctrinal contents. The Mahāyānaviṃśikā[68] for example not only speaks of *cittamātra* (18)—something

[64] The treatment of these topics (if not the topics themselves) could suggest that this treatise may be by a later author.—On this problematic work cf. N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Bhavasaṅkrānti Sūtra and Nāgārjuna's Bhavasaṅkrānti Śāstra (Adyar, 1938).

[65] Compare MMK, Chapter xxvi.—For a Madhyamaka version of this Sūtra see V. V. Gokhale in Mahāyānasūtrasaṃgraha i (ed. P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga, 1961), pp. 107—16.

[66] Catuḥśatakaṭīkā, ya, fol. 103a2.—On the Bodhisambhāraśāstra cf. Uryūzu Ryūshin, IBK 17/2 (1969), pp. 513—9; J. W. de Jong, AM 17 (1971), p. 109.

[67] The authorship of this work available only in Kumārajīva's Chinese translation (Taishō 1521) has been questioned by A. Hirakawa, IBK 5/2 (1957), p. 504 sq. But see R. Hikata, Suvikrāntavikrāmi-Paripṛcchā Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtra (Fukuoka, 1958), pp. lii sq., lxxii sq., where the following sequence of works by Nāgārjuna is suggested: MMK, Ta-chih-tu-lun, *Bodhisambhāraśāstra, *Daśabhūmika(sūtra)-vibhāṣā. See also S. Yamaguchi, Eastern Buddhist 1 (1966), pp. 45—47.—An earlier Chinese translation of the *Daśabhūmikavibhāṣā is reported to have been made by Dharmarakṣa, who worked at Ch'ang-an between 265 and 313. According to E. Lamotte, L'enseignement de Vimalakīrti (Louvain, 1962), p. 76, this could mean that a work by Nāgārjuna reached China by the year 265, long before Kumārajīva.—On the critique of Vedic and Upaniṣadic doctrines in this work see H. Nakamura, HJAS 18 (1955), pp. 89—92.

[68] This work has been assigned to Nāgārjuna in Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's Bodhi-

a Mādhyamika might well do in the sense the expression has in the Daśabhūmikasūtra[69]—but it also denies the existence of external objects (19), a doctrine characteristic of the Vijñānavāda that does not seem to have been a tenet in the pure Madhyamaka school and which made its appearance only much later in the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis.[70] The Svabhāvatrayapraveśasiddhi,[71] the text of which is in any case closely related to Vasubandhu's Trisvabhāvanirdeśa from which it differs only in some details, can scarcely be by Nāgārjuna I (i.e. the author of the MMK) because it concerns the three *svabhāvas* of the Vijñānavāda school.[72]

The *Ekaślokaśāstra, extant in a Chinese translation by Gautama Prajñāruci (Taishō 1573), explains in a single stanza the sense of non-substantiality.[73]

Nāgārjuna is also credited with a refutation of theism *(īśvara)*.[73a]

The Akṣaraśataka although sometimes ascribed to Nāgārjuna is likely to be by Āryadeva.

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mārgadīpapañjikā (fol. 324a).—Cf. V. Bhattacharya, Mahāyānaviṃśaka of Nāgārjuna, Viśvabharati Studies, I (Calcutta, 1931); S. Yamaguchi, Eastern Buddhist 4 (1926), p. 56 sq.; (1927), p. 169 sq.; G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, I (Rome, 1956), pp. 201 sq. The work exists in two Tibetan translations, and in a Chinese one (Taishō 1576).

[69] Daśabhūmikasūtra, Chapter vi (E): *cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam;* cf. Candrakīrti, MA vi. 68 (below, p. 73).

[70] Cf. Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṃgraha, Chapter xxiii, with Kamalaśīla, Pañjikā i. 6 (p. 18).

[71] See S. Yamaguchi, Shūkyo kenkyū, 1931; L. de La Vallée Poussin, MCB 1 (1932), p. 404; 2 (1933), pp. 147—61.

[72] The fact that three (at least partly) comparable notions are found in some of the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras does not seem to stand against this estimation since the conception in these Sūtras is perhaps at the most a forerunner of the developed Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda theory of the three natures, which is reflected here in the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa. On the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtra version of the doctrine see E. Conze and S. Iida, Mélanges Louis Renou (Paris, 1968), pp. 229—42; D. Seyfort Ruegg, Théorie du *tathāgatagarbha* et du *gotra*, pp. 147—8, 325—6. See however N. Hakamaya, IBK 24/1 (1975), pp. 20—30.

[73] Translated by H. R. Rangaswami Iyengar, Mysore University Journal for Arts and Science 1 (1927), no. 2.—A Tibetan version, apparently not included in the bsTan-'gyur, is in the Stein collection in London (no. 595 of L. de La Vallée Poussin, Catalogue of the Tibetan manuscripts from Tun-huang in the India Office Library, Oxford, 1962).

[73a] The *Īśvarakartṛtvanirākṛtiḥ, Viṣṇor Ekakartṛtvanirākaraṇam included in the bsTan-'gyur, the Sanskrit text of which has been published by F. W. Thomas, JRAS 1903, pp. 345—9 and 703, and Th. Stcherbatsky, A Buddhist philosopher on monotheism, in H. C. Gupta, ed.-transl., The papers of Th. Stcherbatsky (Calcutta, 1969), pp. 1—16 (translated from the original Russian published in Zapiski vostok. otd. Imp. Rusk. Arkheol. Ob., St. Petersburg, 1904, vol. 16 no. i, pp. 058—074). See also Nāgārjuna's Shih-erh-men-lun, Chapter x; É. Lamotte, Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, i, pp. 137, 141.—Cf. H. Jacobi, Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern (Bonn, 1922), pp. 39, 63; H. Nakamura, HJAS 18 (1955), p. 84 sq.; G. Chemparathy, WZKSO 12—13 (1968—69), pp. 85—100; H. von Glasenapp, Buddhismus und Gottesidee (Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz, 1954).

## The Hymns

Another important category of works ascribed to Nāgārjuna consists of hymns *(stava)*. They are mentioned under the generic name of *saṃstuti* in the Madhyamakaśāstrastuti;[74] and in the Tibetan tradition they are known collectively as the hymnic corpus (*bstod chogs*, as opposed to the *rigs chogs* or scholastic corpus).[75]

Prajñākaramati has referred in particular to a group of four hymns, the Catuḥstava, in his Pañjikā on the Bodhicaryāvatāra (ix. 76 which quotes the Niraupamyastava, and ix. 108 which quotes the Lokātītastava). Our sources do not however make clear which of the hymns ascribed to Nāgārjuna actually make up this quartet; and they have been variously identified as the Nirupama° or Niraupamya°, Lokātīta°, Cittavajra°, and Paramārtha-stava,[76] as the Nirupama°, Lokātīta°, Acintya°, and Stutyatīta°,[77] and as the Lokātīta°, Niraupamya°, Acintya°, and Paramārtha° (this last identification follows the commentator Amṛtākara).[78]

In several of the hymns we find a positive conception of absolute reality *(paramārtha)* and a cataphatic approach to it, and these features distinguish the hymns philosophically from the apophaticism which characterizes the theoretical scholastic treatises comprising Nāgārjuna's Yukti-corpus. The Niraupamyastava speaks of the Buddha's being perceived by the faithful *(bhakta)* and those who are devoted *(lālasāḥ = mos rnams)* to the idea of the deeds accomplished by the Bodhisattva and Buddha (23). The Paramārthastava also alludes to praise bestowed with *bhakti* by the devotee on the *guru*, i.e. the *buddha* who, though beyond speech, is praised by the devotee's use of expressions belonging to ordinary linguistic usage. But in the final analysis who/what is the object of praise when all *dharma*s are in reality empty *(śūnya)?* Philosophically the Niraupamyastava is remarkable for its reference to the non-differentiation of the *dharmadhātu*, which justifies the non-differentiation of the vehicles *(yāna)* and thus establishes the One Vehicle *(ekayāna)*; the three separate *yāna*s have been taught merely as a means to introduce living beings to the teaching (21).[79] This hymn adds that the *dharmamaya kāya* is permanent *(nitya)*, stable *(dhruva)* and peaceful *(śiva)* (22). On these two points in particular the Niraupamyastava is not far removed from the theory of the absolute expounded in the doctrine of the *tathāgatagarbha* (to be found in

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[74] In his PP and Madhyamakāvatāra Candrakīrti quotes verses from the Niraupamya- and Lokātīta-stava.

[75] Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, Le Dharmadhātustava, in: Études tibétaines dédiées à la mémoire de Marcelle Lalou (Paris, 1971), p. 448 sq.

[76] L. de La Vallée Poussin, Muséon 14 (1913), pp. 1—18.

[77] P. Patel, IHQ 8 (1932), pp. 316—31, 689—705; 10 (1934), pp. 82—89.

[78] G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, i (Rome, 1956), pp. 235—7.—In his Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, iii (Louvain, 1970), p. xliii, É. Lamotte opted for La Vallée Poussin's identification.

[79] Cf. Ratnāvalī iv. 88 (referred to above, p 26).

certain Mahāyānist Sūtras and in the Ratnagotravibhāga) and the *prakṛtisthagotra* (to be found in the Prajñāpāramitā literature).

Still closer to the *tathāgatagarbha/tathāgataadhātu* theory, and even more consistently cataphatic in approach, is the Dharmadhātustava[80] which, though not included in the Catuḥstava collection, has been ascribed to Nāgārjuna both by the Buddhist traditions and by a number of modern scholars.[81] At first sight this hymn would perhaps seem to be by a later Nāgārjuna (there are indeed traces in it of ideas associated in particular with Tantrik thought); but in the present state of our knowledge the possibility cannot be altogether excluded that at least the kernel of this work is an early production of the Madhyamaka school, if not a work by Nāgārjuna I. While the Suhṛllekha (like the commentary on the Daśabhūmikasūtra) contains a reference to Amitābha, the Dharmadhātustava alludes to Amitāyus (56 sq.).[82]

## The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa

The Ta-chih-tu-lun (*Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, Taishō 1509), a most extensive treatise of encyclopaedic scope ascribed to Nāgārjuna, is formally a commentary on a large Prajñāpāramitāsūtra (the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā). Its authorship has been the subject of recent discussion, and it has been argued that it is the work not of the author of the MMK (Nāgārjuna I) but of an author (a Nāgārjuna II)—or authors—who lived in northwestern India or Kāśmīr not earlier than the beginning of the fourth century, i.e. at least a century later than Nāgārjuna I who is besides considered to have been a South Indian.[83] Remarkably, this treatise is unknown to the Indian and Tibetan traditions; and it is available only in the Chinese version made at the beginning of the fifth century by Kumārajīva, a scholar and translator from Kučā who had studied in Kāśmīr, and his Chinese collaborators.[84] It is in fact not certain exactly how much of the work we now have goes back to an Indian original, which Kumārajīva is stated by his disciple Seng-jui to have used in his work of translation, and how much of it might be the product of Central Asian (or

[80] See D. Seyfort Ruegg, Le Dharmadhātustava de Nāgārjuna, p. 448 sq.

[81] S. Schayer, OLZ 1935, col. 402, 406; C. Regamey, Three chapters from the Samādhirājasūtra (Warsaw, 1938), p. 25; K. Venkata Ramanan, Nāgārjuna's philosophy as presented in the Mahā-Prajñāpāramitā-Śāstra (Rutland and Tokyo, 1966), pp. 35, 37, 368a; R. H. Robinson, Early Mādhyamika, p. 27.

[82] Cf. Le Dharmadhātustava de Nāgārjuna, p. 468 note 103.

[83] É. Lamotte, Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, iii (Louvain, 1970), and iv (1976). See also A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism (New Delhi, 1970), p. 388—9. But J. W. de Jong, AM 17 (1971), p. 105 sq., was not convinced by all of Lamotte's arguments.

[84] On Kumārajīva (344—413 or 350—409 ?) see J. Nobel, Kumārajīva, Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philos.-hist. Kl. (Berlin, 1927), pp. 206—33; R. H. Robinson, Early Mādhyamika in India and China (Madison, 1967), p. 71 sq.; and É. Lamotte's translation of the Ta-chih-tu-lun: Le traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse (Louvain, 1944 sq.).

Serindian) scholarship in the fourth century, and also of Chinese exegetical activity at the beginning of the fifth century.[85] At all events there is much in the treatise that speaks in favour of the hypothesis of multiple or collective authorship. In addition to explaining a Prajñāpāramitāsūtra the *Upadeśa refers to a large number of other Mahāyānist Sūtras; and it quotes also the Prajñāpāramitāstotra of Rāhulabhadra, evidently a contemporary and follower of Nāgārjuna I (see below), as well as Āryadeva.[86] It constitutes furthermore a very valuable source concerning Śrāvakayānist doctrines, especially those of the Sarvāstivāda which it discusses at length; and it thus makes possible a comparison of an important current of early Mahāyānist thought and a leading school of the Śrāvakayāna.

Kumārajīva's version consists of two parts. The first, which is said to have been translated *in extenso* into Chinese, corresponds to pp. 1—34 of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā (in N. DUTT's edition) and contains 52 chapters (translated by É. LAMOTTE, Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, volumes i—v [Louvain, 1944—80], pp. 1—2371). The second part, which is presented as an abridgement of the original, contains 89 chapters (of which only Chapter xx dealing with the Bodhisattva's entry in the Mahāyāna and the seven 'common' and ten 'special' *bhūmi*s has been translated by LAMOTTE, Traité, v, pp. 2373—2445).

Especially noteworthy are the references found in the *Upadeśa to a positive theory of reality *(dharmatā, tathatā, dharmadhātu, bhūtakoṭi)*.[87]

## Some methodological and theoretical issues in Nāgārjuna's philosophy

The procedure (mentioned above, p. 9) that consists in regarding the MMK and related texts of the same category attributable to Nāgārjuna as providing the criterion for establishing the genuineness of a text and defining the earliest stage of Madhyamaka thought, however appropriate and indeed necessary it is, clearly does not finally and decisively resolve all the problems that confront the historian who attempts to establish the authenticity of a work traditionally ascribed to Nāgārjuna and to determine the characteristic features of his philosophy. Not only is it possible that Nāgārjuna's philosophy underwent development and change in the course of his life, but he might even have adopted more than one single approach to certain problems. In the works ascribed to him we in fact find both a negative theory and apophatic treatment and a positive theory and cataphatic treatment of the *paramārtha*. And we

[85] Cf. P. DEMIÉVILLE, JA 1950, p. 380 sq.; R. HIKATA, Suvikrāntavikrāmi-Paripṛcchā, p. lii sq.; LAMOTTE, Traité, iii, p. xlv sq.—In these circumstances, the fact that the Ta-chih-tu-lun quotes Rāhulabhadra or Āryadeva (see below) cannot be considered as conclusive proof that its author is a second Nāgārjuna.

[86] Whether it also refers to a chapter of Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka, as has been supposed by LAMOTTE (Traité, iii, pp. xl, 1370 note), has been discussed by DE JONG, AM 17 (1971), pp. 107—8, whose conclusion is that it does not. See now LAMOTTE, Traité iv, pp. xiii—xv.

[87] Cf. K. VENKATA RAMANAN, op. cit., pp. 16, 44—45, 251 sq.

also meet an approach (that might perhaps be compared with the *epoché*) according to which only silence—a philosophically motivated refraining from the conceptualization and verbalization that belong to the discursive level of relativity and transactional usage—is considered to correspond in the last analysis to the *paramārtha*, which is as such inconceivable and inexpressible in terms of discursivity. While no doubt related to apophaticism, this latter approach goes beyond a negative as well as a positive theory; and in the Madhyamaka it is distinguishable from apophaticism as well as cataphaticism.

The MMK and the other related theoretical scholastic treatises which do not employ such terms as *dharmadhātu*, *dharmakāya*, *tathatā*, etc. are mainly apophatic in their approach to reality. On the contrary, several of the hymns ascribed to Nāgārjuna are cataphatic in approach, mention the *dharmadhātu* and *tathatā*, and even qualify the *dharmamaya-kāya* positively. As for the 'epochistic' approach, it is exemplified in the MMK by the statements that no *dharma* was ever taught by the *buddha* to anybody anywhere (xxv. 24cd)[88] and that on the level of absolute reality designata and discursive development have come to a stop (xviii. 7 and 9; xxii. 15; xxv. 24ab), as well as in hymns such as the Paramārthastava (1—2ab, 9—10) and the Niraupamyastava (25a). This theory was fulfilled in the idea of the silence of the Ārya *(ārya-tūṣṇī[m]-bhāva)*.[89]

The negative and positive theories of absolute reality together with the apophatic and cataphatic approaches to its description have often been represented as opposed doctrines. For some Tibetan exegetes the difference between the two was indeed at the root of the opposition between the doctrine of emptiness of own being *(raṅ stoṅ)* and that of the emptiness only of heterogeneous factors that are not constitutive of the absolute *(gžan stoṅ)*. The advocates of the *gžan stoṅ* theory of an absolute that is not empty of certain constitutive factors—which they developed partly an the basis of the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine—have then connected what they hold to be the opposed and unilaterally negative theory with Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra and Prasannapadā; and they have gone so far as to describe it as nihilistic emptiness *(chad stoṅ)*.[90] However, the fact remains that works connected with both theories have been ascribed to Nāgārjuna even by the Tibetan *gžan stoṅ* tradition that contrasts them by assigning them to two distinct literary genres (the scholastic *rigs čhogs* and the hymnic *bstod čhogs*) as well as to quite different periods in

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[88] Cf. Śūnyatāsaptati 70.—In MMK xxvii. 30 it is said that Gautama taught the *dharma* for the purpose of eliminating all dogmatic views (*dṛṣṭi;* cf. xiii. 8).

[89] See Ratnāvalī i. 73 and Candrakīrti, PP i, p. 57. 8. Cf. G. M. Nagao, The silence of the Buddha, in: Studies in Indology and Buddhology (Fests. S. Yamaguchi, Kyōto, 1955), p. 137 sq.; and É. Lamotte, Traité, i, p. 30 n. 2; iv, pp. 2021—7; L'enseignement de Vimalakīrti (Louvain, 1962), pp. 109—10, 317—18.

[90] Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, The Jo naṅ pas, JAOS 83 (1963), pp. 73—91; La théorie du *tathāgatagarbha* et du *gotra* (Paris, 1969); and Le traité du *tathāgatagarbha* de Bu ston Rin chen grub (Paris, 1973), indexes s.v. *gžan stoṅ*.

Nāgārjuna's life.[91] Furthermore, it has not so far proved possible to demonstrate that a hymn such as the Niraupamyastava with its more positive theory of reality was composed by a writer different from the author of the MMK. In these circumstances it may be appropriate to consider whether the two approaches are not coordinate on the literary level (where a hymn may be contrasted with a scholastic treatise) and complementary on the philosophical and religious levels (where the two theories, though contrastive are not necessarily incompatible). This would appear to be consonant with the basic Mahāyānist theory that ultimately reality is not verbalizable and discursively conceptualizable, and that it can be known only directly and immediately, i.e. beyond *vikalpa* and *prapañca*. And it would conform with the idea that only an as it were semioticized silence could adequately correspond to reality. In sum, on the level of discursive thinking and language, the positive and negative lines of approach (comparable respectively with the *via eminentiae* and *via negativa*), though 'asymptotic', would be regarded as valid complementary approximations to reality, for which the silence of the Ārya is a still more adequate 'signifier'.[92]

Consequently, to characterize Nāgārjuna's philosophy as exclusively negativistic and his method as only apophatic on the basis of numerous statements in the MMK and other closely related treatises, to take this view as the single doctrinal standard by which the authenticity of any work ascribed to Nāgārjuna has to be judged, and to conclude that a work that does not conform to this standard cannot be by (the same) Nāgārjuna is a procedure that poses at least as many problems as it is supposed to solve. It is moreover circular inasmuch as it would attempt to settle the problem of the authenticity of a text on the basis of a doctrinal criterion which can itself, however, only be established on the basis of the entire corpus of Nāgārjuna's writings. In the present state of our knowledge it is therefore only proper to concede that we possess no

[91] Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, Le Dharmadhātustava de Nāgārjuna, p. 448 sq.

[92] Silence as refraining from verbalization and as philosophically motivated aposiopesis is not mere absence of semiosis on the pragmatic level. And it can therefore be regarded as a semiotic sign in its own right, even though it abolishes the ordinary processes of the semantic level.—It would also seem to be in some respects comparable with 'learned ignorance', the *docta ignorantia* of Nicholas Cusanus (Nicolaus of Cues). The complementarity referred to above should, however, probably not be regarded as a coincidence of opposites *(coincidentia oppositorum)* if opposed qualities are thereby thought of as converging in a supreme entity. For the Mādhyamika, reality is certainly not to be represented in terms of the third position of the *catuṣkoṭi*, where an '*x*' is conceived of as both '*A*' and '$\bar{A}$'; and he refrains from hypostatizing the *paramārtha*. Unlike Cusanus, therefore, the Mādhyamika does not develop an idea like *complicatio* in contrast to *explicatio* (though comparable ideas are perhaps latent in the Mahāyāna and were elaborated in the Sūtras and Śāstras dealing with the *tathāgatagarbha*, and then especially in the *gžan stoṅ* tradition). (In Buddhist canonical literature, silence (Pāli *tuṇhībhāva*) was a sign of consent or affirmation regularly used by the Buddha. For Vedic links between silence, the unexpressed *(anirukta)* and the *brahman*, see L. Renou, La valeur du silence dans le culte védique, JAOS 69 (1949), p. 11 sq.).

philologically decisive or doctrinally binding criterion by which to determine whether, in addition to the MMK and the treatises closely related to it, at least some of the other works ascribed to Nāgārjuna are by the author of the MMK. Accordingly, it will be preferable to speak here of texts and philosophical structures while for the time being reserving the question of the authorship of some of these works, and without seeking to represent one single body of doctrine as *the* philosophy of Nāgārjuna.

The following sketch of some salient points of philosophical interest in Nāgārjuna's thought is based mainly on the MMK, the principal theoretical work and the chief scholastic treatise of the Madhyamaka school.

On the methodological side several points deserve special mention. First, starting with Nāgārjuna the Mādhyamikas have employed a form of philosophical argument based on pointing out an eventuality or consequence *(prasaṅga)* that results from any proposition or thesis operating with the idea of the real existence of an entity *(bhāva)*, this *prasaṅga* being unacceptable to the advocate of the proposition himself. This method is used to reject and annul any and all speculative views *(dṛṣṭi)*, whatever their source, that involve the hypostatization of some entity possessing positive or even negative own being *(svabhāva)*. The Mādhyamika's *prasaṅga* reasoning is evidently not strictly speaking an apagogic proof because he does not seek to establish *a contrario* something that is the reverse of what has been rejected. And it is to be regarded as comparable with a reduction *ad absurdum*—a procedure ordinarily used to prove a proposition by deducing a contradiction from the negation of that proposition taken together with other propositions explicitly or implicity accepted—only on condition that it is clearly understood that propositions postulating the substantial own being of some entity are the opponent's exclusively, and also that the negated proposition stated by the Mādhyamika is not meant by him to express or imply a dogmatic counter-view intended to supersede the rejected proposition in a dichotomously structured set of alternatives according to the semantic principle of bivalence. At the same time the logical principle of the excluded middle is frequently evoked in Nāgārjuna's reasoning.[93]

[93] See Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā i, p. 24. 3 sq.: *niḥsvabhāvabhāvavādinā sasvabhāvabhāvavādinaḥ prasaṅga āpadyamāne kutaḥ prasaṅgaviparītārthaprasaṅgitā/ . . . satyāṃ śaktau vaktur vivakṣām anuvidhīyante/ tataś ca parapratijñāpratiṣedhamātraphalatvāt prasaṅgāpādanasya nâsti prasaṅgaviparītārthāpattiḥ/* 'When the advocate of the doctrine that entities are without own being adduces a *prasaṅga* against the advocate of the doctrine that entities have own being, how could there exist [for the former] the occurring of some thing contrary to the *prasaṅga?* . . . When they have semantic capacity [words] conform to the intention of the speaker. Therefore, because the application of the *prasaṅga* results exclusively in the negation of the opponent's thesis, there can arise nothing that is contrary to the *prasaṅga*.'

Since all views postulating anything of any kind of entity *(bhāva)* are thus excluded by the Mādhyamika, even though he is seen to have a philosophical theory (*darśana* or *vāda*) his *prasaṅga* method has therefore to be distinguished from the

What came to be known later in the Madhyamaka school as *prasajyapratiṣedha*—i.e. non-presuppositional and non-implicative absolute negation as opposed to *paryudāsapratiṣedha* or presuppositional and implicative relative negation—is accordingly of fundamental importance for the Mādhyamika because it does not commit him to maintaining the contradictory of the proposition he has negated, which he would indeed consider to be no less faulty than the one negated. This *prasajya*-negation will be discussed below in connexion with Bhāvaviveka, who appears to be the first Mādhyamika to make use of the term, and Candrakīrti. Suffice it to say here that by, for example, denying by *prasajya*-negation that an entity is produced in a certain way (see e.g. MMK i. 1 and xxi. 13) the Mādhyamika is not committed to asserting the

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indirect proof *(avīta ~ śeṣavat)* by residue *(pariśeṣa)* in which one thesis about an entity is established by eliminating all others as impossible. The *pariśeṣa* has been defined in the Nyāyabhāṣya I. i. 5 as follows: *prasaktapratiṣedhe saty anyatrâprasaṅgāc chiṣyamāṇe sampratyayaḥ*. The Mādhyamika's *prasaṅga* method thus differs also from the *vitaṇḍā* 'cavil'—defined in the Nyāyasūtra I. ii. 3 as *jalpa* or specious argument lacking the assertion of a counter-thesis *(pratipakṣasthāpanā)* in the place of the opponent's *pakṣa* being rejected—to the extent that, according at least to Vācaspatimiśra's definition in his Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā, the *vaitaṇḍika* is one who seeks to establish his own *pakṣa* by the method of residue *(pāriśeṣya)*. Following this definition, then, the *vaitaṇḍika* too has a *pakṣa* even if he does not attempt to establish it directly, but only indirectly by eliminating other *pakṣas (tasmād asti vaitaṇḍikasya pakṣaḥ, na tu parapakṣapratiṣedhād anyā sthāpanā/ tenâsya pakṣo 'sti, nâsti tu pakṣasthāpanā)*. In sum, the *prasaṅga* method as used by the Mādhyamika would differ from the *pariśeṣa-anumāna* because the latter consists in eliminating in a finite number of alternatives all the *pakṣas* belonging to opponents, the residual *pakṣa* being then maintained as one's own without it being thought necessary to establish it. But for the Mādhyamika reality (*paramārtha, tattva*, etc.) cannot be one alternative, even a residual one, in a number of alternatives since it is not an entity about which a *pakṣa* or *pratijñā* can be stated within the frame of complementary and dichotomous opposites.

Terms used in Madhyamaka literature to denote a complementarily opposed concept or category are: *pratidvandvin* (Tib. *'gran zla, 'gal zla;* see e.g. PP ii. 17, xv. 5, xvi. 4, and xx. 21), *pratibandhin* (Tib. *'gal zla;* see e.g. PP xxiii. 21), and also sometimes *pratipakṣa* (see e.g. PP ii. 14, 17, vii. 33, xiii. 7), these expressions being usually found in the course of the discussion of opponents' views. In the Ratnāvalī (i. 72 and ii. 3—4) the word *pratipakṣa* is used virtually in the same sense. —On the principle of the solidarity of complementary opposites cf. J. May, Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, p. 16 and notes 68 and 80.

It does not seem that a *prasaṅga*-type argument is to be reduced to a hypothetical syllogism in the *tollendo tollens* mode ('if $p$ then $q$; but $\bar{q}$; $\therefore \bar{p}$'); and according to the Mādhyamika no real entities actually correspond to the variables of the formula. In any event, Nāgārjuna's procedure in the case of *prasaṅga*-type reasoning does not appear to involve the use of the hypothetical syllogism. Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, JIP 5 (1977), pp. 55—56.

Concerning other early uses of the word, it is to be recalled that in the terminology of the Indian grammarians *prasaṅga* meant 'occasion, [provisional] application [of a rule].' And in scholastic usage *prasaṅga* = *prāpti* and *prasajyate* = *prāpnoti* 'occurs, applies'; cf. PP vii. 3 where *prāpta* is glossed as *prasakta*.—Cf. also D. Seyfort Ruegg, WZKS 22 (1978), p. 177 sq.

contradictory proposition that an entity is produced in the opposite way, as he would be if the negation were of the implicative *paryudāsa* kind; similarly, by denying that *nirvāṇa* is a positive entity (*bhāva*, see e.g. MMK xxv) he is not committed to asserting the contradictory proposition that it is a negative entity *(abhāva)*.[94]

Nāgārjuna's regular way of analysing and deconstructing (that is, 'emptying' or 'zeroing') any postulated entity is first to show that its substantial self-nature has been constructed and posited in terms of sets of related terms.

In the MMK we meet with binary sets such as origination/destruction *(utpāda/nirodha)*, own being/other being *(svabhāva/parabhāva)*, existence/non-existence *(bhāva/abhāva)*, conditioned/unconditioned *(saṃskṛta/asaṃskṛta)*, defining mark/defined thing *(lakṣaṇa/lakṣya)*, and identity/difference.[95] Another binary set, that of agent and action (e.g. *gantṛ* 'goer' and *gati* 'going'), may appear expanded into a ternary set, an example being the goer, the action of going (*gati* or *gamana*, i.e. *gatikriyā*), and that which is to be gone over or traversed (*gantavya* as *karman*), which can in its turn be trichotomized as (already) traversed *(gata)*, (still) untraversed *(agata)* and in process of being traversed *(gamyamāna)* (Chapter ii). A further such set is made up of a seer *(draṣṭṛ)*, seeing (*darśana*, i.e. *dṛśikriyā* 'action of seeing') and the object to be seen *(draṣṭavya)*, which can in its turn be trichotomized into the (already) seen *(dṛṣṭa)*, the (yet) unseen *(adṛṣṭa)* and what is in process of being seen (*dṛśyamāna:* see Prasannapadā iii. 3; cf. MMK, Chapter xiv). Other comparable sets are made up of the impassioned person *(rakta)*, passion *(rāga)* and the object of passion *(rañjanīya)* (Chapter vi; cf. Chapter xiv); the bound *(baddha)* person who has to be liberated and the unbound *(abaddha)* one, together with the one becoming bound (see Prasannapadā xvi. 7); and the person in error

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[94] Cf. Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā i, p. 13: *nanu ca: naiva svata utpannā ity avadhāryamāṇe parata utpannā ity aniṣṭaṃ prāpnoti/ na prāpnoti/ prasajyapratiṣedhasya vivakṣitatvāt parato 'py utpādasya pratiṣetsyamānatvāt/* This procedure is not to be understood as ignoring or rejecting the principles of non-contradiction and the excluded middle; see below, pp. 39, 41, 60, 65, 68, 79, 83n., 109.

The difference between these two forms of negation is in some respects parallel to that between weak and strong negation, although it does not seem that they can be wholly equated with these two kinds of negation in modern logic in view of the special use of *prasajya* negation in Madhyamaka thought.—In the usage of the Indian grammarians, *prasajyapratiṣedha* is verbally bound predicate or sentence negation, and *paryudāsapratiṣedha* is nominally bound term negation. The difference between *prasajya* and *paryudāsa* negation was also known to the Mīmāṃsā school. Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, JIP 5 (1977), p. 3 sq. (with bibliography).

[95] The terms used for identity and difference are: *eka(tva)/anya(tva)* (see e.g. MMK x. 1), *ananya/anya* (xiv. 7), *eka(tva)/pṛthak(tva)* (e.g. vi. 4 and xx. 20), *ekībhāva/nānābhāva* (ii. 21 cf. xviii. 10 and xxi. 10), and *tattva/anyatva* (xxii. 8, cf. xviii. 10—11). These relata can be thought of as being in a relation of cause and effect (e.g. in xx. 20).—Cf. Candrakīrti, PP iv. 8, xxii. 1 (p. 435), 5; xxvii. 6; Madhyamakāvatāra vi. 143 on *tattvānyatva*.

*(viparīta)*, the one not in error *(aviparīta)* and the one in process of entering into error *(viparyasyamāna)* (xxiii. 17–18).

Nāgārjuna shows that since these sets are made up of interrelated and hence dependent concepts or categories, no term can be posited as a real entity possessing independent and substantial *svabhāva* or 'aseity'; for the postulated *svabhāva* is by its very definition unable ontologically to exist within the above-mentioned sets of correlates. Thus goer and going are said to be neither one nor different (ii. 18); that is, they lack the postulated *svabhāva* of an entity.

The theory of emptiness of own being or non-substantiality of all entities has also been explicated by means of the negation of the positions *(koṭi)* in terms of which an entity may conceivably be posited, viz. a positive one (I), a negative one (II), a conjunction of the positive and negative ones (III), and an indeterminate one consisting in the bi-negation of both the positive and negative positions (IV).[96] Analysis by means of the negation of this fourfold set of positions is a further feature characteristic of Nāgārjuna's philosophical method. It is employed in his discussion of the absolute non-occurrence of a *bhāva* produced from itself (I), from another (II), from both itself and another (III), and from neither (i.e. without a cause; i. 1; xxi. 13), as well as in his discussion of the *tathāgata* as neither *śūnya* (I), *aśūnya* (II), both (III) and neither (IV) and of *nirvāṇa* as neither *bhāva* (I), *abhāva* (II), both (III) and neither (IV) (Chapters xxii and xxv). This mode of analysis is founded on the consideration that an entity and its qualifier can be conceptually related only in terms of these four limiting positions, which together exhaust all conceivable relationships between a subject and its predicate; at the same time these positions stand in a relation of complementarity in the frame of dichotomizing conceptualization *(vikalpa)* and discursive development *(prapañca)*, the one therefore both depending on and evoking its conceptual correlate. Now, the things in question are in fact found not to exist at all as self-existent entities since it has been shown in Nāgārjuna's analyses that severally or all together the four positions do not apply. Moreover, the negation of a proposition expressing one position does not imply the affirmation of the contrary one because the negation here is non-presuppositional absolute *prasajya*-negation, so that all four positions are annulled ('zeroed').[97]

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[96] The term *catuṣkoṭi* has not actually been employed in the MMK, Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka and Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā. In Prajñākaramati's Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā ix. 2 it is found in connexion with a quotation taken from a later Mādhyamika master (identified as Saraha).—On the uses of the *catuṣkoṭi* in the Madhyamaka and other schools of the Mahāyāna, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, JIP 5 (1977), pp. 1–71. And on the two distinct uses of the 'neither . . . nor' formula, one of which presupposes an ineffable entity in position IV whereas the other does not, see ibid., pp. 16–20.

[97] In his analyses Nāgārjuna has not in every case made use of all four positions of the *catuṣkoṭi*, and in many passages we find mention of positions I and II only. The 'tetralemma' is of course itself based in the last analysis on a binary set of two opposed terms, in conformity with the principles of contradiction and excluded

A further form of analysis in five points investigates the causal relation between two things, e.g. fire as one with its fuel (I), different from its fuel (II), possessing fuel (III), the locus of fuel (IV), and located in fuel (V) (x. 14). It is explained that the relation between fire and fuel is one of appropriator *(upādātṛ)* and appropriated *(upādāna)*, which is thus analogous to that between a self *(ātman)* as appropriator and the five psycho-physical groups that are appropriated *(upādāna-skandha*, x. 15).[98] Nāgārjuna then demonstrates that none of these five relations can obtain between the two relata so long as the latter are supposed to be entities possessing independent and substantial own being. Factors sustaining such relations since they have originated in dependence can, therefore, be shown to be without own being and empty.—As suggested by the reference to the relation appropriator/appropriated, this form of analysis in five points evidently derives from a form of analysis used in the Buddhist canon to investigate a designational entity with respect to the factors *(dharma)* on the basis of which it is imaginarily constructed. Thus the concept of an *ātman* or individual *(pudgala)*—which Buddhist thinkers have regarded as a fictional construct superimposed on the five *skandhas*—was analysed with respect to whether it is identical with the *skandhas* (I), different from the *skandhas* (II), the locus of the *skandhas* (III), located in the *skandhas* (IV), and possessing the *skandhas* (V); and in each case the relation postulated has been shown to be untenable, so that no *ātman* or *pudgala* can find a place among the *dharmas* which are accepted as the only valid and real factors for the purpose of philosophical analysis.[99]—The *vicāra* in five points has also been applied to the *tathāgata*'s relation to the *skandhas* (MMK xxii).[100]

middle; the full quaternary set is then meant to cover exhaustively all conceptually imaginable positions in which a putative entity might be postulated.—In MMK ii—and in the parallel analyses in Chapters iii and xvi as summed up in the verses in Prasannapadā iii. 3 and xvi. 7—the analysis rests only on positions I, II and IV; cf. ii. 8 and 15, with the Prasannapadā, where the principle of excluded middle is evoked (Buddhapālita evidently differs here and supposes the 'third' to correspond to position III). In xxv. 15—16 we find positions I, II and IV. Elsewhere—e.g. in i. 7, ii. 24—25, vii. 20, viii. 9—10, xxiii. 20, and xxv. 11—13—Nāgārjuna's analysis rests on positions I, II and III only. (It is to be noted that in xxvii. 17 and 27 the subject is distributed between each predicate—'partly . . . partly'—in the case of position III, and the proposition is negated by Nāgārjuna.)

In MMK xviii. 8 a fourfold set of unnegated predicates—'so' (*tathya*, the antonym of *mṛṣā* 'false' according to Candrakīrti), 'not so,' 'both so and not so,' and 'neither so nor not so'—is applied to all (conditioned) things (*sarva* = *saṃskṛtadharmas* according to Candrakīrti) in conformity with the Buddha's graded and successive teachings *(anuśāsana)*. And in MMK xviii. 6 the question of an *ātman* is taken up under the unnegated positions I, II and IV. But in neither case is Nāgārjuna stating a view held by the Madhyamaka school; on the interpretation of these two passages see D. Seyfort Ruegg, JIP 5 (1977), pp. 5—9, 37—39.

[98] Cf. Prasannapadā xxvii. 26.

[99] See MMK xvi. 2 on the *pudgala* in relation to the *skandhas* (and xxiii. 5 on the *kliṣṭa* in relation to the *kleśas*). Only identity and difference between an *ātman* and the *skandhas* are considered in xviii. 1.

A difference between these modes of fivefold analysis lies in the fact that the first

A close examination of language and its categories thus reveals the groundlessness and untenability of the conventional notions of an entity possessing a *svabhāva* and existing in a nexus of conceptual construction or causality. All things are in fact ultimately non-substantial *(niḥsvabhāva)* and empty of own being *(svabhāvaśūnya)*.

When it appears from Nāgārjuna's discussion that he considers that no thing is to be posited in terms either of the above-mentioned binary, ternary or quinary sets of relations or of the four positions—in short, that no entity possessing a *svabhāva* of any kind is to be postulated—there can be no ground for supposing that he has either neglected or rejected the principle of the excluded middle in 'classical' two-valued logic by positing an '$x$' that is neither '$A$' nor '$\bar{A}$'. Nor is there then any reason to feel the need to suggest that as a rational thinker he was using some kind of three-valued logic;[101] for in the MMK and his related treatises Nāgārjuna has carefully refrained from postulating the existence of an indeterminate value for a real entity.[102]

Also, in his analysis and criticism of concepts and categories, Nāgārjuna's reasoning is clearly based on the principles of contradiction and exclusion.[103]

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mentioned mode concerns two causally related entities (fire and fuel, for example) which have the same ontological and epistemological status, whereas the following mode relates to a designational entity (*ātman* or *pudgala*) imaginarily constructed on the basis of *dharmas*, viz. the five *skandhas* which possess an accepted validity in the Buddhist tradition, even though the Mādhyamika does not allow them ultimate reality. It seems likely that the latter served as a model for the application of the fivefold analysis to the relationship between *dharmas* on the same level, and basically it goes back to the canon; see e.g. Saṃyuttanikāya iii, p. 44, and iv, p. 287 on the fourfold investigation (i.e. *rūpam* [or: *vedanām . . . viññāṇam*] *attato samanupassati, rūpavantaṃ vā attānam, attani vā rūpaṃ, rūpasmiṃ vā attānam*). (Like the canonical passage just mentioned, the Mahāvyutpatti § 209 also enumerates four rather than five points).—On the twenty forms of *satkāyadṛṣṭi* eliminated by this form of analysis, see Candrakīrti, Madhyamakāvatāra vi. 144.—Concerning the total of five rather than four, it is reached by that mode of counting which enumerates a covering item in addition to the items included under it. That is, we have basically the two items of identity and difference (see MMK xxii. 8 and xviii. 1), with difference then subdivided into three items; and the total can be regarded as consisting in five or four items according to whether the covering item (difference) is counted separately or not.

[100] The word *tathāgata* is in this context interpreted as referring to the *buddha* (MMK xxii. 15) or *bhagavant* after *nirodha* (i.e. in *nirvāṇa*) (xxv. 17). (Elsewhere however, e.g. in the context of the *avyākṛtavastus*, *tathāgata* can refer to any individual. Compare Candrakīrti's PP xxii. 1, where mention is made also of *ātman*).

[101] Cf. for example F. STAAL, Exploring mysticism (Berkeley, 1975), p. 39 sq.

[102] For the principle of excluded middle, see e.g. MMK ii. 8, 15 (cf. xvi. 8, xxi. 14 and xxv. 15—16); Śūnyatāsaptati 72. See also Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā v. 6, xv. 7 and xxiii. 14.

Concerning the special use of a formula corresponding to the (unnegated) fourth *koṭi*—namely the 'neither . . . nor' formula—in connexion with ultimate reality which is no entity of any kind (e.g. in MMK xxv. 10, where *nirvāṇa* is said to be neither entity nor absence of entity), see our discussion in JIP 5 (1977), pp. 16—20.

[103] See e.g. MMK v. 6, vii. 30, viii. 7, xxi. 10, and xxv. 14. Cf. MMK xxvii. 22 and

In view of his radical critique of conceptual entities and categories as grounded in the discursivity of thinking and language, and because of his method of argument based on *prasaṅga*-reasoning which points out the untenability of a view without implicitly postulating the counter-view, Nāgārjuna's theory in his scholastic works can no doubt be properly described as largely negative, as already observed above. But this carefully worked out *via negativa* is not nihilistic, nihilism being the extreme of the *ucchedavāda* which Nāgārjuna and his followers have avoided as strictly as its opposite, the eternalist extreme of the *śāśvatavāda*. Nor can his procedure be dismissed as mere sophistry, hair-splitting and fault-finding contentiousness. Its rationale lies on the one hand in a philosophically elaborated theory of the non-substantiality of any entity posited in the dichotomous structure of discursive thinking and language, and on the other hand in the principle that ultimate reality *(tattva)* cannot be expressed or conceived in the frame of *vikalpa* and *prapañca* (xviii. 9). For the same reasons Nāgārjuna's procedure cannot be described as anti-philosophical even if he maintains no propositional thesis *(pratijñā)* intended to establish a speculative metaphysical system.

Of fundamental importance in Nāgārjuna's philosophy are the two truth-levels, that of worldly surface-convention *(lokasaṃvṛti)* and that which is true ultimately (*satyaṃ paramārthataḥ*, xxiv. 8). The latter is of course the sole truth, corresponding as it does to reality *(tattva)* characterized as still *(śānta)*, without discursive development and free from dichotomizing conceptualization and multiplicity (xviii. 9; cf. xxv. 24). Yet the relative level is not simply to be dispensed with, for it is on the basis of transactional usage *(vyavahāra)* that the *paramārtha* is indicated *(deśyate;* xxiv. 10); in order to penetrate the profundity of the teaching, therefore, one must understand the distinction between the two *satyas* (xxiv. 9). The proper use of *vyavahāra* indeed makes it possible to deal with the factors of relative existence and philosophical analysis, such as the four truths (*āryasatya*, xxiv. 1–3), the three jewels of the *buddha*, *dharma* and *saṃgha*, and the eight kinds of persons who cultivate the path (xxiv. 4–5 a b), all of which are recognized by the Buddhist tradition. It would be altogether mistaken to suppose that *śūnyatā* destroys *(pratibādh-)* these factors along with the existence of karmic fruits, *dharma* and *adharma*, and the totality of worldly usages (xxiv. 5 c d–6).[104] And since *śūnyatā* could harm an unintelligent person who has incorrectly grasped it (xxiv. 11),[105] in order not to be ruined one must understand *śūnyatā* according to the principle of dependent origina-

25; Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā i. 7, xv. 7, and xviii. 6; D. Seyfort Ruegg, JIP 5 (1977), pp. 18, 48–49, 54–55.

[104] The unconditioned *(asaṃskṛta)* as well as the conditioned *dharmas* and factors belonging to the surface level of transactional usage are accordingly not without a certain 'as if' validity, although they are in reality *(paramārthataḥ)* all without own being (cf. H. Vaihinger's 'Als ob' theory of fictions). This does not involve a rejection of *saṃvṛti* and *vyavahāra*: the phenomena are indeed 'saved.'

[105] Cf. Ratnāvalī ii. 20–22.

tion and non-substantiality in its non-nihilistic sense along with the motive *(prayojana)* determining the teaching of emptiness (i.e. the stilling of all discursive development, according to Candrakīrti) (xxiv. 7).

Nāgārjuna's philosophy is conceived with the purpose of revealing the convergence of *śūnyatā*, *pratītyamutpāda* and the Middle Way *(madhyamā pratipat)*.[106]

As set out in the MMK, the idea of origination in conditioned dependence *(pratītyasamutpāda)* is two-faceted since it evidently relates to both truth-levels, that of the surface *(saṃvṛti)* and transactional usage *(vyavahāra)* and that of ultimate reality *(paramārtha)*. Inasmuch as origination in dependence embraces all the conditioned factors of the world, it clearly pertains to the transactional level of surface truth.[107] Now, since whatever *dharma* originates in dependence on another is neither identical with it nor different from it (xviii. 10), it might be said that for Nāgārjuna this level is both unamenable to ontological construction and antinomic—and perhaps even that it is characterized by causal indeterminism.[108] *Pratītyasamutpāda* does not then imply, as it did for the Ābhidhārmikas whom Nāgārjuna criticizes, that a *dharma* defined as a factor bearing its own specific characteristic *(svalakṣaṇa)* is born from other such *dharmas* known as its cause(s) and condition(s).[109] Rather, it refers to interdependent *dharmas* in a field of conditionship which have transactional validity on the surface level, but whose nature consists precisely in being non-substantial and hence empty of own being in virtue of the fact of their dependent origination: they are as it were ciphers having no independent ontological status as positive, negative, both positive and negative, or indeterminate entities.

What arises in conditioned dependence is therefore in the last analysis still 'by nature' (*śāntaṃ svabhāvataḥ*, vii. 16). Now, looked at in this manner, *pratītyasamutpāda* pertains to the fact or truth of dependent origination, i.e. to the reality of all conditioned *dharmas*. And as the true state of affairs concerning these *dharmas*, which are thus empty of own being, *pratītyasamutpāda*

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[106] MMK xxiv. 18, and Vigrahavyāvartanī 22 with Vṛtti on 70. Cf. MMK xxiv. 36, and Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā xxiv. 40.

[107] Cf. Candrakīrti's expressions *sāṃvṛta-pratītyasamutpāda* (PP i, p. 10—11) and *laukika-tattvalakṣaṇa* (PP xviii. 10).

[108] See Candrakīrti's remarks in PP i, pp. 9, 26, and Madhyamakāvatāra vi (discussed below, pp. 72—78). This indeterminism is referred to by Nāgārjuna as 'stillness by nature' in MMK vii. 16 quoted below (compare the expressions *prakṛtiśānta* and *prakṛtivivikta*). Compare also Ratnāvalī i. 47, where it is stated that production (*utpatti*, i.e. of a *bhāva*) is understood neither in terms of reality *(tattvatas)* nor even in terms of designation *(prajñapti)*.

[109] Cf. Candrakīrti, PP xv. 2 (p. 261. 6) on the *sāṃvṛta-svarūpa* of the Abhidharma. —For the definition of a *dharma* as bearing a specific characteristic *(svalakṣaṇa-dhāraṇa)*, see Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya i. 2 (ed. Pradhan, p. 2. 9). In the Abhidharma, *dharmas* are regularly determined with reference to their characteristic natures.

may then be termed emptiness (*śūnyatā*, xxiv. 18).[110] In the introductory verses to the MMK the *pratītyasamutpāda* is moreover described as not annihilated and not eternal, undestroyed and unborn (just like *nirvāṇa* in xxv. 3), and as without multiplicity and tranquil (just like ultimate reality, *tattva*, in xviii. 9).

The complexity of the idea of *pratītyasamutpāda* is further brought out when Nāgārjuna states that he who recognizes it sees not only the characteristic feature and the conditioned processes of the world—viz. 'suffering' *(duḥkha)*[111] and origination *(samudaya)* respectively, i.e. the first two *āryasatya*s—but also unconditioned cessation *(nirodha)*, the third truth, and the path *(mārga)*, the fourth truth that as it were leads from the first two truths to the third (cf. xxiv. 40).

It would seem that the above-mentioned ambivalence of origination in dependence as pertaining either to the dependently produced conditioned factors *(pratītyasamutpannā dharmāḥ)* or to the fact (or truth) of dependent origination *(pratītyasamutpāda)* is paralleled in the terminology used to express the theory of emptiness. Thus, as already noted, the term *śūnya* 'empty' is an epithet of all *dharma*s; and *śūnyatva* is then the state or property of emptiness of all *dharma*s.[112] On the other hand, the term *śūnyatā* tends to be reserved for this fact or true state of affairs; and it is accordingly a term that

[110] The two aspects of *pratītyasamutpāda* might perhaps be clarified by saying that as including (extensionally) all conditioned factors originating in dependence *(pratītyasamutpanna)* whose nature is to be empty *(: śūnyatva)*, *pratītyasamutpāda* belongs to the *saṃvṛti* level. But as the fact or true state of affairs of dependent origination that relates (intensionally) to all conditioned factors, *pratītyasamutpāda* concerns the ultimate reality or truth of their emptiness *(śūnyatā)*; and it accordingly pertains to *paramārtha* (cf. PP vii. 15, p. 159. 6). (Because the *asaṃskṛta*, which is *pāramārthika*, is also *svabhāvaśūnya*, *śūnya* and *saṃskṛta* are of course not coterminous). Since *pratītyasamutpāda* thus pertains, in the one way or the other, to both the *sāṃvṛta* and *pāramārthika* levels, it is equivalent in its range to *śūnyatā*. The two terms are not exact synonyms, however, and they have distinct spheres of use even if essentially they have a common (nominalistic) reference *(upādāya prajñaptiḥ)*.—Compare the old controversy as to whether *pratītyasamutpāda* is *saṃskṛta* or *asaṃskṛta*. See also Abhidharmakośabhāṣya iii. 28. The old canon already attests the application of the term *dharmatā* to the principle of *pratītyasamutpāda* comprising the twelve members of origination in dependence; see Saṃyuttanikāya ii, pp. 25—26, and Nidānasaṃyukta (ed. C. Tripathi, Berlin, 1962), pp. 147—9, 164 (cf. Candrakīrti, PP i, p. 39—40), where this description is found with the key formula ... *utpādād vā tathāgatānaṃ anutpādād vā sthitā eveyaṃ dharmatā dharmasthitaye dhātuḥ*. Then in the Daśabhūmikasūtra (8 G = p. 136) this *dharmatā* is described as *sarvadharmaśūnyatā* (and *sarvadharmānupalabdhi*). The meaning of the word *dharmatā* has of course developed during the history of Buddhist thought, and it is in the Mahāyāna that the link between *śūnyatā* and *dharmatā* has been worked out; but the connexion between *pratītyasamutpāda* and *śūnyatā* is found already e.g. in the Nidānasaṃyukta, p. 153.

[111] Cf. PP xxiv. 1.

[112] See e.g. MMK xxvii. 29; Vigrahavyāvartanī 21—22, 57, 59, 61 with Vṛtti.—'Empty' is of course not to be understood here as the complementary opposite of 'not empty' in the binary set *śūnya/aśūnya* (see MMK xiii. 7; cf. vii. 33 on *saṃskṛta/asaṃskṛta* as a dichotomous pair).

relates to the *paramārtha* (although as a name it belongs, like any designation, to the transactional surface-level of *saṃvṛti*).[113]

The twin principles of *pratītyasamutpāda* and *śūnyatā* thus found a philosophical Middle Way that eschews both the extremes of annihilationism *(ucchedavāda)* and eternalism *(śāśvatavāda)*. The Madhyamaka takes account of 'phenomena'—the manifoldness of *dharmas* on the *saṃvṛti* level—and reality—the *paramārtha*—while refraining from presenting them as opposed factors. And instead of postulating either a pluralism of entities or a single monistic entity it operates with the principle of non-duality.

What has been tentatively referred to above as the causal indeterminism of the factors within the process to which the truth of *pratītyasamutpāda* applies is inseparable from *śūnyatā* both as emptiness of own being making everything possible[114] and as release from (or: expeller of) all speculative dogmatic views (xiii. 8). And the 'stillness' in question is characteristic of both *paramārtha* (gnoseologically speaking) and *nirvāṇa* (soteriologically speaking).

Both gnoseological and soteriological aspects are combined also in *pratītyasamutpāda* because, when ignorance (*avidyā* 'misknowledge', the first of the twelve members of origination in dependence) has come to a stop, there is no more possibility for the conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*, the second member of this set) to arise (xxiii. 23). This stoppage of *avidyā* is achieved through gnosis *(jñāna)*, as a result of meditative realization (of *pratītyasamutpāda*) (xxvi. 11).

Cessation of origination or birth may be said to result, according to Nāgārjuna, also from the cessation of the notions of self *(ahaṃ[kāra])* and everything belonging to self *(mama)* which lead to appropriative clinging (*upādāna*, xviii. 3–4). Release thus follows from the cessation of action *(karman)* and the defilements *(kleśa)* issuing from dichotomizing conceptualization *(vikalpa)*,

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[113] In the Vigrahavyāvartanī-Vṛtti 22, *pratītyasamutpannatva* is given as the reason for a thing's having no own being *(niḥsvabhāva)*, which in turn is given as the reason for a thing's being empty *(śūnya)* in VV-Vṛtti 21. In Prasannapadā xxvii. 29, Candrakīrti has given *pratītyasamutpannatva* as the reason for *śūnyatva;* cf. xxiv. 19 (p. 505. 16) on *pratītyasamutpanna* and *śūnya*.—Concerning the difference in use between *śūnyatā* and *śūnya(tva)*, it is true that inconsistencies are encountered in our texts, where Skt. *śūnya* has on occasion been translated by Tib. *stoṅ pa ñid* instead of *stoṅ pa* (examples are to be found in PP xxiv. 1, p. 475. 6, 8; conversely, in the Sanskrit text of PP xxiii. 13 [p. 461. 15–16] we find *svabhāvaśūnyatva* where the Tibetan has *raṅ bžin gyis stoṅ pa*). And it is also true that the situation is further complicated by the fact that Tib. *stoṅ pa ñid* renders both *śūnyatā* and *śūnyatva*. Yet, as a rule, the Tibetan exegetes have distinguished between *śūnya* = *stoṅ pa* as an adjective modifying all *dharmas (chos)*, and *stoṅ pa ñid* (= *śūnyatā*). (In a case where the Madhyāntavibhāga i. 13 refers to *śūnya* when *śūnyatā* is the topic in question, Sthiramati explains in his commentary that the suffix of state *[bhāvapratyaya]* has been 'elided' *[lupta] metri causa*). According to the Prajñāpāramitā literature and the Madhyamaka, *śūnyatā* is itself empty of own being (and Sthiramati has pointed out in the same place that *śūnyatā* is no more different from what is empty than are *duḥkhatā* from what is painful or *anityatā* from what is impermanent, for it is the *dharmatā* of *dharmas*).

[114] MMK xxiv. 14 and Vigrahavyāvartanī 70; cf. MMK xxiv. 36.

which in its turn proceeds from discursive development *(prapañca)*. *Prapañca* itself comes to a stop in *śūnyatā*.[115] Release is, however, not to be reified as one term in a binary set made up of bondage/release; for *bandhana/mokṣa* belongs—like *śūnya/aśūnya*, *saṃskṛta/asaṃskṛta* or any other set of dichotomously opposed complementary concepts or categories—to the realm of *vikalpa*.

On the level of *paramārtha*, there is neither superaddition of *nirvāṇa* nor removal of *saṃsāra* as opposed entities (xvi. 10). Furthermore, the state of continuous interrelated and dependent coming-and-going *(ājavaṃjavībhāva*, in the round of existences) comes, once stoppage of such interrelatedness and dependence is achieved, to be designated as *nirvāṇa* (xxv. 9). In this way there is really no differentiating property[116] between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa;* and there is no difference, however subtle, between a terminal limit of *nirvāṇa* and a terminal limit of *saṃsāra* (xxv. 19–20).[117] Similarly, the *tathāgata* and the world of living beings *(jagat)* have the same 'nature' *(svabhāva)*, i.e. both are precisely without own being (*niḥsvabhāva*, xxii. 16). *Nirvāṇa*—which as already observed is not an entity to be posited in terms of the four positions (xxv. 4)—is also said to be free from elimination and acquisition, and to be undestroyed and non-eternal, neither stopped nor produced (xxv. 3), so that it has been 'defined' in much the same way as the *pratītyasamutpāda* in the introductory verses to the MMK.

The characteristic of reality *(tattva-lakṣaṇa)* is then to be free from dichotomizing conceptualization and, accordingly, to be without multiplicity, still and undeveloped in discursive development (xviii. 9; cf. xxii. 15 and xxv. 24). On this point too Nāgārjuna's soteriology is closely linked with gnoseology. Reality, the level of *paramārtha* which is simply shown—and as it were plotted through philosophical analysis of the 'zeroed' *dharmas*—is never hypostatized as an entity of any kind whatsoever.

As noted above, terms to designate reality such as *dharmadhātu*, *dharmakāya* and *tathatā* employed elsewhere in the Mahāyānist literature of the Sūtras and Śāstras, including even some works connected with the Madhyamaka school, do not occur in the MMK. To indicate reality Nāgārjuna has there confined himself—apart from the well-established words *nirvāṇa* and *śūnyatā*—to the terms *paramārtha* (xxiv. 8, 10), *tattva* (xviii. 9 and xxiv. 9) and *dharmatā*

[115] *śūnyatāyām*, MMK xviii. 5. (There is the variant *stoṅ pa ñid kyis* = *śūnyatayā* 'by emptiness'). Candrakīrti here explains *prapañca* in terms of objectification *(upalambha)* of a *vastu* (PP xviii. 5, p. 350. 18); cf. PP xxii. 15 *(vastunibandhanā hi prapañcāḥ)*, xxv. 24 (where *prapañca* is glossed as *nimitta*), xviii. 5 (p. 350. 15), and i, p. 11. 6 (where *prapañca* is said to have the characteristic of a designatum, etc.: *abhidheyādilakṣaṇa*). In MMK xxv. 24 *upalambhopaśama* and *prapañcopaśama* figure side by side. But in PP xviii. 9 (p. 373. 9) *prapañca* is said to be *vāc*, which 'develops' *arthas;* and what is undeveloped in discursive development is unexpressed by words *(prapañcair aprapañcitaṃ vāgbhir avyāhṛtam)*.

[116] *viśeṣaṇa* (Tib. *khyad par*) = *viśeṣa* 'difference' according to Candrakīrti.

[117] Candrakīrti speaks of the imaginary construction of a prior and posterior limit *(pūrvāparakoṭikalpanā)*, which is in fact impossible (PP xxv. 21 *avataraṇikā;* cf. xi. 1).

(xviii. 7).[118] To be recalled here also is Nāgārjuna's rejection of an *asaṃskṛta* opposed within dichotomizing conceptualization to the *saṃskṛta* (vii. 33), of a *śūnya* opposed to the *aśūnya* (xiii. 7), and even of absence of defilement opposed to the state of defilement (cf. xxiii. 25).

The philosophy of the MMK and the related treatises differs from that of the Ābhidhārmikas in that Nāgārjuna moved from the taxonomic and constructive inventorization of a plurality of *dharmas* conceived of as individually specifiable and analytically independent entities, with causal laws connecting them, to a theory of *dharmas* operating as non-substantial factors arising in the functional interdependence of conditionship. This theory is described by Nāgārjuna in terms of dependent origination, absence of own being and emptiness. Unlike that of so many other philosophers, Nāgārjuna's philosophical theory is not made up basically of a system of propositional judgements with accompanying categorical and hypothetical syllogisms; and it takes on not only a dialectical but a structural character, its terms being conceptually, logically and linguistically interrelated—but nevertheless metaphysically non-substantial—*dharmas*. The name of the basic principle of the theory—*śūnyatā*—is itself non-referential, for Nāgārjuna refrains from positing an absolute in the frame of any conceptual position that would involve its hypostatization as a positive, negative or indeterminate entity.

Nāgārjuna was thus engaged in a radical rethinking of the philosophical endeavour, that is, of the very idea of philosophy and the terms in which it is to be pursued. And by turning away from the construction of a speculative doctrine involving the postulation of entities having some kind of self-nature he clearly sought to keep strictly to the Middle Way indicated by the Buddha in the only manner he found commensurate with it.

It was left to Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika successors to elaborate his philosophy and pursue in particular the refutation of the speculative views and dogmas of both non-Buddhist and Buddhist philosophers (his pupil Āryadeva was especially renowned for excelling in this task), and then to apply their master's theory by undertaking the systematization of Madhyamaka philosophy in its three main schools (those of Bhāvaviveka, Buddhapālita/Candrakīrti and Śāntarakṣita).

*Commentaries on Nāgārjuna's works*

Commentaries on Nāgārjuna's theoretical scholastic works, and in particular on the MMK, are numerous. The *Akutobhayā was traditionally regarded as

[118] The terms *dharmadhātu* and *tathatā* do appear in Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā, in quotations and discussions of Mahāyānist doctrine. On the usage of the hymns ascribed to Nāgārjuna see above. (On the absence of *dharmakāya* and *dharmadhātu* in early Chinese versions of the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtra see L. LANCASTER, Eastern Buddhist 8 [1975], p. 36 sq. And on the usage of the MMK see R. H. ROBINSON, Early Mādhyamika, p. 63.)

Nāgārjuna's own commentary on his MMK;[119] but for some time this ascription has been questioned.[120] It has been observed that a close connexion exists between this work and Āryadeva.[121] It has also been suggested that it is related to the commentary, available only in Chinese (Taishō 1564), attributed to a certain Ch'ing-mu[122], an Indian master who was known in addition by a name that appears in Chinese transcription as Pin-lo-chieh but whose identity remains to be elucidated.[123] This Pin-lo-chieh has even been identified with Āryadeva.[124] At all events both the *Akutobhayā and Ch'ing-mu's commentary show familiarity with Āryadeva's work. Ch'ing-mu has also sometimes been credited with the commentary preserved in Chinese on Nāgārjuna's Shih-erh-men-lun, a work otherwise ascribed to Nāgārjuna himself.[125]

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[119] A German translation of this work was published by M. Walleser, Die mittlere Lehre des Nāgārjuna, nach der tibetanischen Version übertragen (Die buddhistische Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, 2. Teil, Heidelber, 1911).

[120] Because the *Akutobhayā (chapter xxvii, fol. 113a2) quotes a verse *(ñan pa po daṅ mñan bya daṅ/ /smra po 'byuṅ ba šin tu dkon/ /de phyir mdor na 'khor ba ni/ /mtha' yod ma yin mtha' med min//)* that is found in Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka (vii. 5). (Cf. mKhas·grub·dGe·legs·dpal·bzaṅ, sToṅ·thun·chen·mo, fol. 37b—38a; E. Obermiller, AO 11 [1933], p. 4 note 9.) The lDan·dkar·ma Catalogue lists the *Akutobhayā after both Bhāvaviveka's and Buddhapālita's commentaries on the MMK. Moreover, the main earlier Indian commentaries—Buddhapālita's Vṛtti, Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa and Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā—do not appear to mention the *Akutobhayā. (At the same time, there exist numerous similitarities between the Tibetan version of the commentary of Buddhapālita on the MMK and the *Akutobhayā). On the relation of the *Akutobhayā to the Chung-lun and references to it in the Chinese tradition, see M. Walleser, Die mittlere Lehre des Nāgārjuna nach der chinesischen Version übertragen, Die buddhistische Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, 3. Teil (Heidelberg, 1912), p. ix sq. On its authenticity see also C. Ikeda, Anesaki Commemoration Volume (Tokyo, 1934), pp. 291—3.

[121] See J. W. de Jong, AM 17 (1971), p. 109.

[122] Cf. É. Lamotte, Traité, iii, p. 1373; J. W. de Jong, loc. cit.—A German translation of this work was published by M. Walleser, Die mittlere Lehre des Nāgārjuna, Die buddhistische Philosophie (see above, n. 120), 3. Teil (Heidelberg, 1912). Cf. R. A. Gard, IBK 3/1 (1954), pp. 376—370.

[123] The Chinese transcription Pin-lo-chieh has been interpreted as Piṅgalākṣa (= Piṅgalanetra, Piṅgalacakṣus); see É. Lamotte, Traité, iii, p. 1373. Ch'ing-mu would correspond in meaning to something like Nīlanetra.— Cf. R. H. Robinson, Early Mādhyamika, p. 29, who gives Vimalākṣa; N. Péri, BEFEO 1911, p. 366 note; M. Walleser, Die mittlere Lehre, 3. Teil, p. x sq. (It may be noted that a Piṅgala of the Brahmanical tradition, the supposed author of the Chandaḥsūtra, was regarded as a *nāgarāja;* cf. A. Weber, Indische Studien [Berlin, 1863], p. 157 sq.).

[124] É. Lamotte, Traité, iii, pp. xxxix, 1373. Cf. P. Demiéville in L. Renou et J. Filliozat, L'Inde classique, ii (Paris, 1953), § 2137. 1. The identity of Āryadeva and Ch'ing-mu was rejected by G. Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist texts on logic (Baroda, 1929), p. xvii.

[125] Cf. R. A. Gard, IBK 2/2 (1954), pp. 747—742; P. Demiéville, op. cit., § 2137. 2; N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Visvabharati Annals 6 (1954), p. 166.

For the developed Madhyamaka school in its two main classical branches the commentaries on the MMK by Buddhapālita and his follower Candrakīrti and the one by Bhāvaviveka are of fundamental importance (see below).

It is to be noted that among the earlier commentaries on Nāgārjuna's writings there are some by important masters of the Yogācārin/Vijñānavādin school. A portion of a commentary ascribed to Asaṅga on the beginning of the MMK is preserved in Chinese (Taishō 1565, translated in 543); it refers to Rāhulabhadra and comments also on the preliminary stanzas to the MMK concerned with the eight negative epithets applied to *pratītyasamutpāda.*[126] A commentary by Sthiramati is also preserved in Chinese (Taishō 1567, translated about 1000); it evidently knows Bhāvaviveka's commentary on the MMK.[127] In addition, a commentary by Sthiramati's master Guṇamati which is no longer extant is known to tradition; it seems to have been known to Bhāvaviveka. The existence of such commentaries on the MMK by leading authorities of the Vijñānavāda clearly indicates that Nāgārjuna's work was not considered to be the exclusive property of the Mādhyamikas in the narrow sense of a particular school, and that it was regarded as fundamental by Mahāyānist thinkers of more than one tendency.

Commentaries on the MMK are also reported to have been composed by Devaśarman,[128] Guṇaśrī[129] and Rāhula(bhadra).[130]

There are commentaries on the Śūnyatāsaptati and the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā by Candrakīrti, one by Ajitamitra on the Ratnāvalī (above, p. 24), one by Mahāmati on the Suhṛllekha (above, p. 26), and one by a certain Maitreyanātha on the Bhavasaṃkrānti (above, p. 29).

On the hymns ascribed to Nāgārjuna, although some of them are referred to and quoted for example by Candrakīrti, the only commentary available in Sanskrit is one by Amṛtākara on the Lokātīta°, the Niraupamya°, the Acintya° and the Paramārtha-stava.[131]

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[126] Cf. P. Demiéville, L'Inde classique, § 2138.

[127] Cf. H. Nakamura, Journal of Intercultural Studies no. 4 (1977), p. 79—80; Y. Kajiyama, WZKSO 12—13 (1968), p. 198. (The Taishō edition contains only Chapters i—xiii).

[128] Devaśarman is referred to by Avalokitavrata in his Ṭīkā on Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa, chapter i (wa, fol. 225a—226b), where the title of his commentary is given as dKar·po·'char·ba.

[129] He is referred to by Avalokitavrata, op. cit., fol. 85a.—For a list of eight commentaries—those of Nāgārjuna himself (i.e. the*Akutobhayā), Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti, Devaśarman, Guṇaśrī, Guṇamati, Sthiramati, and Bhāvaviveka—see the colophon to the *Akutobhayā (fol. 114a). (In his Bodhimārgadīpapañjikā, fol. 324b, Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna has substituted a commentary by Guṇadatta for Devaśarman's, which he stated is on the Prajñāpradīpa of Bhavya).

[130] His commentary is said to have been translated into Chinese by Paramārtha (500—569); see É. Lamotte, Traité, iii, p. 1374.

[131] See G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, i (Rome, 1956), pp. 235—46.

*Āryadeva*

The master usually considered to be next in importance after Nāgārjuna in the early undivided Madhyamaka school is Āryadeva, whom the sources represent as a direct disciple of Nāgārjuna.[132] He was especially famed for his skill in argument, notably against the representatives of schools such as the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika concerning whose doctrines at this time his work provides important information.[133]

According to Candrakīrti, Āryadeva was born in the 'island' *(gliṅ)* of Siṅgala (Siṃhaladvīpa) as the son of a king; but he renounced his station as prince, left the world and came to South India where he attended on Nāgārjuna as his master.[134] This Siṃhaladvīpa has often been identified with Śrī Laṅkā[135]—a location which has been considered confirmed by references in the Dīpavaṃsa (xxii. 41 and 50) and Mahāvaṃsa (xxxvi. 29) to a certain Deva, whom these sources place in the second half of the third century when the Vetullavāda was wide-spread in Śrī Laṅkā; but this identification has been put in question.[136]

The commentary on the Madhyamakaśāstra ascribed to Pin-lo-chieh has, as already mentioned, been considered an authentic work by Āryadeva since Piṅgala appears as an epithet of his.[137] But this attribution has been questioned.[138]

Āryadeva has traditionally been credited with the authorship of the Śata(ka)-śāstra (Pai/Po-lun) extant only in Kumārajīva's Chinese translation of the early fifth century (Taishō 1569).[139] The problem of the connexion between this work and the Catuḥśataka (available in Sanskrit fragments and in a Tibetan

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[132] Āryadeva is said to have been known also under the names Kāṇadeva, Nīlanetra, Piṅgalanetra, etc. (cf. É. Lamotte, Traité, iii, p. 1373 note; above, p. 48). As for his date, it has to be determined in relation to Nāgārjuna's, whose direct disciple he is considered to be. There is a quotation from Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka (ii. 8) in Chapter cv of Harivarman's Tattva/Satyasiddhiśāstra (cf. the Sanskrit translation by N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Baroda, 1975, p. 252).

[133] See M. Honda, IBK 23/1 (1974), pp. 7—12, and E. Frauwallner, WZKSO 2 (1958), p. 131 for the Sāṃkhya; G. Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist texts on logic, pp. xiv—xxx for the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya.

[134] Candrakīrti, Catuḥśataka-ṭīkā, fol. 34b. Cf. T. Watters, On Yuan Chwang's travels in India (London, 1904—5), i, p. 320—1; ii, p. 200sq.

[135] É. Lamotte, Traité, iii, p. 1373 note. Cf. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva (Calcutta, 1931), p. xix.

[136] See N. Dutt, IHQ 10 (1934), pp. 137—42, who places Siṃhapura in Northwest India. P. S. Sastri, IHQ 31 (1955), p. 196 sq., takes Andhra to be Āryadeva's birthplace.

[137] É. Lamotte, Traité, iii, p. 1373.

[138] See J. W. de Jong, AM 17 (1971), p. 109.

[139] For the Śata(ka)śāstra see G. Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist texts on logic (Baroda, 1929), p. xiii sq. Cf. G. Tucci, La versione cinese del Catuḥśataka di Āryadeva confrontata col testo sanscrito e la traduzione tibetana, RSO 10 (1923), pp. 522.—This text seems to be listed in the lDan·dkar·ma Catalogue (ed. M. Lalou, JA 1953, p. 335, no. 677) ?

translation as well as in a partial Chinese version)[140] is complicated. The two texts have much in common as to their contents, but they are not identical either in the total number of their verses or with respect to the treatment of their subject-matter; and the authenticity of the shorter work has even been queried.[141] This uncertainty is compounded by the fact that the Catuḥśataka is itself frequently referred to simply as Śataka, for example in Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā. In his commentary on the Catuḥśataka (fol. 34b) Candrakīrti furthermore observes that the word *catuḥ* had sometimes been (tendentiously) omitted; and he states (fol. 34a) that when Dharmapāla, the master of the Nālandā school of the Vijñānavāda, commented on the work, he in fact broke it up into two parts, one dealing with an exposition of the Dharma and the other with critical discussions of controversial topics, and then commented only on the latter part. The second half of the Catuḥśataka was translated into Chinese together with Dharmapāla's commentary in 650 by Hsüan-tsang (Taishō 1570–1).[142]

The ten chapters (in 50 '*ślokas*' or 32-syllable units) of Kumārajīva's Chinese version of the first half of the Śata(ka)śāstra are: (i) Renunciation of sin and merit, (ii) Refutation of the *ātman*, (iii) Refutation of unity, (iv) Refutation of diversity, (v) Refutation of sense-perceptions, (vi) Refutation of their objects, (vii) Refutation of the existence of the effect in the cause, (viii) Refutation of the non-existence of the effect in the cause, (ix) Refutation of permanence, and (x) Critique of the empty. These chapters accordingly deal with approximately the same subjects as the 200 verses of the last eight chapters of the CŚ, though in different words. This text is accompanied by a commentary ascribed to Vasu (certain passages of which follow almost verbatim the Ta-chih-tu-lun).[143]

Āryadeva's major work is the Catuḥśataka, which is available in fragments in Sanskrit, in Hsüan-tsang's above-mentioned Chinese translation of the second part only, and in a Tibetan translation.[144] The work consists of the follow-

[140] See below.

[141] See J. W. DE JONG, AM 17 (1971), p. 110. Cf. R. GARD, IBK 2/2 (1954), pp. 751–747.

[142] See É. LAMOTTE, Traité, iii, p. 1371–72; G. TUCCI, RSO 10 (1923), p. 523 sq., and Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist texts on logic. Cf. R. H. ROBINSON, Early Mādhyamika, pp. 27, 33; P. DEMIÉVILLE, L'Inde classique, ii, § 2137. 3.—See also E. FRAUWALLNER, Candramati, in Studia Indologica (Festschrift W. Kirfel, Bonn, 1955), p. 66 sq., on Dharmapāla's commentary and the Vaiśeṣika.

[143] On Vasu see N. PÉRI, BEFEO 1911, p. 361 sq.; G. TUCCI, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist texts on logic, p. xiv; E. FRAUWALLNER, On the date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vausubandhu (Rome, 1951), pp. 35–38, 48–49 (who identifies this Vasu with his Vasubandhu I); R. H. ROBINSON, Early Mādhyamika, pp. 33, 211. On this Vasu's knowledge of the Sāṃkhya see E. FRAUWALLNER, WZKSO 2 (1958), p. 131.

[144] See HARAPRASAD SASTRI, Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. iii, no. 8 (1914), pp. 449–514; P. L. VAIDYA, Études sur Āryadeva et son Catuḥśataka (Paris, 1923); G. TUCCI, RSO 10 (1923), pp. 521–67; V. BHATTACHARYA, Proceedings and Transactions of the Fourth Oriental Conference, Allahabad (1926), pp. 831–71, and The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva (Calcutta, 1931); S. YAMAGUCHI, Chūgan bukkyō ronkō (Tōkyō, 1965), p. 197 sq.

ing 16 chapters. (i–iv) Elimination of the erroneous positing of things as permanent *(nitya)*, pleasant *(sukha)*, pure (*śubha* or *śuci*),[145] and self *(ātman)* (according to Candrakīrti these four chapters which dispel the four *viparyāsa*s explain the nature of mundane things so that they may be abandoned and buddhahood may be achieved). (v) The Bodhisattva's practice (which makes it practically possible to achieve Buddhahood). (vi) Elimination of the defilements *(kleśa)* which hinder the preceding. (vii) Elimination of attachment to the enjoyment of seemingly desirable sensory objects *(viṣaya)*, which causes the defilements to arise and increase. And (viii) the practice of the disciple. The first eight chapters of the CŚ are thus concerned with the preparation of those who practise the path. The last eight chapters then explain the non-substantiality of the *dharma*s. They deal in turn with the negation *(pratiṣedha)* of (ix) permanent entities, (x) self *(ātman)*, (xi) time, (xii) dogmatic opinions *(dṛṣṭi)*, (xiii) sense-faculties and their objects, (xiv) the positing of doctrinal extremes (*antagrāha*, e.g. existence, non-existence, both, and neither) with special reference to identity and difference, and (xv) the positing of conditioned *(saṃskṛta)* things as real. Finally chapter xvi, entitled 'An exposition of the cultivation of ascertainment for master and disciple', is devoted to a consideration of logical and epistemological problems in the doctrine of *śūnyatā*. In particular, it is pointed out (in conformity with Vigrahavyāvartanī 29–30) that he who does not maintain a thesis *(pakṣa)* based on the positions of existence *(sat)*, non-existence *(asat)*, and both cannot be attacked in logic by an opponent (xvi. 25).

The titles of the chapters of the CŚ differ slightly in the Tibetan translations of the basic text and of Candrakīrti's Ṭīkā, the latter adding the word *bsgom pa (bhāvanā)* where it is lacking in the former (e.g. Chapter xvi); this emphasis on meditative realization (and on *bhāvanāsamādhi* in the Ṭīkā version of Chapter ix) accords with the reference to the Bodhisattva's *yoga*-practice in the full title of the work, which in the bsTan-'gyur version is Bodhisattvayogacaryāśāstra-Catuḥśataka-Kārikā (the Sanskrit fragments have *yogācāra*). It is noteworthy that the term *yogācāra/yogacaryā* is here applied to a work dealing largely with a form of *bhāvanā* directed towards philosophical analysis and the critical treatment of controversial points. The use of this term is remarkable since it came to be usually associated with the school of the Yogācārins/Vijñānavādins established subsequently by Asaṅga and appears already in the title of one of their basic sources, the Yogācārabhūmi (known in the bsTan-'gyur version as Yogacaryābhūmi). Some kind of close relation may well have existed between Āryadeva and early masters of the Yogācārin school; for not only has the Hastavālaprakaraṇa, a work by Dignāga, been ascribed to him by an Indo-Tibetan tradition but, as already mentioned, the Yogācārin Dharmapāla wrote a commentary on the second portion of the CŚ as late as the sixth century.[146]

[145] See e.g. Ratnāvalī ii. 48–70.

[146] There also exist, as mentioned above, some important commentaries on Nāgārjuna's MMK by masters of the Yogācārin/Vijñānavādin school.—The Chinese

Yet the reference in the title of the CŚ to *yogācāra/yogacaryā* could hardly have been intended to express any specific connexion between it and the school of the Yogācārins/Vijñānavādins; and it appears that the word was then still being used as a general term to denote practisers of the Buddhist spiritual and intellectual disciplines without reference to a particular philosophical school.[147]

In addition to Dharmapāla's above-mentioned commentary on the second part of the CŚ, there is a complete Ṭīkā by Candrakīrti, now available only in Tibetan. In it (fol. 35a) reference is made to examples *(dpe = dṛṣṭānta)* relating to the first eight chapters which had been supplied earlier by Dharmadāsa.[148]

The Akṣaraśataka and its Vṛtti have been ascribed to Nāgārjuna by Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna[149] and the Tibetan tradition, but to Āryadeva by the Chinese.[150] This work, which is mainly directed against Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika type theses, discusses *inter alia* the formal objections against establishing the existence of entities by means of an inference *(anumāna)* comprising a thesis and logical reason, as well as the epistemological difficulties involved in postulating their production, duration and destruction. In conventional transactional usage *(vyavahāra)* entities *(bhāva)* are said to be comparable to a dream; that is, they lack the characteristics of existence, non-existence and both existence and non-existence, and they are also not uncaused because they arise through effort. It is quite possible to speak conventionally of the existence of things, but not from the point of view of ultimate reality; and it is altogether impossible to deduce the existence of a thing from its name (Vṛtti, fol. 164b—165a).

As for the Hastavālaprakaraṇa and its Vṛtti, although ascribed to Āryadeva by an Indo-Tibetan tradition, they are probably by Dignāga, who is named as their author in the Chinese tradition.[151]

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canon has preserved the above-mentioned commentary on the Śataka by the Bodhisattva Vasu translated, together with the basic text, by Kumārajīva (Taishō 1569); but it is uncertain whether this person is the same as the Vijñānavādin Vasubandhu.

[147] The fact that the term Madhyamaka is still not used could perhaps be understood as indicating that this term also was not yet in (regular) use to designate a particular school of thought.

[148] A certain Dharmadāsa, clearly another Vijñānavādin, is known (along with Dignāga) as a master of Dharmapāla; see Tāranātha, rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 124, and Sum·pa·Ye·šes·dpal·'byor, dPag·bsam·ljon·bzaṅ (ed. S. Ch. Das), pp. 99, 102. Tāranātha has also mentioned Dharmadāsa as a direct pupil of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (p. 105), and as a teacher of Ārya Vimuktisena (p. 108). (Is this the Dharmadāsa mentioned as its author in a manuscript of the Vṛtti on the Cāndra-Vyākaraṇa?)

[149] Bodhimārgadīpapañjikā, fol. 324b.

[150] See V. V. Gokhale, Akṣara-Çatakam, the hundred letters (Heidelberg, 1930), who points out that the introductory verse indicates that the commentary was composed by a pupil of (Ārya-)Deva; S. Yamaguchi, Ōtani gakuhō 9 (1930), p. 191 sq.

[151] See F. W. Thomas and H. Ui, JRAS 1918, pp. 267—310; E. Frauwallner,

The bsTan·'gyur also contains two very short works attributed to Āryadeva, the *Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi[152] and the *Madhyamakabhramaghāta. In the Chinese canon there is found a treatise attributed to the Bodhisattva Āryadeva on explanations of *nirvāṇa* given by twenty sectarian teachers mentioned in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (Taishō 1640, translated in the first part of the 6th century by Bodhiruci).[153] Another work ascribed to him is a refutation of four Hīnayānist schools mentioned in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (Taishō 1639, also translated by Bodhiruci).

On the Jñānasārasamuccaya, which may be by a later author named Āryadeva, see below on the Madhyamaka-Vajrayāna synthesis.

### *Rāhulabhadra*

In the early Madhyamaka, in addition to the Stavas and Stotras ascribed to Nāgārjuna, the hymnic genre is represented by the Prajñāpāramitāstotra of Rāhulabhadra.[154] A Tibetan tradition has taken him to be the master of Nāgārjuna (perhaps owing to a confusion with a later Nāgārjuna whose master Saraha was otherwise known as Rāhulabhadra). But according to other Tibetan and the Chinese traditions, including one recorded by the Mādhyamika master Chi-tsang (549—623), he is regarded as a contemporary and follower of Nāgārjuna. In other sources again he is regarded as a successor of Āryadeva.[155] The

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WZKSO 3 (1959), pp. 128—30, 152—6; M. Hattori, Dignāga on perception (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 7.—Thomas and T. R. V. Murti, Central philosophy of Buddhism (London, 1955), p. 94, ascribe the work to Āryadeva.

[152] English version by R. W. Clark and Lozang Jamspal, Tibet Journal 4/2 (1979), p. 29 sq.

[153] On this work see G. Tucci, Un traité d'Āryadeva sur le "Nirvāṇa" des hérétiques, TP 24 (1926), pp. 16—31; H. Nakamura, HJAS 18 (1955), pp. 93—102.

[154] Ed. R. Hikata, Suvikrāntavikrāmi-Paripṛcchā Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtra, pp. 1—2. This *stotra* is also found at the beginning of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā and Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (ed. N. Dutt), as well as in part in the Ta-chih-tu-lun (cf. Lamotte, Traité, ii, pp. 1061—5).

[155] See Bu·ston, Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 99a (Obermiller, ii, p. 123); 'Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal, Deb·ther·sṅon·po, ka, fol. 18a (Roerich, i, p. 35); Tāranātha, rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ (ed. Schiefner), pp. 53 sq., 83, and bKa'·babs·bdun·gyi·rnam·thar, fol. 181 sq. (Grünwedel, p. 10 sq.), who also makes Rāhulabhadra the master of Nāgārjuna.—But elsewhere in his rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ (pp. 68, 73) Tāranātha makes Rāhulabhadra a successor of Nāgārjuna and a disciple of Āryadeva. And Bu·ston also quotes a lineage in which Rāhula follows Āryadeva (Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 94a l [Obermiller, ii, p. 109, has Bāhula, which is presumably a misreading or misprint for Rāhula]; cf. Sum·pa·mkhan·po, dPag·bsam·ljon·bzaṅ, (ed. S. Ch. Das), p. 90).—Cf. G. Tucci, JPASB 26 (1930), p. 141 (= Opera minora, i, p. 212 sq.), and É. Lamotte, Traité, iii, p. 1374 note (who refers to the remark of Chi-tsang that Rāhula was a contemporary of Nāgārjuna, and to the information given by Chan-jan [711—782] according to which Rāhulabhadra composed a commentary on Nāgārjuna's work). J. W. de Jong, AM 17 (1971), p. 107—8, seems to incline to the view that Rāhulabhadra preceded Nāgārjuna. H. Nakamura, Acta Asiatica 1 (1960), p. 63, placed him in the third century, after Āryadeva.

Madhyamakaśāstrastuti of Candrakīrti speaks of Nāgārjuna's being accompanied *(sahita)* by Rāhulabhadra. Writings attributed to Rāhulabhadra are quoted in the Ta-chih-tu-lun (chapter xviii), as well as in Asaṅga's commentary on the Madhyamakaśāstra (Taishō 1565) and *Sāramati's *Mahāyānāvatāraśāstra (Taishō 1634).[156]

In the Prajñāpāramitāstotra the *prajñāpāramitā* is described as beyond dichotomizing conceptualization *(nirvikalpā)* and discursive development *(niṣprapañcā)*. Rāhulabhadra writes: He who sees thee as thou really art (or: devotedly)[157] sees the *tathāgata*. The Buddhas are thy beloved sons, and thou art thus the tender progenetrix of all Heroes devoted to the weal of others. Though one, thou art praised under various appellations by the *tathāgata*s, who thus make thee accessible to their disciples. Also, when thou art reached, faults and disputes raised by polemists vanish. Thus thou terrifiest the foolish whilst thou comfortest the wise. Not coming from anywhere and not going anywhere, thou art not made into an object of perception *(nôpalabhyase)* by the wise; however, those who see thee not but do truly (or: devotedly, *bhāvataḥ*) take recourse *(prapad-)* to thee are released as soon as they have done so: this is a great marvel! By the Protectors of the world *(lokanātha)* who, for the sake of conventional communication *(prajñaptyartham)* with incarnate beings, adopt transactional linguistic usage *(vyavahāra)* thou art expressed out of compassion—without being [really thus] expressed. Indeed, who is able to praise thee who art without phenomenal mark *(nirnimittā)* and pure *(nirañjanā)*, who transcendest the entire realm of words, and who art not fixed anywhere? However, we who have praised thee who art not to be praised according to convention *(saṃvṛti)* are fulfilled through verbal expressions.

This hymn, besides containing ideas expressed also in some of the hymns ascribed to Nāgārjuna, is remarkable because it employs (though no doubt in a different and still unsystematic way) terms such as *prapad-*, *bhāva*, *āśaya*, and *bhakti* that were to become so usual in the works of the *bhakti* movements. As for the conception of the *prajñāpāramitā*—both transcendent and immanent, and the ground of both bondage and release for all beings whether they see her or not (15)—it is in certain respects comparable with the *tathāgatagarbha*/*tathāgatadhātu* theory of the Ratnagotravibhāga Commentary.[158] And the question arises as to whether Rāhulabhadra represented a related trend in early Madhyamaka thought. He also composed a hymn to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka,[159] a Sūtra devoted in large part to the theory of the One Vehicle *(ekayāna)* which is closely connected with the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine of the

[156] See É. Lamotte, Traité, ii, p. 1060; iii, p. 1374; H. Ui, ZII 6 (1928), p. 223—4; G. Tucci, JRAS 1930, p. 612 (= Opera minora, i, p. 240).

[157] *bhāvena*, 'really, truly' or 'resolutely, devotedly, affectionately'.

[158] Ratnagotravibhāga Commentary i. 149—52.

[159] Ed. Wogihara and Tsuchida in their edition of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (Tokyo, 1934—5), Introduction, pp. 37—39. This hymn is included in the Kashgar Ms. of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka from the Petrovskij collection (tentatively dated to between the sixth and ninth century).

Ratnagotravibhāga (which in fact cites the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka in ii. 58). Moreover, as already observed, he is quoted by *Sāramati, the master of the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine and the Ratnagotravibhāga, in his *Mahāyānāvatāraśāstra (Taishō 1634).[160]

Rāhulabhadra thus represents a fairly distinct current in early Madhyamaka thought that was not elaborated in the theoretical scholastic texts of the classical school based on the MMK, but which is reflected in the hymns ascribed to Nāgārjuna. Still a commentary on the MMK by Rāhulabhadra is said to have been translated into Chinese by Paramārtha (see above, p. 49); but this work is not extant.

*'Nāga'*

A certain Nāgāhvaya—literally 'the one named Nāga'—is mentioned in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra in the context of a prophecy *(vyākaraṇa)* where he is evidently identified with Nāgārjuna himself.[161] 'Nāga' is, however, elsewhere spoken of together with Āryadeva as a pupil of Nāgārjuna.[162]

Nāgāhvaya has then been taken as a proper name and identified with a certain Tathāgatabhadra by Tāranātha, who adds that he was the author of hymns to the *trikāya*[163] and on the *(tathāgata)garbha*[164] and that the verses of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra were thereupon widely sung in the South. This master is thus linked with the so-called Vijñapti-Madhyamaka,[165] a theory associated with the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine and the positive interpretation of ultimate reality as empty only of the heterogeneous.[166] The historical and

[160] According to Tāranātha (rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 68), Rāhulabhadra received the meaning of the *(tathāgata)garbha* from Āryadeva in the neighbourhood of Kāñcī!

[161] Laṅkāvatārasūtra x. 165—6 (where Nāgāhvaya is translated into Tibetan as Klu·žes·bod·pa); cf. Candrakīrti, Madhyamakāvatāra vi. 3 (p. 76). See also Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa liii. 449—50 (ed. Gaṇapati Śāstrī, iii, p. 616—17; K. P. Jayaswal and R. Saṃkṛtyayana, Imperial History of India [Lahore, 1934], p. 35—36], where Nāgāhvaya is said to be an adept of the *māyūrī vidyā* as well as *niḥsvabhāvārthatattvavit*. Cf. G. Tucci, JPASB 26 (1930), p. 142 (= Opera minora, i, p. 212); N. Dutt, IHQ 7 (1931), pp. 633—9.

[162] Tāranātha, rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 68 (where Schiefner's edition reads Klu·bos).

[163] sKu·gsum·la·bstod·pa (*Trikāyastotra/stava or *Kāyatrayastotra/stava ?). A hymn to the three *kāyas* has been published by A. von Staël-Holstein, Bull. de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences de St. Pétersbourg, no. 11 (1911), pp. 837—45; this work is quoted by Nāḍapāda (Nāropā, Sekoddeśaṭīkā, p. 57—58) and is found at the beginning of 'Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal's Deb·ther·sṅon·po. But in the bsTan·'gyur a Kāyatrayastotra the first three verses of which correspond to the first three of the Sanskrit text just mentioned is ascribed to Nāgārjuna himself.—Compare the *Kāyatrayāvatāra ascribed in the bsTan·'gyur to Nāgamitra (Klu'i·bšes·gñen).

[164] *sñiṅ po'i bstod pa* (cf. Sum·pa·mkhan·po, dPag·bsam·ljon·bzaṅ, ed. S. C. Das, p. 90).

[165] *rnam rig gi dbu ma* (Tāranātha, op. cit., p. 68).

[166] *gžan stoṅ;* see above, p. 34. As already noticed, Rāhulabhadra is also linked with this current of thought (see above, p. 55).

doctrinal context in which the information available from our sources is embedded often evokes the later Madhyamaka-Vajrayāna synthesis, rather than the early period of the Madhyamaka school.[167] Yet at least certain of the allusions appear to refer to an earlier time, indeed even to a period prior to the author of the MMK.[168] Taken together the available information points to some (possibly quite early) doctrinal trends of considerable interest with which certain currents in the Madhyamaka may have on occasion converged, although in its classical period and going back as far as the MMK the pure Madhyamaka school was characterized by apophaticism and appears to have had practically nothing to do with the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine.

Since the references in our sources to 'Nāga' remain obscure and the history of this period of Buddhist thought is very imperfectly known to us, considerable further research is required to untangle the skein and reveal the literary, philosophical and religious movements that stand veiled behind these allusions.[169]

Another figure whose name contains the word Nāga and who is associated with Nāgārjuna is Nāgabodhi. He is known to some sources as having lived on the Śrīparvata. It is not certain whether this shadowy and elusive figure is the same as the Tāntrika Nāgabodhi, the disciple of the Tāntrika Ārya Nāgārjunapāda (see below, p. 104).[170]

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[167] See Tāranātha's rGya·gar·chos·'byuń, pp. 66—68.

[168] A Sthavira named Nāga is connected with a certain 'Bhadra' (:Mahādeva) and the five points *(gži lńa)* at issue at the Council of Pāṭaliputra, and also with a certain Yid·brtan·pa (Sthiramati/*Sthitamati/*Sāramati ?); see Bhāvaviveka, Tarkajvālā, fol. 162b—163a (= Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna, u, fol. 179a8). Cf. É. Lamotte, Histoire du bouddhisme indien, i (Louvain, 1958), p. 308; D. Seyfort Ruegg, La théorie du *tathāgatagarbha* et du *gotra* (Paris, 1969), p. 47.

[169] For a brief discussion of some possible interpretations of the information available to us on these persons and on the doctrinal connexions see D. Seyfort Ruegg, op. cit., pp. 46—50.

[170] It has been suggested that Nāga(bodhi) was the author of the Ta-chih-tu-lun (see A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism [Delhi, 1970], p. 388).—As for the Tāntrika Nāgabodhi, he is reported to have been the teacher of Vajrabodhi (*c.* 671—741), a master of the Tattvasaṃgraha-Tantra, and Amoghavajra (*c.* 705—774). On him see G. Tucci, JPASB 26 (1930), p. 142 (= Opera minora, i, p. 212); Bu·ston, Chos·'byuń, fol. 102a (Obermiller, ii, p. 132); 'Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal, Deb·ther·sńon·po, ja, fol. 4b—5a (Roerich, i, p. 360—1); Tāranātha, rGya·gar·chos·'byuń, p. 68—69.

# THE MIDDLE PERIOD: THE SYSTEMATIZATION OF THE MADHYAMAKA SCHOOL

By the middle of the sixth century the Mādhyamika followers of Nāgārjuna had not only formed into a distinct school known as the Madhyamaka, but they were dividing into two branches with Buddhapālita (*c.* 470—540 ?) at the head of one and Bhāvaviveka (Bhavya, *c.* 500—570 ?) as the chief exponent of the other.

Historians have used the term Prāsaṅgika to designate Buddhapālita's school because it restricted itself to the *prasaṅga*-type reasoning already used by Nāgārjuna, and the term Svātantrika to designate Bhāvaviveka's school since it introduced independent *(svatantra)* inferences into its process of reasoning. The terms Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika—which do not seem to be actually attested as the names of the two branches of the Madhyamaka in the Sanskrit sources now accessible to us[171]—correspond respectively to the Tibetan terms Raṅ·rgyud·pa and Thal·'gyur·ba, which have been regularly employed by Tibetan scholars to designate the two sections of the pure Madhyamaka school.

In his commentary on the Tattvasaṃgraha Kamalaśīla (eighth century) speaks simply of undifferentiated Mādhyamikas, while for the Vijñānavādins he adopts the distinction between Sākāravādins and Nirākāravādins.[172] In his commentary on the Jñānasārasamuccaya (fol. 51 b) Bodhibhadra (*c.* 1000) mentions as the two schools of the Madhyamaka only Bhāvaviveka's and Śāntarakṣita's.[173] And in the eleventh century Advayavajra divides the Mādhyamikas into Māyopamādvayavādins and Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādins.[174]

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[171] In most of our sources the protagonists of the various branches are referred to either by name or simply by general expressions such as *eke* 'some'/*apare* 'others,' *svayūthya* '[a master] of our own school,' *ācārya* 'master,' etc. (The word *prāsaṅgika* appears in another sense in Kamalaśīla's Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā 3308 and Prajñākaramati's Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā ix. 27 for example, but not in Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā.)

[172] See for example Kamalaśīla's Tattvasaṃgragapañjikā 1916—17. For a similar terminology cf. Ratnākaraśānti, Triyānavyavasthāna, fol. 114a sq. (*kun rfob śes pa'i rnam par smra ba* and *śes pa rnam pa med par smra ba*); see below, p. 122 sq.

[173] In its Tibetan version Bodhibhadra's Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana distinguishes, with regard to the analysis of *saṃvṛti*, between masters like Bhavya who do not take a cognitive image *(ābhāsa)* as the object of valid cognition *(snaṅ ba la mi 'jal ba)*, and masters like Śāntarakṣita who hold that inner cognition alone appears as various *(citra, vicitra)*, whereas things so appearing are not real *(snaṅ ba'i dṅos po ji lta ba ma yin gyi naṅ gi śes pa kho na sna ćhogs su snaṅ bar smra ba)* (fol. 51 b).

[174] Tattvaratnāvalī, pp. 14, 19 sq. (That is, the school of Śāntarakṣita and

Among Tibetan scholars the appellations mDo·sde·pa'i·dbu·ma/mDo·sde·spyod·pa'i·dbu·ma (= Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka) and rNal·'byor·spyod·pa'i·dbu·ma (= Yogācāra-Madhyamaka) were current by the end of the eighth century.[175] They are found in two of the earliest known Tibetan doxographical treatises, the lTa·ba'i·rim·pa'i·man·ṅag written by dPal·brćegs (end of the eighth century) and the lTa·ba'i·khyad·par written by Ye·šes·sde (*c.* 800), two renowned scholars and translators who worked during the first diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet.[176] These two appellations distinguish between the Mādhyamikas according to whether they maintain or reject the existence of an external object *(bāhyārtha)* on the surface-level (*saṃvṛti* or *vyavahāra*). On the other hand the appellations Thal·'gyur·ba = Prāsaṅgika and Raṅ·rgyud·pa = Svātantrika seem to appear only somewhat later in Tibet, towards the beginning of the second diffusion of Buddhism in the eleventh century, when the Prāsaṅgika school became established there.

In the following pages Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika will be employed as convenient designations for the two main divisions of the pure Madhyamaka school going back respectively to Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka although these terms refer to a single feature of each of their doctrines, namely their methods of ascertaining reality through reasoning.[177] And the name Yogācāra-Madhyamaka will be used, in accordance with earlier usage, to designate the synthesizing school of Mādhyamikas whose foremost representative was Śāntarakṣita.[178]

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Haribhadra and the school of Candrakīrti respectively according to mKhas·grub·dGe·legs·dpal·bzaṅ, sTon·thun·chen·mo, fol. 41a—b. See also 'Jam·dbyaṅs·bžad·pa·Ñag·dbaṅ·brćon·'grus, Grub·mtha'·chen·mo, ii, fol. 131b6 and 142b6; lCaṅ·skya·Rol·pa'i·rdo·rje, Grub·mtha', kha, fol. 11b.) For the *apratiṣṭhānavāda*, reference may be made also to the Paramārthabodhicittabhāvanākrama ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa/Śūra (gi, fol. 156b2—3).—In his lTa·ba'i·rim·pa'i·man·ṅag, however, dPal·brćegs appears to apply a similar terminology differently (fol. 140a—b, where he is speaking of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamikas and Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas).—Corresponding Tibetan terms are *sgyu ma rigs grub pa* and *rab tu mi gnas pa*. According to Ćoṅ·kha·pa (Lam·rim·chen·mo, fol. 342a—b), these two appellations were (inappropriately) given by some scholars to the two branches of Mādhyamikas with reference to their respective theories of the *paramārtha*. Ćoṅ·kha·pa refers to Blo·ldan·šes·rab's stricture against attempts to make such distinctions with respect to the Mādhyamikas' theories of the *paramārtha*.—On the term *'jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma (pa)* for the Prāsaṅgika school see below, note 259.

[175] Bodhibhadra has stated that Sautrāntikas too may be regarded as Mahāyānists. And he notes that the expression Sautrāntika has been explained as the name given to those who accept literally the text of the Ṣaṇmukha and Bhadracaryāsūtra (Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana, fol. 49a—b).

[176] sKa·ba·dPal·brćegs, lTa·ba'i·rim·pa'i·man·ṅag, fol. 140a—b; Ye·šes·sde, lTa·ba'i·khyad·par, fol. 252b (cf. Manuscrit Pelliot tibétain 814, fol. 5a sq.; see also Manuscrit Pelliot tibétain 116, p. 112 sq.).

[177] These terms may also refer to the manner of the generation in the mind *(saṃtāna)* of the theory ascertaining *pāramārthika-śūnyatā;* see Ćoṅ·kha·pa, op. cit., fol. 343a4.

[178] For further details see below, p. 87 sq.

*Buddhapālita*

Concerning Buddhapālita's life little is reliably known except that he flourished about the year 500.[179] His extensive commentary (Vṛtti) on the MMK is now available only in a Tibetan translation;[180] but his great importance for the history of the Madhyamaka is amply vouched for by his follower Candrakīrti.

Buddhapālita represents a conservative current in Madhyamaka thought that resisted the adoption of the logico-epistemological innovations which were at the time being brought into Mahāyānist philosophy (e.g. by Dignāga, *c.* 480—540). Thus he did not make use of independent inferences to establish the Mādhyamika's statements; and he employed the well-established *prasaṅga* method, which points out the necessary but undesired consequence resulting from a thesis or proposition intended to prove something concerning an entity. From the Mādhyamika's standpoint this method has the advantage of not committing the critic who uses the *prasaṅga* to taking up a counter-position and maintaining the contradictory of what he has denied, which as a Mādhyamika he would consider to be just as faulty as the position he has negating.[181] Buddhapālita's procedure appears accordingly to be in keeping with Nāgārjuna's as expressed in the MMK and the Vigrahavyāvartanī.

With respect to the Mādhyamika's statement 'Things are not produced from themselves' (cf. MMK i. 1), Buddhapālita points out that such production of a thing having own being from itself would be quite useless because it would already exist in virtue of the own being it is supposed to have; in addition, such production would involve the fault of over-extension *(atiprasaṅga)*, for a thing already existing by own being would, on this assumption, never cease being produced. Regarding the second negative statement 'Things are not produced from an other', Buddhapālita observes that if they were so produced the consequence would necessarily be that all things could be produced from all things *(sarvataḥ sarvasambhavaprasaṅgaḥ)*. With respect to the third negative statement 'Things are not produced from both [themselves and an other]', Buddhapālita points out that the faults attaching to the two preceding alternatives would combine in this third one *(ubhayadoṣaprasaṅga)*. Finally, concerning the fourth negative statement 'Things are not produced from no cause', Buddhapālita also observes that were they so produced the consequence would necessarily be that all things could always be produced from all things *(sadā ca sarvataś ca sarvasambhavaprasaṅgaḥ)*.[182]

[179] Cf. Y. Kajiyama, WZKSO 12—13 (1968—9), p. 194, quoting H. Ui, who gave 470—540; D. Seyfort Ruegg, ibid., p. 306; H. Nakamura, Journ. of Intercultural Studies 4 (1977), p. 126. E. Frauwallner, Philosophie des Buddhismus (Berlin, 1956), p. 221, put him a little earlier, in the fifth century.

[180] On Chapter ii cf. M. Tachikawa, A study of Buddhapālita's Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti, Journal of the Faculty of Literature, Nagoya University, No. 63 (1974).

[181] See above, p. 36—38.

[182] Cf. MMK and Prasannapadā i. 6 sq.; vii. 18 sq.; Śūnyatāsaptati 4—5. It is to be recalled that all these statements contain *prasajya*-negations.

In many passages Buddhapālita's Vṛtti is closely related to or identical with the *Akutobhayā. The precise relationship of these two works has yet to be fully clarified, especially in view of the fact that the Tibetan texts of the last five chapters of both works (translated by Jñānagarbha and Cog·ro·Klu'i·rgyal·mćhan) are practically identical.

*Bhāvaviveka*

Bhāvaviveka (*c.* 500—570 ?) was born probably in South India. He was also known as Bhavya and Bhāviveka.[183]

Bhāvaviveka took up a position radically opposed to Buddhapālita's on the matter of the logical establishment of the Mādhyamika's philosophical position in general and of the negative statements in particular. In his view the necessary co-ordination with scripture *(āgama)* of an adequate logical method of reasoning *(yukti)* requires more than *prasaṅga* arguments because, to establish the Mādhyamika's position, there is needed in addition an independent *(svatantra)* inference *(anumāna)*, which can also be embodied in a proper 'syllogism' *(prayogavākya)*. And it is from this characteristic use of a *svatantrānumāna* that Bhāvaviveka's school has received its name of Svātantrika. This school is also known as the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka, in contradistinction to the synthesizing Yogācāra-Madhyamaka.[184]

In thus seeking to establish the Mādhyamika's doctrinal position by means of logically elaborated inferences and 'syllogisms', rather than by the *prasaṅga* method only, Bhāvaviveka evidently wished to utilize methods developed by the Buddhist logico-epistemological school headed by his elder contemporary Dignāga, who has been regarded as belonging to a branch—the Satyākāravāda or Sākāravāda—of the Vijñānavāda school while at the same time continuing Sautrāntika tendencies.

Bhāvaviveka's views on the philosophical status of the two truth-levels (*saṃvṛti*° and *paramārtha-satya*) and on the formulation of logical proofs made him, however, the target of criticism by masters of the Vijñānavāda: Sthiramati (*c.* 510—570 ?) of the Valabhī school, who commented on Nāgārjuna's MMK apparently after Bhāvaviveka, and Dharmapāla (*c.* 530—561 ?) of the

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[183] The name Bhāvaviveka is attested in Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā. The form Bhavya is found in the Mahāvyutpatti (no. 3495: sKal·ldan). And the form Bhāviveka is presupposed by some Chinese transliterations as well as by the Tibetan translation sNaṅ·bral (compare the name Bhāvivikta, a Naiyāyika of the sixth century ?). In the Madhyamakaśāstrastuti of Candrakīrti (11) we find also Bhāvin.—On him see L. de La Vallée Poussin, MCB 2 (1932—3), p. 60 sq.; S. Iida, Reason and emptiness (Tōkyō, 1980), p. 5 sq.

[184] In the Tibetan doxographical literature the two schools are then known respectively as the mDo·sde·[spyod·]pa'i·dbu·ma·[raṅ·rgyud·pa] = Sautrāntika-[Svātantrika-]Madhyamaka and the rNal·'byor·spyod·pa'i·dbu·ma·[raṅ·rgyud·pa] = Yogācāra-[Svātantrika-]Madhyamaka.

Nālandā school, who commented for example on Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka.[185] As understood by his commentator Avalokitavrata, Bhāvaviveka has referred critically to a commentary on the MMK written by Sthiramati's teacher Guṇamati.[186] On the contrary, Bhāvaviveka has quoted Devaśarman's commentary on the MMK with approval.[187]

Bhāvaviveka's commentary on the MMK entitled Prajñāpradīpa, which is now accessible only in Chinese (Taishō 1566) and Tibetan translations, is accordingly one of the most important explanations of that basic work from both the historical and philosophical points of view. It is related to the *Akutobhayā in many passages. And it contains a critique of Buddhapālita's interpretation of Nāgārjuna, as well as critical discussions of the Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Nirgrantha (Jaina), and Ābhidhārmika doctrines.

No less important is Bhāvaviveka's great original work comprising the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās, available in the original Sanskrit and in a Tibetan translation, and his own very extensive commentary entitled Tarkajvālā, now accessible only in Tibetan. This work is one of the earliest and most valuable sources we possess for the history not only of Buddhist thought but also of Indian philosophy in general, for it contains a review and critical discussion of the doctrines of the main schools known to Bhāvaviveka. Chapter ix refers even to some practices of the Persian Magi *(maga)*. This work has served as a basis for later histories of Indian philosophy composed by Buddhist authors in India and then, especially, in Tibet. It consists of the following eleven chapters: (i) Maintenance of the *bodhicitta*, (ii) Following the Muni's vow,[188] (iii) Quest for knowledge of reality *(tattvajñāna)*,[189] (iv) Introduction to the determination of reality according to the Śrāvaka, (v) Introduction to the determination of reality according to the Yogācārin,[190] (vi) Introduction to reality according to the Sāṃkhya,[191] (vii) Introduction to reality according to the Vaiśeṣika, (viii) Introduction to reality according to the Vedānta,[192]

[185] See Avalokitavrata, Ṭīkā, wa, fol. 103a sq. Cf. Y. Kajiyama, WZKSO 12–13 (1968), pp. 193–203, on the controversy between Bhāvaviveka and the Vijñānavāda.

[186] See Prajñāpradīpa i. 4, and Avalokitavrata, Ṭīkā, wa, fol. 198b–199a. Cf. Y. Kajiyama, WZKSO 7 (1963), p. 37–38; 8 (1964), p. 106.

[187] See e.g. Prajñāpradīpa i. 7d.—Avalokitavrata notes (wa, fol. 225a7–226b) that Bhāvaviveka considered Devaśarman's interpretation here as correct (in contradistinction to Buddhapālita's).

[188] See V. V. Gokhale, IIJ 14 (1972), pp. 40–45.

[189] See V. V. Gokhale, IIJ 5 (1961–2), pp. 271–5. Part of this chapter has been studied by S. Iida, op. cit., p. 52 sq.; see also the same author's article in M. Sprung (ed.), The problem of two truths in Buddhism and Vedānta, pp. 64–77.

[190] See S. Yamaguchi, Bukkyō ni okeru mu to u no tairon (Kyōto, 1941); S. Iida, Kanakura Festschrift (Tōkyō, 1966), p. 79 sq.

[191] See M. Honda, IBK 16/1 (1967), pp. 33–38.

[192] This chapter of the MHK, which seems to contain the earliest known reference to the term *vedānta* in Madhyamaka literature, has been published by V. V. Gokhale and H. Nakamura, IIJ 2 (1958), pp. 165–89, and H. Nakamura, ALB 39 (1975),

(ix) Introduction to the determination of reality according to the Mīmāṃsā,[193] (x) Exposition of the realization of omniscience *(sarvajñatāsiddhi)*, and (xi) Exposition concerning praise and specific characteristics *(stutilakṣaṇa)*.

The Tattvajñānāmṛtāvatāra, mentioned by Bhāvaviveka in his 'Jewel in hand treatise', is evidently the title of a work that comprised only chapters i—iii of our Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās and contained the main points of its author's philosophy.[194] The Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna, which appears separately in the bsTan-'gyur, corresponds to part of Chapter iv of the Tarkajvālā.[195]

Bhāvaviveka's 'Jewel in hand treatise' (Chang-chen-lun, available in Hsüantsang's Chinese version, Taishō 1578)[196] was apparently composed between the Tattvajñānāmṛtāvatāra and the expanded work in which this text has been included, for it contains a reference to the former title. It presents a summary of Mādhyamika doctrine and takes the form of a discussion, on the levels of both reasoning and meditation, of the Mādhyamika's statement: 'In reality conditioned things are empty *(śūnya)* because they are produced from conditions, like a magical production; the unconditioned *(asaṃskṛta)* is not real because it is not produced, like a sky-flower.' This statement consists of two inferential propositions each accompanied by its logical reason and homologous example (no heterologue being available since the propositions are universal), and including the important qualification 'in reality' *(paramārthataḥ)* which is characteristic of Bhāvaviveka's system.[197] The treatise also discusses and refutes Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines, as well as the Vijñānavādin's theory of the *paratantra* or dependent nature. It contains a defence of the Mādhyamika's negative statements, and it emphasizes both that they contain non-presuppositional negation and that they have the function of showing that what is negated is without own being (*svabhāva*, rather than of annulling some own being possessed by the thing negated).[198] The final section of the treatise is devoted to an important exposition of Madhyamaka gnoseology, *bhāvanā*, *prajñā* and the *yogācāra*'s understanding of reality,[199] elimination of the discursive concept of emptiness *(śūnyatā)*, and realization of the Middle Way.

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pp. 300—29. See also H. Nakamura, Shoki no Vedānta tetsugaku (Tōkyō, 1950), p. 238 sq.; HJAS 18 (1955), p. 103; JOIB 14 (1965), pp. 287—96.

[193] See S. Kawasaki, IBK 22/2 (1974), pp. 1—8.

[194] See V. V. Gokhale, IIJ 2 (1958), p. 165 note; 14 (1972), p. 41.

[195] On Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā iv. 8 (ja, fol. 161a3 sq.).—Cf. A. Bareau, JA 1956, pp. 167—91 (and Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule [Paris, 1955], pp. 17—26).

[196] See L. de La Vallée Poussin, MCB 2 (1932—33), pp. 60—138; N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Karatalaratna (Visva-Bharati Studies No. 9, Santiniketan, 1949).

[197] See below.

[198] Cf. above, p. 22, 37—38.

[199] That is, the Yogin's understanding (not specifically the Yogācārin/Vijñānavādin's); cf. above, p. 53 and below, p. 72.

The *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha[200] presents a schematic division of the levels of truth. The *paramārthasatya*, which is without discursive development *(prapañca)*, comprises not only the pure and ultimate absolute free from all conceptualized and verbalized forms *(rnam graṅs: paryāya)* whatsoever, but also a second aspect associated with conceptualization and verbalization where reasoning is employed to negate both the four conceivable positions *(koṭi)* and the production of a thing in terms of any of the four positions mentioned in MMK i. 1. On the other hand, *saṃvṛti* is either 'true' *(tathyasaṃvṛti)*, in the case of things that are causally efficient *(arthakriyāsamartha)*; or it is 'false' *(mithyāsaṃvṛti)*, in which case it may either be accompanied by imaginary construction (e.g. the rope mistaken for a snake) or be without this imaginary construction (e.g. the moon which is seen as double because of a physical defect actually present in the eye and not because of imaginary construction). While it has been suggested that the *saparyāya-paramārtha* and the *tathya-saṃvṛti* are identical,[201] it should be noted that the second kind of *paramārtha* (the *saparyāya*) consists only in the negation of the positions in terms of which an entity is posited as having own being *(svabhāva)*—that is, in a special kind of propositional knowledge that may be considered *pāramārthika* because it pertains to ultimate reality or *śūnyatā*—whereas the *tathya-saṃvṛti* covers all things possessing causal efficiency on the surface level of relative transactional convention. This discussion has a parallel in passages of the Tarkajvālā (iii. 26, fol. 63a) where it is stated that there is a second form of *paramārtha* comprising discursive development *(prapañca)* and notional construction *(abhisaṃskāra)* which is exemplified in the negative propositions *(pratiṣedha)* of MMK i. 1; it is therefore known as *śuddha-laukikajñāna* (as distinct from *lokottarajñāna*).[202]

Bhāvaviveka considered that what he termed the *prasaṅgavākya* of Buddhapālita remains open to objection *(glags yod pa'i ćhig = sāvakāśavacana)* from an opponent because it lacks the logical reason *(hetu, liṅga)* and example *(dṛṣṭānta)* necessary for a valid inference; and he argued that it therefore cannot exclude the opposite thesis and thus acquire full probative force.[203] Moreover, according to Bhāvaviveka, by simply negating production without any qualification or restriction the user of this *prasaṅgavākya* comes into conflict with the established Buddhist doctrine of origination in dependence

[200] See N. Aiyaswami Shastri, Journal of Oriental Research 5 (1931), pp. 41—49.

[201] Y. Kajiyama, Bhāvaviveka and the Prāsaṅgika School, Nava-Nālandā-Mahāvihāra Research Publication, i (1957), pp. 302, 311, 314—15.

[202] This parallel would appear to support the ascription of the *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha to the author of the Tarkajvālā.

[203] Cf. Avalokitavrata, Ṭīkā, wa, fol. 86a—b: *gžan yaṅ de ji ltar rigs pa ma yin že na/ glags yod pa'i chig yin pa'i yaṅ phyir te/ gnas brtan buddha pā li tas bšad pa de ni rgol ba gžan gyi klan ka'i glags yod pa'i ćhig yin pa'i phyir yaṅ rigs pa ma yin no/ /yaṅ žes bya ba'i sgra ni gtan ćhigs daṅ dpe ma brjod pa'i phyir daṅ gžan gyis smras pa'i ñes pa ma bsal ba'i phyir rigs pa ma yin par 'ba' žig tu ma zad kyi/ de ni glags yod pa'i ćhig yin pa'i phyir yaṅ rigs pa ma yin no žes bya bar sbyar ro//*

*(pratītyasamutpāda)*. Therefore, in place of it, Bhāvaviveka introduced the *svantantrānumāna* qualified by the restriction *paramārthataḥ (don dam par na)* 'in reality'; and he expressed this independent inference in the form of a 'syllogism' *(prayogavākya)*.[204] When the Mādhyamika's negative statements are thus expanded by the restriction *paramārthataḥ*, the propositions *(pratijñā)* take the form: *na paramārthataḥ* + subject of the proposition + *svataḥ* (or: *parataḥ*, etc.) *utpannam* '*x* is not in reality produced from itself (or: an other, etc.).'[205] In his Tarkajvālā Bhāvaviveka has specified that the qualification *paramārthataḥ* relates to the predicate of the inferential proposition;[206] and the *paramārtha* to which reference is made is Bhāvaviveka's second kind which involves discursive development *(prapañca)* and notional construction *(abhisaṃskāra)*.[207]

With regard to the type of negation involved in the negative statements of the Madhyamaka, Bhāvaviveka appears to be the first thinker of the school to have explicitly stated that it is absolute (non-presuppositional) negation *(prasajyapratiṣedha)*—i.e. one that consists in pure negation without the opposite of what is negated being even implicitly affirmed—rather than relative (presuppositional) negation *(paryudāsapratiṣedha)* where negation is subordinate to the implicit affirmation of the opposite of what is negated.[208] This being so, according to Bhāvaviveka absolute negation of a proposition does not involve the indirect affirmation of the contradictory proposition.

Since the negative propositions in question have universal validity for all *dharmas*, any example *(dṛṣṭānta)* adduced cannot be other than a homologous *(sapakṣa)* one; and Bhāvaviveka's *prayogavākya* therefore lacks the heterologue *(vipakṣa)* in which the logical reason is absent, and which is an essential part of a valid inference according to the logicians.[209]

Bhāvaviveka has observed that his use of negative propositions does not represent mere fault-finding contentiousness *(vitaṇḍā)*; this is because his proposition does have as subject *(pakṣa)* a term that he accepts—namely *śūnyatā*—and it is therefore without the fault *(pakṣadoṣa)* of being empty.[210]

Bhāvaviveka's arguments against the Vijñānavāda are to be found in his Prajñāpradīpa, and in Chapter v of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās and the Tarkajvālā. It seems that in his time the doctrinal disagreements between the Mādhyamikas and Vijñānavādins became acute. This opposition did not, how-

[204] Prajñāpradīpa, passim. Cf. Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā i, pp. 14, 25, 36, 38.

[205] Prajñāpradīpa, i. 1, p. 11, quoted by Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā i. 1, p. 25 sq.

[206] Tarkajvālā iii. 26, fol. 63b—64a.

[207] See above, p. 64.

[208] Prajñāpradīpa i. 1, p. 10; Tarkajvālā iii. 26.—It is to be noted that the Tibetan doxographers take up the two types of negation when describing the Sautrāntika doctrines also. The Indian grammarians have of course used the terms *prasajya* and *paryudāsa* from the time of Patañjali; see above, note 94.

[209] Cf. *Karatalaratna in MCB 2 (1932—33), p. 73. (On the absence of a *sapakṣa*, see ibid., p. 78.) From the point of view of these logicians, then, this formal deficiency is a very serious weakness in Bhāvaviveka's system.

[210] Tarkajvālā iii. 26, fol. 64b.

ever, prevent him from adapting the advances made by Dignāga's branch of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda in either logic and epistemology or in soteriology and gnoseology whenever he found them appropriate, but without of course abandoning the basic Madhyamaka principle of the emptiness of all *dharma*s including consciousness *(vijñāna)* and the highest non-conceptual gnosis *(jñāna)* achieved in meditative realization. In other words, for the investigation of the surface level, Bhāvaviveka was prepared to make use of methods and insights developed by another school; but in his theory of the *paramārtha* he remained faithful to the basic theory of his school.[211]

Thus not only in the Tarkajvālā but also in his 'Jewel in hand treatise'—in connexion with the proposition 'The unconditioned is not real because it is not produced'—Bhāvaviveka presents a critique of the more or less substantialist theories of absolute reality propounded by other schools. He rejects the Vaibhāṣika's notion of *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* as an entity existing in reality, as well as the conception that takes *ākāśa* as some thing non-existent which he ascribes to the Sautrāntikas. And he dismisses the Vijñānavāda idea of *tathatā* as possessing substantive *(dravyasat)* own being, and as the object *(ālambana)* of either supramundane non-dichotomizing gnosis *(nirvikalpakalokottarajñāna)* or pure post-concentrative mundane knowledge *(pṛṣṭhalabdha-laukikajñāna)*; for a theory of the *tathatā* that conceives it as an absolutely real entity, though beyond the categories of existence and non-existence, merely assimilates it to the ineffable *ātman* of the heterodox sectarians. *Tathatā*, then, is simply cessation of all dichotomizing conceptualization.[212]

The *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa is also ascribed to Bhavya. In the Tibetan translation, the only extant version of this work, the Tarkajvālā is even referred to as having been composed by its author.[213] However, the work contains references to Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti; and its doctrine bears the stamp of later developments, including some inspired by the Vajrayāna. Presumably it has accordingly to be assigned to another (later) Bhavya.[214]

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[211] Bhāvaviveka seems thus to have taken a step towards a synthesis of the methods (if not the doctrines) of these two great schools of Mahāyānist philosophy, a synthesis that was developed further by Śāntarakṣita in the eighth century. Bhāvaviveka's Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka is nevertheless considered by doxographers to differ from Śāntarakṣita's Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka by accepting external objects *(bāhyārtha)* and rejecting that form of direct knowledge additional to the cognitions derived through the five sense-faculties and the mind, and known as 'self-awareness' *(svasaṃvedana, svasaṃvitti)*. See below, p. 87.

[212] See MCB 2 (1932—33), pp. 105—22.

[213] Fol. 335b3: *bdag gis bkod pa rtog ge 'bar ba.*

[214] On this work cf. lCaṅ·skya·Rol·pa'i·rdo·rje, Grub·mtha', kha, fol. 6a; S. Schayer, RO 11 (1935), pp. 206—11; S. Yamaguchi, Bukkyōgaku bunshū, i (Tōkyō, 1972), p. 249 sq.— C. Lindtner, AO 40 (1979), p. 90, has ascribed this work to Bhavya = Bhāvaviveka I, disregarding the reference to Dharmakīrti (and dating Candrakīrti as a consequence to 530—600).

A certain Bhavya (sKal·ldan·rgyal·po) was, according to Bu·ston (Chos·'byuṅ,

*Later Svātantrikas*

Avalokitavrata composed a very extensive and detailed Ṭīkā on Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa.[215] This work is of great value for the historian of Indian philosophy during this important and active period in its development. Among the great Buddhist masters of the seventh century to whom it refers are Dharmakīrti, the continuator of Dignāga's logico-epistemological school, and Candrakīrti, who opposed Bhāvaviveka on several important points of Madhyamaka thought.[216]

An earlier commentary on the Prajñāpradīpa by Guṇadatta is referred to by Avalokitavrata.[217]

Jñānaprabha, a follower of Bhāvaviveka, was known to Fa-tsang (643—712) on the authority of Divākara as a contemporary and opponent at Nālandā of Śīlabhadra, the disciple of Dharmapāla (*c.* 530—561 ?) and teacher of Hsüan-tsang (602—664).[218]

*Śrīgupta*

Śrīgupta (seventh century ?) is the author of a small treatise entitled Tattvāvatāravṛtti. According to Tāranātha he was a teacher of Jñānagarbha;[219] and he is often classified as a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika.[220]

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fol. 138a7 [ii, p. 215]), the teacher of rÑog·Blo·ldan·šes·rab (1059—1109), with whom he translated Prajñākaragupta's Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra; he must therefore be distinguished also from the author of the Prajñāpradīpa, etc. On the Tāntrika Bhavya see below, p. 106.

[215] Tāranātha makes Avalokitavrata a contemporary, in the South, of King Devapāla (whom he places before Dharmapāla, *rg. c.* 770—810 or 775—812); see rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 162. He has been tentatively dated in the seventh century by Y. Kajiyama, WZKS 17 (1973), p. 162.

[216] It has been observed that Avalokitavrata has not gone into Candrakīrti's critique of Bhāvaviveka's position; see Y. Kajiyama, WZKSO 7 (1963), p. 39.

[217] Ṭīkā, wa, fol. 45a3. Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna has included a commentary by Guṇadatta in his list of the eight great commentaries on the MMK (Bodhimārgadīpapañjikā, fol. 324b); but this indication seems to be due simply to confusion with Devaśarman, whom he has mentioned as a commentator on the Prajñāpradīpa (whereas, as noted above, Avalokitavrata states that Bhāvaviveka refers to Devaśarman). In the list of the eight commentaries given by mKhas·grub·dGe·legs·dpal·bzaṅ, Devaśarman in fact figures instead of Guṇadatta; and Devaśarman's dKar·po·rnam·par·'char·ba is said to be the commentary on the MMK followed by Bhāvaviveka (sTon·thun·chen·mo, fol. 37b).

[218] See Fa-tsang's treatise on the 'Awakening of Faith' referred to by L. de La Vallée Poussin, MCB 2 (1932—33), pp. 63—64, 139. Cf. N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Karatalaratna, p. viii; N. Péri, BEFEO 1911, p. 367 note; A. Forte, Divākara (613—688), Annali di Ca'Foscari, 13/3 (Serie Orientale 5, Venice, 1974), pp. 150—1.

[219] rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 152. See also the ordination-lineage quoted below, p. 89 and note 285.—Tāranātha makes Śrīgupta a contemporary of Dharmakīrti and Vimalacandra (a king of the Candra dynasty which preceded the Pālas), and gives his teacher's name as *Sampraduta (?); see op. cit., p. 132.

[220] Bu·ston counts Śrīgupta as a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika (Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 103a [ii, p. 135]; cf. fol. 158b).

His treatise is devoted to the logical elaboration and explication of the proposition that all things—external elements *(paramāṇu)* and internal cognitions—are in reality *(tattvataḥ)* without own being, for they are all without either simple or multiple self-nature (*ekasvabhāva* and *anekasvabhāva*) just like a reflection *(pratibimbavat)*. This argument constitutes one of the four (or five) 'great reasons' adduced to establish the Madhyamaka theory of non-substantiality by the later Indo-Tibetan tradition. A material element, it is explained, is not simple (i.e. partless and hence spatially unextended) because there could then never be any extended aggregates of such elements in space; nor is it multiple since multiplicity presupposes a plurality of simple elements the possibility of which has just been refuted.[221] Similarly it is argued that the notion of either simple or multiple cognition is untenable. And any third possibility *(rāśi)* beside the simple and multiple is unavailable owing to the principles of contradiction and the excluded middle. Moreover, the images *(ākāra)* of the mind are not false *(alīka)*. But ultimately mind as well as the mental factors are without own being. And the teaching of Vijñapti is provisional since it serves as an expedient to bring persons who postulate the existence of real entities to an understanding of non-substantiality. All things perish in an instant *(kṣaṇa)* and are transient; permanent things could be efficient *(arthakriyāsamartha)* neither sequentially nor simultaneously. The Middle Way lies then in eliminating the twin extremes of eternalistic imputation *(samāropa)* of a *svabhāva* and nihilistic denial *(apavāda)* of everything. While one does not know reality, and so long as *saṃvṛti* is not brought to a stop, one is bound to the wheel of acts and their results, viz. the conditions culminating in old age and death; passion, hate and the other *kleśa*s in fact arise because of grasping at things misconceived as substantially real. But through exact view *(samyagdṛṣṭi)* both ultimate good *(naiḥśreyasa*, i.e. liberation) and well-being in the world *(abhyudaya)* are attained.

### *Jñānagarbha*

Jñānagarbha, who is stated to have been a disciple of Śrīgupta,[222] is the author of the Satyadvayavibhaṅga and its autocommentary (Vṛtti).[223] This work has been commented on by Śāntarakṣita in his Satyadvayavibhaṅga-

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[221] For an earlier critique of the idea of a *paramāṇu* along similar lines, see Vasubandhu, Viṃśatikā 11 sq. And for the idea that an element is neither impartite and simple (since it has multiple sides in space) nor multiple (because this could be nothing but a multiplicity of the simple units just rejected), see also Ratnāvalī i. 71 (and Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣaparicccheda 360).

[222] See Tāranātha, rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 152.

[223] These two works by Jñānagarbha are available in the sDe·dge edition (3881—2), but not in the Peking edition of the bsTan·'gyur.—Bu·ston counts Jñānagarbha as a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika (Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 103a [ii, p. 135]). See also Ćoṅ·kha·pa, Legs·bšad·sñiṅ·po, fol. 63a. According to mKhas·grub·dGe·legs·dpal·bzaṅ, Jñānagarbha's Satyadvayavibhaṅga, Śāntarakṣita's Madhyama-

Pañjikā.[224] Jñānagarbha is also reported to have been a teacher of Śāntarakṣita.[225] In all probability he flourished in the first part of the eighth century.[226]

In his treatise he has sought to clarify the theory of the two truths, which had become the object of misunderstanding even among some Buddhists. The opponents against whom he was arguing were Dharmapāla (*c.* 530—561) and his followers according to Śāntarakṣita (Pañjikā, fol. 4a2), who also notes discussions by Jñānagarbha of the views of Sthiramati (*c.* 510—570) (fol. 32b) and Devendrabuddhi (*c.* 630—690) (fol. 28a). In conformity with the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka position, the theory of the *paratantra*—the second of the three *svabhāvas*—is alluded to (fol. 7a, 12b); while the *cittamātra* is regarded as only a step leading finally to the ultimate understanding of *dharmanairātmya* according to the Madhyamaka (fol. 13a).

Jñānagarbha explains that the first of the two truths, the *paramārtha*, is non-deceptive. Its nature is in accord not with appearance (*snaṅ ba: pratibhāsa*,

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kālaṃkāra and Kamalaśīla's Madhyamakāloka were known as the *raṅ rgyud śar gsum* (rGyud·sde·spyi·rnam, ed. Lessing-Wayman, p. 90). But this authority counts Jñānagarbha as a Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika since (he says) the latter maintained that *rūpa*, *śabda*, etc. are other than *citta* and are therefore non-sentient and material; while Śāntarakṣita and his school held them to be not other than *citta* and considered the *bāhyārtha* (corresponding to what others held to be *jaḍa* or material) to be unestablished (which is, however, not to say that they claimed all *dharmas* to be simply one's own thought) (see op. cit., p. 92, and sTon·thun·chen·mo, fol. 37a).—For some Japanese studies on Jñānagarbha see H. Inagaki, in: Buddhist thought and Asian civilization (Fests. H. V. Guenther, Emeryville, 1977), p. 132 sq.

[224] A Jñānagarbha translated Śāntarakṣita's Satyadvayavibhaṅga-Pañjikā into Tibetan together with Ye·šes·sde in the early ninth century; this fact makes it unlikely (though not entirely impossible) that he is the same Jñānagarbha as the author of the basic text and Vṛtti of the Satyadvayavibhaṅga. The translator Jñānagarbha was also responsible, together with Cog·ro·Klu'i·rgyal·mćhan, for the Tibetan translations of Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa and Avalokitavrata's Ṭīkā thereon, so that he may have been a Svātantrika-Mādhyamika; however, he also translated Buddhapālita's commentary on the MMK (first translation). In these circumstances it is difficult to determine which Jñānagarbha was the author of the commentary on the Maitreya-chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, and also of the Yogabhāvanāmārga (or °patha) included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan·'gyur (the latter work shares a concern with problems of meditational practice treated by Kamalaśīla in his Bhāvanākrama).—Another Jñānagarbha was a teacher and collaborator of Mar·pa·Chos·kyi·blo·gros in the eleventh century; see e.g. 'Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal, Deb·ther·sńon·po, ña, fol. 2a (ii, p. 400, together with G. N. Roerich's note on p. 417).

It is to be noted further that Tāranātha has recorded the existence of doubts concerning whether the author of the Satyadvayavibhaṅga-Pañjikā and the author of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra are identical (rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 162—3). See also Ćoṅ·kha·pa, Legs·bšad·sñiṅ·po, fol. 64b, and lCaṅ·skya·Rol·pa'i·rdo·rje, Grub·mtha, kha, fol. 6a—b, who also reject the identity of authorship of these two works.

[225] Cf. Sum·pa·mkhan·po·Ye·šes·dpal·'byor, dPag·bsam·ljon·bzaṅ (ed. S. Ch. Das), p. 112.

[226] Tāranātha makes Jñānagarbha a contemporary of King *Govicandra (op. cit., p. 152).

*nirbhāsa*, etc.) but with certain knowledge achieved through reasoned principles (*yukti* or *nyāya*) and a proper logical reason *(trirūpa-liṅga)* (fol. 4a). It is also free from the movement of discursive thinking, not to speak of syllables *(akṣara)* (fol. 5a); indeed, as stated in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, only silence is adequate to the *dharmamukha* which is without duality *(advaya)* and is free from discursive development *(niṣprapañca)* (fol. 6a–b). The *saṃvṛti* on the contrary is appearance, and it is not ultimately real or true. But what is perceived by everybody inclusive even of untutored cowherds is still termed *saṃvṛti-satya* (fol. 4a). It involves designations *(prajñapti)* in terms of worldly pragmatic usage *(lokavyavahāra)*, namely what is indicated by syllables, language and linguistic convention *(saṃketa)* (fol. 5a). What originates on the basis of causes and conditions *(hetupratyaya)*—conceived of as authentic things *(vastu)* without, however, being imagined to be produced in reality—is true *saṃvṛti*. It is free from anything imaginarily construed as produced in reality (this latter being a pure construct issuing merely from certain philosophical imputations) as well as from the appearance of *vijñāna* or the transformations *(pariṇāma)* of primordial matter (*pradhāna*, as in the Sāṃkhya system) and material elements *(bhūta)* (fol. 5b; cf. 12b1), not to speak of erroneous perceptions such as a double moon *(dvicandra)* (fol. 4a). The *saṃvṛti* is accordingly either true or not true according to whether it has causal efficiency *(arthakriyāsāmarthya)* —as in the case e.g. of water, which is described as non-delusive on the relative level—or does not have this causal efficiency—as in the case e.g. of a mirage, which is delusive on the relative level. But both forms of *saṃvṛti* are similar in that they partake of appearance *(snaṅ ba can)* (fol. 5b, 6b). The true *saṃvṛti* is then comprised of all things in their entire extension *(yāvat)* as they appear from causes in the concordant cognitions of all people, including even the simple-minded *(bāla)* (fol. 5b). There is also no disagreement concerning their appearance-aspect *(snaṅ ba'i cha)* in the cognitions of a disputant *(vādin)* and his opponent *(prativādin)* (fol. 5a); and this fact makes possible meaningful philosophical debate invoking the subject, attribute and example of an inference *(anumāna)* concerning things the status of which is in dispute and has to be validly inferred (fol. 9b). Yet in reality, with respect to their 'thusness' *(tathatā)*, *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti* are not different (fol. 10a). Jñānagarbha has furthermore discussed the nature of selfawareness (*svasaṃvedana* or *svasaṃvitti* 'self-cognition,' fol. 4b) and the non-reality of the images *(ākāra)* of knowledge (fol. 4b, 7a; cf. 13a). Special attention is given to the principle that neither a simple nor a multiple thing can produce either a single or a multiple effect, which is argued at some length (fol. 7a sq.). The treatise ends with a treatment of buddhahood and the three *kāya*s of the *buddha* together with associated gnoseological matters (fol. 14a–15a).

In this treatise Jñānagarbha has mentioned (fol. 11a sq.) some 'bad disputants' who held not only that entities such as *rūpa* are not produced in reality but also that they are not produced even in *saṃvṛti*, so that they are comparable for example with the son of a barren woman (*vandhyāputra*, etc., i.e. a mere

*flatus vocis*); and he has criticized their opinion as being *inter alia* incompatible with worldly pragmatic usage based on valid knowledge such as direct perception. The allusion might be to Candrakīrti's theory of causal indeterminism even on the relative level, or it may be to some other opponent; the name of the opponent Jñānagarbha had in view is not given in the appropriate passage of Śāntarakṣita's Pañjikā (fol. 36a sq.).

A Yogabhāvanāmārga (or Yogabhāvanāpatha) included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan-'gyur is ascribed to (a) Jñānagarbha.[227]

*Candrakīrti*

Candrakīrti, about whose life we have little reliable information, lived in the seventh century (*c.* 600—650).[228]

He criticized with acumen and penetration the objections against Buddhapālita's procedure raised by Bhāvaviveka and this Svātantrika master's adoption of independent inferences and syllogisms. And he sought to establish once for all the *prasaṅga* method of reasoning, so that he has been regarded as the founder in the strict sense of the Prāsaṅgika school. Candrakīrti's critique is directed also against doctrines of the Buddhist logico-epistemological school which he regarded as contrary to Nāgārjuna's teaching, and against the metaphysical and gnoseological theories of the Yogācārins/Vijñānavādins.

Candrakīrti's two largest and best-known works are the Madhyamakāvatāra, which is available in some Sanskrit fragments and in Tibetan, and the Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛttiḥ, an extensive commentary on the MMK available in the original Sanskrit as well as in Tibetan.[229]

The Madhyamakāvatāra-Kārikās are accompanied by a detailed commentary (Bhāṣya). This independent treatise is conceived as a general introduction to the Madhyamaka-Śāstra and was composed before the Prasannapadā which refers to it. It is divided into sections according to the ten productions of thought (of Awakening, *cittotpāda*), each of which is linked with one of the ten stages *(bhūmi)* of the Bodhisattva and a corresponding perfection *(pāramitā)*. These ten sections are followed by a short one on the qualities *(guṇa)* of the

[227] On the existence of different persons with the name Jñānagarbha see above, note 224.

[228] The dates 530—600 have been proposed by C. Lindtner, AO 40 (1979), p. 91, on the assumption that the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa was composed by Bhavya = Bhāvaviveka I. But this text refers not only to Candrakīrti but also to Dharmakīrti (see above, p. 66), who is usually placed in the seventh century.

[229] A Tibetan translation of the Madhyamakāvatāra was edited, together with the autocommentary (Bhāṣya), by L. de La Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica ix (St. Petersburg, 1907—12); it was translated by him, up to vi. 165, in Muséon 8 (1907), pp. 249—317; 11 (1910), pp. 271—358; and 12 (1911), pp. 235—328.—The Sanskrit text of the Prasannapadā was edited by L. de La Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica iv (St. Petersburg, 1903—13). See also J. W. de Jong, IIJ 20 (1978), pp. 25—59 and pp. 217—52.

Bodhisattva, one on the Buddha-stage *(buddhabhūmi)*, and a brief conclusion. In this work Candrakīrti has frequently mentioned the practiser of Yoga, or *yogācāra*, thus conforming with the usage of Āryadeva and also Bhāvaviveka. The emphasis placed in the MA on soteriological and connected gnoseological topics, following the Daśabhūmikasūtra which serves as a point of departure on the subject, both distinguishes this general treatise from works of the school which relate to the MMK and brings it into line with what Nāgārjuna has himself written in some of his other works,[230] and with topics already treated by Bhāvaviveka in his 'Jewel in hand treatise'.

The sixth section of the Madhyamakāvatāra dealing with the Abhimukhī-stage and the *prajñāpāramitā* is by far the longest, and it explains in great detail different themes connected with transcending discriminative knowledge *(prajñā)* as the Bodhisattva's central perfection. Taking as his point of departure the negation of production from self etc. (cf. MMK i. 1), Candrakīrti first considers origination in dependence *(pratītyasamutpāda)* and emptiness *(śūnyatā)*. In particular, he discusses (12) Bhāvaviveka's use of independent inference to establish the Mādhyamika's doctrines; and he examines his qualification of the negative statements by the restriction 'in reality' *(paramārthatas)*, which he rejects on the ground that production is no less unreal (indeterminate) on the level of *saṃvṛti* (this being one of the main points of the Prāsaṅgika school).[231] Candrakīrti also explains (23 sq.) the theory of the two truths—the *saṃvṛti*° and the *paramārtha-satya*—in relation to the distinction between 'covering' *(vṛ-)*, which is characteristic of relative knowledge in the world *(loka)*, and the highest gnosis *(jñāna)* of the saint *(ārya)* which comprehends with perfect accuracy. The *saṃvṛtisatya* is then shown to be *lokasaṃvṛtisatya* (27), i.e. what originates in dependence and is thus well-established in worldly transactional usage (in contradistinction to what is due to erroneous cognition, *mithyājñāna*, and is therefore untrue even on the surface-level) (28). Conventional transactional truth *(vyavahārasatya)* is to be regarded as means *(upāya)*, and the *paramārthasatya* as what is attained by means of it *(upeya)* (80).[232] Candrakīrti notes that all things *(bhāva)* have these two natures (23 and 27); but since the first is actually delusive from the point of view of ultimate reality it is not in fact 'true' *(satya)* (28). This leads to the examination (31) of what is established in worldly consensus *(lokaprasiddha)*, and of the question of valid knowledge *(pramāṇa)* on the worldly surface level. Next, in connexion with the negation of production from an other entity, Candrakīrti takes up (34 sq.) the examination and refutation of the Vijñānavādin's doctrine of the three natures—in particular the dependent nature *(paratantrasvabhāva)*—and of the 'store-consciousness' *(ālayavijñāna)*. And pointing to the fact that the Laṅkāvatāra-

[230] Or: in works at least ascribed to Nāgārjuna. On the Ratnāvalī, the *Bodhisambhāra-śāstra and the commentary on the Daśabhūmika see above. Compare also Chapter v of Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka.

[231] See above, p. 43; below, p. 77.

[232] Cf. MMK xxiv. 10.

sūtra has identified the *ālayavijñāna* with the *tathāgatagarbha* while at the same time describing the latter doctrine as provisional and of indirect meaning *(neyārtha)*, Candrakīrti seeks to establish that the *ālayavijñāna* itself must by the same token be of provisional and indirect meaning according to the Sūtra (95).[233] The denial of an external object *(bāhyārtha, bahirartha)* of knowledge and the theory of 'self-awareness' *(svasaṃvedana, svasaṃvitti)* are also criticized in some detail (71 sq.). In the course of his discussion of the Vijñānavādin's mind-only doctrine Candrakīrti alludes to the *cittamātra* concept mentioned in the Daśabhūmikasūtra;[234] and he clearly distinguishes it from the Vijñaptimātra doctrine he is refuting (83). Returning to the subject of origination in dependence on the level of worldly transactional usage, Candrakīrti notes that the canonical formulae traditionally used to express it—viz. *asmin sati idaṃ bhavati* 'this being, that is' and *asyotpādād idam utpadyate* 'as a result of the origination of this that originates'—are pure doctrinal convention *(dharmasaṃketa)* since no real production of an entity in fact takes place (114).[235] As for the Mādhyamika's own method of analysis *(vicāra)* that puts a stop to all mental construction, it is resorted to not out of a predilection for disputes and a mere desire to refute an opponent's thesis. On the contrary, it is employed with a view to liberation *(vimukti)*. And if other doctrines are overwhelmed in the course of this investigation, this is simply because they are dispelled by the exposition of reality *(tattva)*, just as darkness is by light (117–18). The non-substantiality of all factors *(dharmanairātmya)* having thus been expounded, the following part of the sixth section is devoted to the non-substantiality of the individual *(pudgalanairātmya,* 120 sq.) and to a refutation of the view hypostatizing the individual constituents as real *(satkāyadṛṣṭi,* in twenty canonical and twenty-five commentarial forms). This is done by means of the fourfold and fivefold *vicāra* (144).[236] To these five schemata—identity, otherness, container, containedness, and connexion[237]—Candrakīrti adds two more, namely the aggregation of distinct component parts and shape as belonging either to these individual components or to their totality (151 sq.). Here the classical

[233] Laṅkāvatārasūtra vi, p. 235–6.—In this Sūtra (ii, p. 77–78), the doctrine of the *tathāgatagarbha* was compared with that of the *ātman*. The main line of the pure Madhyamaka school appears either to disregard the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching, or to consider it as an intentional *(ābhiprāyika)* teaching of indirect meaning *(neyārtha)* similar to that of the *ātman*. This is the position e.g. of Bhāvaviveka (Tarkajvālā, ja, fol. 169a) and Candrakīrti (Madhyamakāvatāra vi. 95); cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra (Paris, 1969), pp. 35 note, 402 sq.—On a Mādhyamika current of thought associated with the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine see, however, above, pp. 55–56.

For the distinction between *neyārtha* and *nītārtha* see also Candrakīrti, PP xv. 11 (p. 276) (cf. i. 1, p. 42).

[234] Daśabhūmikasūtra, Chapter vi (E) (quoted above, note 69).

[235] Cf. PP i, p. 9 sq.; 55; above, p. 43.

[236] On *satkāyadṛṣṭi* see recently A. Wayman in Studies in Pali and Buddhism, ed. A. K. Narain (Delhi, 1979), pp. 375–80.

[237] See above, p. 40.

example of 'chariot' as a mere fictional designation based on the assemblage of individual parts is adduced with a view to analysing the fiction of the *satkāyadṛṣṭi* or *ātmadṛṣṭi* that is falsely constructed on the basis of the *skandhas*. This analysis allows the Mādhyamika to retain worldly transactional usage *(lokavyavahāra)*—in terms of conditional designation *(upādāya prajñaptiḥ)*—without, however, positing any entity established either on the surface level of *saṃvṛti* or in ultimate reality (158). The sevenfold scheme of analysis thus reveals the principle of *pratītyasamutpāda* (158) while still saving the appearances of things recognized consensually in the world *(lokaprasiddha)* of *saṃvṛti*, but which cannot sustain careful analysis (159); and it thus permits the Yogin to fathom reality *(tattvam avagāh-)* (160–4). After the fictional construct of an *ātman* the resulting, and *a fortiori* fictional, construct of something related to the self *(ātmīya)* is considered (165). The last part of the section comprises an explanation of the sixteen and twenty forms of *śūnyatā* (179 sq.). Candrakīrti observes that the *pudgalanairātmya* was taught to deliver the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha, who cannot yet fully and completely comprehend the *dharmanairātmya* in all its modes (179). Yet he concludes that they can comprehend it within certain limits, inasmuch as they too must have the knowledge that all *dharmas* are without self-existence *(niḥsvabhāva)*.[238]

The final section of the Madhyamakāvatāra on the *buddhabhūmi* is of special interest for the study of Madhyamaka thought since it is devoted to the Prāsaṅgika school's buddhology, that is, to the nature and qualities of the *buddha* and the gnosis *(jñāna)* corresponding to this supreme level.

On the Madhyamakāvatāra there exists in Tibetan translation an extensive commentary by Jayānanda (see below, p. 113).

Candrakīrti's commentary on the MMK, the Prasannapadā Mūlamadhyamakavṛttiḥ, is considerably more extensive than Buddhapālita's commentary on the same stanzas. Very often in his philosophical discussion Candrakīrti goes beyond, and improves on, Buddhapālita's interpretations; this he does tacitly without calling attention to his own contributions. Candrakīrti's critique of Bhāvaviveka as well as of the Buddhist logico-epistemological school is to be found explicitly set forth in his elaborate explanations on Chapter i of the MMK.

In the Prasannapadā (xxiv. 8) Candrakīrti has again discussed the two truths. *Saṃvṛti* may, he explains, mean (i) ignorance since it completely covers *(vṛ-)* the reality of all things, or (ii) interrelatedness, or (iii) convention *(saṃketa)*, i.e. worldly transactional usage *(lokavyavahāra)* defined in terms of the relation of a designation to its designatum and of a cognition to the object of cognition. The *saṃvṛti* in worldly usage is termed *lokasaṃvṛti;* and while it can serve no real purpose to distinguish an *alokasaṃvṛti* opposed to it (from the point of view of ultimate reality both are unreal, though in different degrees from the

[238] MA i. 8, which quotes Daśabhūmikasūtra, Chapter vii (J); cf. PP xviii. 5. See also MA vi. 179, and above, p. 7.

relative standpoint), one may nevertheless speak of an *alokasaṃvṛti* as distinct from it when considering that there exist persons who can be described as 'not of the world' *(alokāḥ)* since they have experiences which are falsified because of the fact that their sense-faculties are impaired (and which, therefore, do not belong to the general worldly consensus).[239] As for the *lokasaṃvṛtisatya*, it is 'true' in virtue of worldly convention *(saṃvṛti)*, and the whole of transactional usage made up of designations in relation to their designata and cognitions in relation to their objects is then termed 'true' by *lokasaṃvṛti;* but it is not so really *(paramārthataḥ)*.[240] Candrakīrti defines the *paramārtha* on the basis of the MMK (xviii. 7 and 9) as that with respect to which there is no functioning of words and cognitions; for it is not communicated by another, and it is still, directly knowable *(pratyātmavedya)* by the Āryas, and beyond all discursive development *(prapañca)*. Grammatically speaking, the word *paramārtha* is interpreted as an appositional compound (analysable as *paramaś cāsāv arthaś ca*, i.e. a *karmadhāraya*).[241] Such is then what is true, the *paramārthasatya*. For a fuller discussion of the subject Candrakīrti refers back to his Madhyamakāvatāra (vi. 23 sq.).

Although relative and transactional 'truth' is regarded as the means through which the *paramārtha* is realized,[242] Candrakīrti evidently regards the surface-level processes of transactional usage as causally indeterminate—even as antinomic and unamenable to ontological construction. On this subject he quotes Sūtra texts as well as the verse of the MMK (xviii. 10), where Nāgārjuna has said that whatever originates in dependence on some thing is not that thing nor is it different from it, and that that thing is consequently neither destroyed nor eternal (PP i. 1, p. 25–26).[243] In this matter of the *saṃvṛti* level and its processes Candrakīrti thus differs from Bhāvaviveka, who has stated that *tathya-saṃvṛti*, consisting as it does in *avitatha-lokavyavahāra* opposed to *mithyā-saṃvṛti*, is truth *(satya)* and valid knowledge *(pramāṇa)*.[244]

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[239] Cf. MA vi. 24–28 on the question of factors that originate in dependence on the surface level—e.g. *citta*, *rūpa*, *vedanā*, etc.—and what is false even on that level—e.g. a reflection *(pratibimba)*, an echo *(pratiśrutka)*, etc. (The former may be regarded as transactionally efficient and 'true', whereas the latter are not transactionally efficient and are thus false.)—However, in PP xxiv. 11 *lokasaṃvṛti* is described as reflection-like *(pratibimbākāra)*. In fact the entire level of *saṃvṛti* and what originates through *pratītyasamutpāda* is compared with a reflection; cf. xxii. 2, xxiv. 35, xxvi. 11 and xxvii. 29.

[240] Elsewhere Candrakīrti has used the expression *loka-(saṃ)vyavahāra;* see PP i, pp. 57. 10 and xv. 2.

[241] Here Candrakīrti agrees with the first interpretation in Bhāvaviveka's Tarkajvālā (fol. 63a), where the term *paramārtha* is analysed as (i) a compound of *artha* (that which is cognized) and *parama* (the supreme), (ii) a *tatpuruṣa* meaning '*artha* of the supreme,' viz. non-conceptual gnosis, and (iii) that which conforms to the supreme *artha*, viz. *prajñā*. But Candrakīrti differs from Bhāvaviveka in regarding only the *paramārtha* as *satya*.

[242] MA vi. 80; cf. MMK xxiv. 9–11.

[243] See above, p. 43.

[244] Tarkajvālā iii. 12 (fol. 60a).

Self-causation, other-causation and causelessness as well as generation from self, an other or a combination of both self and other having been rejected *(niṣiddha)* in the Madhyamaka, the relative surface-level nature of relative things has been shown *(udbhāvita)*. And it is this precisely that constitutes relative surface-level production in dependence *(sāṃvṛta-pratītyasamutpāda)*. Now, since there is no production in virtue of own being (*svabhāva* 'aseity') with regard to the gnosis *(jñāna)* of the Ārya, no destruction (*nirodha*, i.e. as the complementary opposite of *utpāda* 'production') is to be found there either; and the same applies to *uccheda* and *śāśvata*, *ekārtha* and *nānārtha*, *āgama* and *nirgama*. The *pratītyasamutpāda* is accordingly characterized in the introductory verses to the MMK as free from all these eight features: 'without destruction and production, neither annihilated nor eternal, neither single nor multiple, and without movement to an fro' (PP i, p. 10—11). Thus the principle of conditionship *(idampratyayatā)* has been rethought by the Mādhyamika (PP i, p. 9—10 and MA vi. 114).

With respect to the nature of things, in the discussion of the fourth position of the so-called tetralemma *(catuṣkoṭi)* expressed in the form of a bi-negation ('neither ... nor') and elsewhere, it is observed that no property may be appropriately predicated of ultimately unreal entities. To ascribe a property to an empty thing would indeed be like applying the predicate 'dark' or 'pale' to the son of a barren woman (*vandhyāputra*, *vandhyāsuta*, etc.), which is simply a non-referring designation.[245] To exemplify a non-existent *(avidyamāna: abhāva, nâsti)* construct or non-referring designation we find in addition the comparison with a sky-flower *(khapuṣpa, gaganakusuma)*.[246] Furthermore, in the discussion of the conditioned *(saṃskṛta)*, the sky-flower—which as a mere designation and construct is not causally conditioned—is cited as a counter-example for whatever is causally conditioned, and hence transient and instantaneous *(kṣaṇika)*;[247] but the perishing *(vināśa)* of things is not due to some separate and self-existent cause, for it is precisely the nature of conditioned things to perish.[248]

Candrakīrti's comment on the first chapter of the MMK provides an important account of the Prāsaṅgika's approach to the negative statements of the Madhyamaka (MMK i. 1). Since all things are unproduced from self, etc. not only on the level of the *paramārtha* (on which point Bhāvaviveka of course agrees) but also on the surface level of *saṃvṛti* (since the concept of the production of substantial self-existent entities through causes and conditions is found to be antinomic and onto-logically untenable), Bhāvaviveka's restriction, in his independent inferences and syllogisms, of non-production to the *paramārtha* level is unacceptable.[249] Candrakīrti adds that the qualification 'in

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[245] PP xxii. 12, xxvii. 29 and xviii. 8 (cf. xiii. 3, xxiv. 1).

[246] PP i. 1 (p. 64. 2), v. 2, xxiv. 21.

[247] PP vii. 32; cf. xviii. 1 (p. 343), xxv. 4.

[248] PP vii. 32 with i. 1 (p. 29. 4—5) and xxi. 4.

[249] Cf. however PP xiii. 2 (p. 453. 5): *'tattvataḥ'...paramārthataḥ svabhāvato na vidyante* (speaking of the *kleśas*).

reality' *(paramārthataḥ)* could not possibly be taken to refer exclusively to the doctrines of causality held by non-Buddhist sectarians *(tīrthika)* because these doctrines are invalid even for the surface level. Yet people do in fact commonly speak of an effect proceeding from a cause; and so long as he does not attempt to transform this conventional usage into a philosophical system postulating the causation of substantial entities the Mādhyamika may do so likewise. (Indeed Nāgārjuna has himself proceeded in this way following the Buddha, who is quoted as saying[250] that, although people dispute with him, he does not dispute with them inasmuch as he assents to what is agreed in the world and does not assent to what is not so agreed (PP xviii. 8).) The qualification '*paramārthataḥ*' introduced by Bhāvaviveka is therefore quite without justification (PP i. 1, pp. 26–27).

Candrakīrti points out that Bhāvaviveka's introduction into his independent inferences and syllogisms of the qualification '*paramārthataḥ*' in order to avoid the negation of production on the relative level is also faulty technically. For the inference—*na paramārthata ādhyātmikāny āyatanāni svata utpannāni, vidyamānatvāt* (pp. 25–26)—in which it is introduced will have a faulty thesis *(pakṣadoṣa)*, the subject of the proposition—the eye and the other internal bases—being (in different ways) unreal and unestablished *(asiddhādhāra)* for both its proponent and opponent. It is so for its proponent, the Mādhyamika, since he does not accept such an entity produced from self, etc., and the subject is thus empty (null) for him. And Candrakīrti observes that it would be of no avail in this matter to maintain that the subject of the proposition is established relatively *(saṃvṛtyā)* because the question then arises as to what the qualification *paramārthataḥ* relates to; if it has been used to qualify the negation of production the formula should have been *sāṃvṛtānāṃ cakṣurādīnām paramārthato nâsty utpattiḥ*, but this is not what Bhāvaviveka has in fact written. In any case, Bhāvaviveka's inference remains faulty in its thesis from the point of view of the opponent against whom he is arguing because, for this opponent, the subject of the proposition is real *(dravyasat)* and an inner base unproduced in reality is therefore meaningless for him (pp. 27–28).[251]—In addition, Bhāvaviveka's *svatantrānumāna* also contains a faulty reason because its ground or logical reason—*vidyamānatvāt* (p. 26.1) or *sattvāt* (pp. 30.15, 33.4) 'because it exists'—is defective. This is so because, if existence refers here to the relative surface-level *(saṃvṛti)* only, the logical reason will be unestablished *(asiddha)* from the point of view of its proponent, who does not actually accept the reality of the thing. And if existence related here to the level of ultimate reality *(paramārtha)* the logical reason would be unestablished or contradictory

[250] Saṃyuttanikāya iii, p. 38.

[251] That is, to the opponent in the debate, who presupposes that the eye, etc., are real *(dravyasat)*, non-production of things is not acceptable; and the logical fault of unestablished subject is then usually considered by the logicians, with whom Bhāvaviveka had allied himself, to be a fault in an argument with such an opponent.

*(viruddha)* from the point of view of the proponent, since the Mādhyamika (including Bhāvaviveka) does not in fact accept the real production of any thing (PP i, p. 31, which refers to MMK i. 7).

With regard to the status of a propositional thesis *(pratijñā)* in Madhyamaka thought, it is of course recognized by Candrakīrti (PP i, p. 16) that Nāgārjuna clearly stated that he maintains no *pratijñā*.[252] Yet, in his interpretation of MMK xxi. 2,[253] Candrakīrti describes the first half-verse as a *pratijñā*, the next quarter-verse as the adducing of the undesired consequence *(prasaṅgāpādana)*, and the last quarter-verse as the conclusion *(nigamana)*.[254] But this explanation is not intended to reject the usual Madhyamaka standpoint; for not only does Candrakīrti make it clear that we have to do here with a *prasaṅga* but there is no suggestion that Nāgārjuna was trying to establish the existence of some entity presented as the subject of a proposition. In other words, notwithstanding the terminological difficulty raised by the use of the word *pratijñā*, Candrakīrti evidently does not repudiate here what he expressly stated in the first part of the Prasannapadā, following what Nāgārjuna had himself said on the subject.[255]

As to the logical status of the *prasaṅga* method, and in reply to Bhāvaviveka's criticism of Buddhapālita's *prasaṅga*-type argument as being open to objection, Candrakīrti writes as follows: 'How could it be, as is suggested [by Bhāvaviveka], that the master Buddhapālita who followed the faultless doctrine of the master Nāgārjuna, has propounded a statement that is open to objection *(sāvakāśavacana)*, so that an opponent would be in a position to impugn it? When the advocate of the doctrine that entities are without own being adduces a *prasaṅga* against the advocate of the doctrine that entities have own being, how could there exist [for him] the occurring of some thing contrary to the *prasaṅga?* For words do not reduce him who utters them to dependence, in the manner of policemen armed with sticks and fetters! Rather, when they have semantic capacity they conform to the intention of the speaker. Therefore, because the application of the *prasaṅga* results exclusively in the negation *(pratiṣedhamātra)* of the opponent's thesis, there can arise nothing that is

[252] See Vigrahavyāvartanī 29—30. Candrakīrti also quotes in this connexion Āryedeva's Catuḥśataka xvi. 25: *sadasatsadasac cêti yasya pakṣo na vidyate/ upālambhaś cireṇâpi tasya vaktuṃ na śakyate//* 'He who has no thesis postulating existence, non-existence and both existence and non-existence cannot have an objection levelled against him.'

[253] 'How will there be destruction without production? [Were this the case, there would be] death without birth. There is no destruction without production.'

[254] For Candrakīrti's use of the word *pratijñā* see also PP iv. 2 and viii. 1 and 7; for *nigamana* see v. 5 (and v. 6 [p. 134. 5], vi. 10, ix. 14, and xxvii. 8 for *nigamayati*). The *prasaṅgāpādana* has been explained in PP i. 1, p. 24 (see above, p. 36 note 93; below).

[255] The word *pratijñā* can mean either 'proposition' or 'thesis' (serving to assert something of an entity). It is the second use of the word that can find no legitimate application in the Madhyamaka according to Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti; cf. also D. Seyfort Ruegg, JIP 5 (1977), p. 49—50.

contrary to the *prasaṅga*'.[256] Moreover, in contradistinction to relative (i.e. presuppositional and implicative) negation *(paryudāsapratiṣedha)*, the Mādhyamika's absolute non-presuppositional negation *(prasajyapratiṣedha)* does not commit him to accepting the contradictory proposition concerning the existence of any entity; and its force is fully exhausted in the annulment of the opponent's proposition, as already observed.

In his discussion of the employment in philosophical argument of independent inferences *(svatantrānumāna)* and syllogisms *(prayogavākya)* Candrakīrti has furthermore made a distinction of considerable interest between what we could perhaps call logical referential presuppositions for the interpretation of a proposition and pragmatic use of a proposition. He recalls that the logicians accepted as a binding rule that in an *anumāna* it is necessary in any case to reason with reference to entities the existence of which one accepts oneself *(svaprasiddha)* (whether the reality of these entities has to be presupposed also by one's opponent—*ubhayaprasiddha*, p. 35—is another question still). And a proper *anumāna* is not valid so long as it is founded only on the opponent's presuppositions (*paraprasiddha*, p. 34—35). On the contrary, for the philosopher employing the above-mentioned form of reasoning that simply adduces an undesired consequence in another's argument—the *prasaṅgāpādana*—the situation is altogether different according to Candrakīrti; for as the subjects of his sentences, which contain non-presuppositional *prasajya*-negations, this philosopher does not have to take entities which he himself supposes to be referential. And his *prasaṅgāpādana* indeed has as its sole end the annulment of the opponent's thesis (*parapratijñāniṣedhaphalatva*, p. 34) without its user being committed to any counter-thesis concerning the existential nature of the entities in question. A Prāsaṅgika is accordingly fully entitled to reason taking as his point of departure only his opponent's existential presuppositions; and he is then able to annul his opponent's statements solely on the basis of arguments that the latter has himself accepted (p. 34).

Now, in the light of this distinction, the referentiality of the subjects of their sentences and the truth-value of their propositions become altogether problematical for the Svātantrika, who must use his *svatantrānumāna* and *prayogavākya* in conformity with the established rules, but not for the Prāsaṅgika. For whereas the terms of the former's propositions should be *svaprasiddha* for him in order to fulfil the accepted logical requirements, they are in fact just as empty (null) and non-referential for the Svātantrika as they are for any other Mādhyamika.—As for the teaching of the Buddhas, since they adopt a transactional and pragmatic procedure purely motivated by their desire to help (: *anugraha*) others (p. 36), the terms of their statements need also not be dependent on existential presuppositions of their own concerning the referentiality of any entity being talked about. And they need take into account—in a so to speak purely therapeutic manner—only their auditors' (mis)conceptions. The method

[256] PP i, p. 24 (quoted above, p. 36 note 93); cf. p. 34. 5 and p. 13 (quoted above, note 94).

of their teaching is thus *ad hominem* in the best and most fitting sense (cf. PP i. 1, p. 57–58; xviii. 8). The criterion is then the pragmatic one of the appropriateness of a sentence in a given pedagogical situation.

With respect to the theory of correct knowledge *(pramāṇa)* having a corresponding object *(prameya)*, Candrakīrti follows Nāgārjuna's critique as set forth in particular in the Vigrahavyāvartanī (31 sq.).[257] Candrakīrti's rejection of the logico-epistemological school's doctrines extends to its whole theory of the existence of only two forms of *pramāṇa* together with their corresponding *prameya*s–namely *pratyakṣa* relating to the particular *(svalakṣaṇa)* and *anumāna* relating to the universal *(sāmānyalakṣaṇa)*–for the relationship between them is in no way different from that between a *lakṣaṇa* and its *lakṣya* which has already been criticized by Nāgārjuna (PP i. 1, p. 61).[258] In his epistemology the Prāsaṅgika then proceeds in what at first appears to be a quite naively realistic manner, taking what is accepted in worldly consensus as the basis for his logical procedure *(nyāya)* (PP i. 1, p. 35);[259] yet, based as it is on a prenetrating critique going back to Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva of the generally accepted logical and epistemological theories, the Prāsaṅgika's approach is in fact anything but naive or simplistic.[260]

Candrakīrti also rejects the form of knowledge additional to the forms derived from the five physical sense-faculties and the mind and known as 'self-awareness' (*svasaṃvedana* or *svasaṃvitti*) which was accepted by the Sautrāntikas and Vijñānavādins, inclusive of Dignāga's school, and later by the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas (PP i. 1, p. 61 sq.).[261]

For all his rejection of the pluralistic realism of the Sarvāstivādin's *dharma*-theory, the Prāsaṅgika's criticism led him to adopt in matters of epistemology (if not of ontology and gnoseology) a position that is not unrelated to the Sarvāstivādin's.[262] For people in the world, Candrakīrti observes, understanding of a thing is established through four means of knowledge. These are

[257] PP i, pp. 55–75.

[258] E.g. in MMK, Chapter v.

[259] Hence the name 'Madhyamaka which goes along with the worldly consensus *(lokaprasiddhi)*' given by some Tibetan scholars to Buddhapālita's and Candrakīrti's school (*'jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma;* see Bu·ston, Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 103a [ii, p. 135], and above, pp. 76, 79; this terminology appears also in the Grub·pa'i·mtha'·rnam·par·bšad·pa'i·mjod, fol. 9b, by dBus·pa·Blo·gsal [fourteenth century]). But see mKhas·grub·dGe·legs·dpal·bzaṅ, sTon·thun·chen·mo, fol. 41b–42a, on the appropriateness of this terminology.

[260] It might be described rather as nominalist (and sceptical in the sense of not adopting dogmatic speculative views).—For a later defence of the existence of external objects by Śubhagupta (eighth century, between Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara) see his Bāhyārthasiddhi (cf. M. Hattori, IBK 8/1 [1960], p. 9 sq., and N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Bull. of Tibetology 4 [1967], pp. 1–96). This position was criticized not only by the Vijñānavādins but also by the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas (cf. Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṃgraha, verse 1971 sq.).

[261] Cf. MA vi. 72 sq.

[262] This is a complicated question that has been much discussed. Cf. MA xiii. 1–2 (p. 406–7); mKhas·grub·dGe·legs·dpal·bzaṅ, sTon·thun·chen·mo, fol .42b.

direct perceptual knowledge *(pratyakṣa)*; inference *(anumāna)*, i.e. the form of knowledge having as its object what is not directly perceptible *(parokṣa)* and produced by an inferential mark that does not deviate from what is to be established *(sādhyāvyabhicāriliṅga)*; scriptural testimony *(āgama)*, i.e. the statement of reliable persons *(āpta)* who directly *(sākṣāt)* know things inaccessible to the faculties *(atīndriyārtha)*; and analogy *(upamāna)*, i.e. understanding through similarity *(sādṛśya)* as when we say that the gayal is like the cow (PP i, pp. 71–75).

At the end of each chapter of the PP are found extracts, often very lengthy ones, from a number of Mahāyānasūtras (see above, p. 7) which help to exemplify and corroborate what has been stated in the stanzas of the MMK and Candrakīrti's comment. In several cases the Tibetan translation of the PP does not contain all the quotations included in La Vallée Poussin's edition; and it is therefore possible that some of them are additions to Candrakīrti's text made by the commentarial tradition (see for example La Vallée Poussin's notes on pp. 388, 428 and 539 of his edition; compare also his note 2 on p. 336).

Vṛttis by Candrakīrti are available in Tibetan translation on Nāgārjuna's Śūnyatāsaptati and Yuktiṣaṣṭikā. Candrakīrti also wrote an extensive and important Ṭīkā, extant in Sanskrit fragments and a Tibetan translation, on Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka; unlike his predecessor Dharmapāla, whom he terms a poet (*sñan dṅags mkhan*, fol. 34a) and implicitly accuses of having interpreted Āryadeva in a manner that is contrary to the principles of the Madhyamaka (fol. 34b), he commented not only on the second portion of the work dealing with *dharmaniḥsvabhāvatā* but also on the first part containing an exposition of the Dharma which he considered an essential part of the work (fol. 34a). In his commentary on the Catuḥśataka Candrakīrti alludes to examples *(dpe)* set forth by Dharmadāsa, evidently another Vijñānavādin who turned his attention to Āryadeva's work (fol. 35a).[263] Candrakīrti has referred in this Ṭīkā to his own Madhyamakāvatāra vi. 80 (fol. 63a).[264]

Candrakīrti's Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa is an independent treatise dealing with the factors subsumed under the five groups *(skandha)* and with the related topics of the twelve *āyatanas* and eighteen *dhātus*.[265]

The *Madhyamakāvatāraprajñā or *Madhyamakaprajñāvatāra translated into Tibetan by its author together with 'Gos·khug·pa·lHa(s)·bćas must be by another Candrakīrti who lived much later, in the eleventh century.

On Candrakīrti-pāda, the author of important Tantrik works, see below, p. 105.

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[263] See above, note 148.

[264] On the Catuḥśataka-ṭīkā see S. Yamaguchi, Chūgan bukkyō ronkō (Tōkyō, 1965), p. 167 sq.; Bukkyōgaku bunshū, ii (Tōkyō, 1973), pp. 259 sq., 349 sq.

[265] Cf. S. Yamaguchi, Bukkyōgaku bunshū, ii, p. 437 sq.; C. Lindtner, AO 40 (1979), p. 87 sq.

*Śāntideva*

Śāntideva, the next great representative of the (Prāsaṅgika?) Madhyamaka school, flourished probably in the first part of the eighth century. He is reported to have been born as the son of a king of Surāṣṭra and, like Āryadeva, to have renounced his royal estate for a life of religion.[266]

Following on the elaboration and systematization of Madhyamaka thought carried out by his great predecessors, Śāntideva made a significant contribution to the school by taking the perfections *(pāramitā)* of the Bodhisattva as the focus for his exposition of the Mahāyāna, which he presents as the union of praxis (that is, compassionate method) and theoretical intellection, the two inseparable and coordinate components of the mind of Awakening *(bodhicitta)*. Thus, while Candrakīrti's 'Introduction to the Madhyamaka(-Śāstra)' is articulated round the ten stages of the Bodhisattva with their corresponding *pāramitās*, Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra constitutes an 'Introduction to the practice of Awakening' founded on the great *pāramitās* of the Bodhisattva, the first five of which are auxiliary to and guided by the sixth, namely the perfection of transcending discriminative understanding *(prajñāpāramitā)*.

The Bodhicaryāvatāra comprises the following chapters: (i) The advantages of the *bodhicitta* in its two forms (viz. the Bodhisattva's preliminary resolution—*praṇidhi*—and its realization—*prasthāna*—through the perfections on the Bodhisattva's path proper, 15–17); (ii) Offerings *(pūjā)*, homage *(vandanā)* and confession *(pāpadeśanā)*; (iii) Assumption of the *bodhicitta*; (iv) Absence of distraction in cultivating the *bodhicitta*; (v) Maintenance of awareness of mind; (vi) The Perfection of patient capacity *(kṣānti)*; (vii) The Perfection of energy *(vīrya)*; (viii) The Perfection of meditation *(dhyāna)*; (ix) The Prajñāpāramitā; and (x) The dedication *(pariṇāmanā)* of merit.[267]

In this work what might be called the mystical aspects of Madhyamaka thought come to the fore in connexion with the exposition of the purification of the spirit and contemplation, the Buddha's sustaining power (*buddhānubhāva*, i. 5, which works as a predetermining force—*adhiṣṭhāna*—according to the commentator Prajñākaramati), and the theory of ultimate reality free

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[266] See Bu·ston, Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 113b (ii, p. 161); Tāranātha, rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 125 sq. Cf. A. Pezzali, Śāntideva (Florence, 1968) and J. W. de Jong, IIJ 16 (1975), pp. 163, 179–80.—Śāntideva's BCA is quoted in Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasiddhi, fol. 38b6–7 (= BCA i. 10) and 38b7–8 (= BCA vii. 28).

[267] A recension of the BCA is reported to have lacked Chapters ii and ix (see Tāranātha, rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 127). In the lDan·dkar·ma Catalogue (no. 659) the extent of the BCA is given as 600 *ślokas* (in two *bam po*), rather than the 1000 verses indicated by Bu·ston, Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 114b1, 159a). Bu·ston discusses the discrepancy and states that a difference results from omitting the *pāpadeśanā* chapter (ii); and he observes that some have ascribed Chapter ix to a certain Blo·gros·mi·zad·pa (= Akṣayamati). Cf. Tāranātha, op. cit., p. 127; J. W. de Jong, IIJ 16 (1975), p. 181.—On the question of the incomplete Chinese version of the BCA (ascribed to Nāgārjuna, Taishō 1662) see S. Lévi, BEFEO 1902, p. 253 sq.; L. de La Vallée Poussin, Muséon 4 (1903), p. 313 sq.

from the dichotomy of existence and non-existence. With respect to the last point the Bodhicaryāvatāra contains a verse considered to be a summing up of the central idea of the Middle Way (ix. 35): 'When neither existence nor non-existence presents itself before the mind, then, being without any support [to which to attach itself] because of the absence of any other course [for thinking],[268] the [mind] is still'. Noteworthy also is the final chapter on dedicatory transfer *(pariṇāmanā)* by the Bodhisattva, who assigns all merit accruing to him to the Awakening of all sentient beings without distinction. The authenticity of this final chapter has been questioned on the ground that not all the commentators have commented on it,[269] but this point does not appear to be decisive;[270] in any case, the concept of dedicatory transfer is found in an earlier chapter of the work (v. 101) as well as in the same author's Śikṣāsamuccaya (xvi, p. 296), and of course also in a number of Mahāyāna-Sūtras.—Chapter ix consists essentially in a detailed study of the basic philosophical ideas of the Madhyamaka school. We thus find in it a critique of the *pramāṇas;* a discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda;* the theory of the two truths[271] together with a demonstration establishing that the practice of the Mahāyānist path is not made redundant and unnecessary by the truth of the *pāramārthika* level of *śūnyatā;* and a refutation of the Vijñānavāda together with critiques of other schools of Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophy in India, including theism (*īśvaravāda,* ix. 119 sq.).[272]

Because it is concerned also with the religious side of Madhyamaka thought the Bodhicaryāvatāra has sometimes been described as a primarily religious and devotional poem rather than a philosophical treatise. Such a description however curiously neglects the ninth chapter—the longest in the whole work—dealing with the *prajñāpāramitā,* which clearly places the treatise in the main stream of Madhyamaka thought; and if due consideration is given to this chapter it becomes abundantly clear that the work is hardly more religious in any sense exclusive of philosophy than certain earlier works of the school attributed to Nāgārjuna—e.g. the Ratnāvalī—as well as important portions of Āryadeva's, Bhāvaviveka's and Candrakīrti's treatises.

Śāntideva's Śikṣāsamuccaya is a work in nineteen chapters comprising a total of twenty-seven verses with an extensive explanation made up largely of quotations from canonical texts of the Mahāyāna and dealing *inter alia* with the first five *pāramitās* (in Chapters i, ii—viii, ix, x, and xii sq.) as constituting the

[268] Here the principle of the excluded middle *(tṛtīya-rāśi)* is clearly recognized. See above, p. 41.

[269] See L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Introduction à la pratique des futurs Bouddhas (Paris, 1907), pp. 143—4; cf. A. PEZZALI, op. cit., p. 48—49.

[270] See below, p. 84, on Prajñākaramati's reference to Chapter x.

[271] On the *saṃvṛti* level Prajñākaramati distinguishes between *tathya-* and *mithyāsaṃvṛti* (ix. 2) (as did Bhāvaviveka et al.).

[272] See above, p. 30, note 73a.—On Śāntideva's attitude towards *vijñāna* theory see S. KANAOKA, IBK 10/2 (1962), p. 749 sq.

Bodhisattva's discipline *(vinaya)*. This anthology of canonical texts has preserved Sanskrit versions of a large number of Sūtra passages otherwise unavailable in an Indian language. Of particular interest from the philosophical point of view are Chapter xii on the *cittaparikarman* (preparation of the mind; cf. Chapter vi, p. 122 sq.) and Chapter xiv which is largely devoted to a discussion of the emptiness of all *dharmas*. At the end of Chapter xv is found an explanation of *śūnyatā* as endowed with all excellent modes *(sarvākāravaropetā)*, viz. seven *pāramitās*, *mahāmaitrī*, *muditā* and *upekṣā*, *satyajñānāvatāra*, *bodhicittasattvāpekṣā*, *āśayādhyāśayaprayoga*, four *saṃgrahavastus* (i.e. *dāna*, *priyavadya*, *arthakriyā*, and *samānārthatā*), *smṛtisamprajanya*, *smṛtyupasthāna-samyakprahāṇa-ṛddhipāda-indriya-bala-bodhyaṅga-aṣṭāṅgamārga*, and *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*.[273]

On the basis of what Śāntideva has written in verses v. 105–6 of the Bodhicaryāvatāra Bu·ston[274] and Tāranātha[275] have ascribed to him a work entitled Sūtrasamuccaya. The passage in question is not altogether clear, however, and Nāgārjuna, the author of the well-known Sūtrasamuccaya, is also mentioned in it. At all events, no work entitled Sūtrasamuccaya attributable to Śāntideva is known to exist; and it has therefore been concluded that the above-mentioned ascription is erroneous.[276]

Concerning the master Śāntideva who is identified with the Tāntrika Bhusuku see below.

On the Bodhicaryāvatāra there exist a number of commentaries, the best known of which—Prajñākaramati's Pañjikā—is the only one completely preserved in Sanskrit; as already noted above, it does not comment on Chapter x although it does refer to it (in i. 33). Vibhūticandra's Tātparyapañjikā Viśeṣadyotanī is available in a Tibetan translation (*c.* 1200), as are other earlier and shorter commentaries on the Bodhicaryāvatāra by dGe·ba('i)·lha (Kalyāṇadeva?), Kṛṣṇapāda (eleventh century?) and Vairocanarakṣita (eleventh century). Two abridgements of the Bodhicaryāvatāra connected with Dharmapāla of Suvarṇadvīpa (*c.* 1000) and transmitted by his disciples Kamalarakṣita and Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (to whom one of them, the Bodhisattvacaryāvatārasaṭtriṃśatpiṇḍārtha, seems to be attributed by its colophon, whereas Dhar-

[273] The expression *[sarvākārabalopeta/] sarvākāravaropeta* ~ *sabbākāravarūpeta* was used earlier as an epithet of the Sambuddha, e.g. at the end of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra § 44. 10 (Pali § 6. 10) (ed. E. Waldschmidt, p. 400).—In the Ratnagotravibhāga i. 88–92 and elsewhere the concept of *sarvākāravaropetā śūnyatā* occupies a prominent place in the theory of absolute reality.

[274] Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 114a (ii, p. 163), 115b (ii, p. 166).

[275] rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 127–8.

[276] Cf. J. Filliozat, JA 1964, pp. 473–8; A. Pezzali, op. cit., pp. 80–86; J. W. de Jong, IIJ 16 (1975), p. 182 and p. 171 (giving the text of Vibhūticandra's account of Śāntideva's life, available in both Sanskrit [ed. Haraprasad Sastri, IA 42 (1913)] and Tibetan [at the beginning of the translation of Vibhūticandra's Viśeṣadyotanī]).

mapāla himself is indicated as the author of the shorter Bodhisattvacaryāvatārapiṇḍārtha)[277] are also available in Tibetan translations by Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna and Ćhul·khrims·rgyal·ba. (The Bodhisattvacaryāsūtrīkṛtāvavāda and Bodhisattvacaryāvatārabhāṣya by Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna are not commentaries on Śāntideva's text).

As a result of the contributions made to the school by Candrakīrti and Śāntideva, the doctrine of the Prāsaṅgika branch of the Madhyamaka was firmly and systematically established from the points of view of logic, gnoseology and soteriology. During the last part of the first millennium Candrakīrti's and Śāntideva's writings are not known to have inspired commentarial attention in India; but in Tibet Candrakīrti's commentaries on the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā and Śūnyatāsaptati and Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra and Śikṣāsamuccaya as well as Buddhapālita's commentary on the MMK were translated by the beginning of the ninth century, when they were included in the lDan·dkar·ma Catalogue.[278] In the history of the Madhyamaka school the last quarter of the first millennium was rather the period of the great development and glory of the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis, which will be the subject of the next chapter. As for the Svātantrika school, the treatises of Bhāvaviveka were being studied especially during the third quarter of the first millennium, as is shown by the activity carried on by his followers in India (see above, p. 67 sq.). Translations of works of this branch of the Madhyamaka were made first into Chinese (Prabhākaramitra's Chinese translation of the Prajñāpradīpa, Taishō 1566, dates from 630–2) and later into Tibetan (from about the beginning of the ninth

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[277] The sPyod·'jug·gi·don·bsdus (translated by Nag·ćho·Ćhul·khrims·rgyal·ba) is also ascribed to Suvarṇadvīpa(-Dharmapāla) by Bu·ston (Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 159a).

[278] Commentators on works of the Prāsaṅgika school seem to appear only in the late tenth century in India, first on Śāntideva's (by Dharmapāla and Prajñākaramati) and then on Candrakīrti's (by Jayānanda, a Kāśmīri master who, however, seems to have worked largely in Central Asia).—Buddhapālita's commentary on the MMK was, however, already translated by Cog·ro·Klu'i·rgyal·mćhan (with Jñānagarbha) during the Early Propagation of the Dharma *(sṅa dar)* in Tibet; Candrakīrti's Vṛttis on the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā and Śūnyatāsaptati and Śāntideva's Śikṣāsamuccaya were translated also at that time by Ye·šes·sde (with Jinamitra, Dānaśīla and Śīlendrabodhi). Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra was first translated then by dPal·brćegs (with Sarvajñadeva), and revised subsequently, during the Later Propagation *(phyi dar)*, by Rin·chen·bzaṅ·po (958–1055), rṄog·Blo·ldan·šes·rab (1059–1109) et al. Candrakīrti's major works—the Madhyamakāvatāra, Prasannapadā and Catuḥśatakaṭīkā—were translated into Tibetan only in the eleventh century, by Nag·ćho·Ćhul·khrims·rgyal·ba (born in 1011), Pa·ćhab·Ñi·ma·grags (born in 1055), and rṄoḡ·Blo·ldan·šes·rab. Even Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka was translated only at that time, by Pa·ćhab.—It should be noted that Bu·ston's catalogue contained in his Chos·'byuṅ (fol. 157b sq.) differs in certain respects from the information given above taken from the colophons of the bsTan·'gyur itself; for example, Bu·ston mentions only rṄog as the translator of the Bodhicaryāvatāra (fol. 159a 2).

century at the latest, when they are already found listed in the lDan·dkar·ma Catalogue).[279]

The study of both the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika branches of the Madhyamaka received a new impulse from Bodhibhadra, Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna and their disciples and contemporaries in India and Tibet starting at the end of the tenth century (see below).

[279] Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa was translated into Tibetan by Cog·ro Klu'i·rgyal·mćhan (with Jñānagarbha) along with Avalokitavrata's Ṭīkā; and they are included in the lDan·dkar·ma catalogue. His Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās and Tarkajvālā were translated only in the eleventh century, by Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna and Nag·ćho Ćhul·khrims·rgyal·ba; unlike the Prajñāpradīpa, this work is not available in Chinese. Śrīgupta's Tattvāvatāravṛtti (included in the lDan·dkar·ma catalogue) as well as Jñānagarbha's Satyadvayavibhaṅga (Kārikās and Vṛtti) together with the Pañjikā on it ascribed to Śāntarakṣita (all included also in the lDan·dkar·ma catalogue) were already translated during the Early Propagation *(sṅa dar)* of the Dharma in Tibet, the last three works being translated by Ye·šes·sde.

## THE YOGĀCĀRA-MADHYAMAKA SYNTHESIS

Approximately half a millennium after Nāgārjuna, and following on the developments sketched above which resulted in the constitution and systematization of the two branches of the pure Madhyamaka school, there came to the fore a school which elaborated a synthesis of the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda on the level of the philosophical analysis of surface-level process (but not on that of ultimate reality). This school is known as the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka.[280] Śāntarakṣita, who lived in the eight century, is often regarded as both its founder and leading exponent.

This synthesizing movement was, however, not without precedent before the time of Śāntarakṣita. As noted above, several major Yogācārin/Vijñānavādin masters wrote commentaries on works by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva; and Bhāvaviveka was evidently indebted to Dignāga's school for certain logico-epistemological methods he introduced into Madhyamaka thought, although he was an opponent of the metaphysics of the Vijñānavāda and was himself criticized by its masters. The origin of the Yogācāra-[Svātantrika-]Madhyamaka has been traced back to Ārya Vimuktisena, a master of the Prajñāpāramitā and a commentator on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, by Tibetan doxographers who have in fact held that the Abhisamayālaṃkāra largely agrees in its systemic tenor with the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka position and that most of the Indian commentaries on it may accordingly be connected with that school. This Vimuktisena appears to have been a contemporary of Dignāga and Bhāvaviveka, and he is reported to have been a pupil of theirs and even of Vasubandhu; he is probably to be placed therefore in the first part of the sixth century, a couple of centuries earlier than Śāntarakṣita.[281] Śrīgupta and in particular his disciple Jñānagarbha were also forerunners of Śāntarakṣita.[282]

As seen above, the early Madhyamaka developed by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva had devoted little attention to establishing a theory of the factors and processes of the surface-level *saṃvṛti per se*, the concept of the real production of entities being indeed regarded as analytically and causally antinomic. For

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[280] In Tibetan: rNal·'byor·spyod·pa'i·dbu·ma. The Tibetan doxographical literature refers to it also as the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka (rNal·'byor·spyod·pa'i·dbu·ma·rañ·rgyud·pa), in contradistinction to Bhāvaviveka's Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka, from which it differs notably by denying the existence of an external object *(bāhyārtha)* and accepting 'self-awareness' *(svasaṃvedana, svasaṃvitti)*.

[281] On this question see D. Seyfort Ruegg, WZKSO 12–13 (1968), pp. 306–7. And on the Madhyamaka-Prajñāpāramitā synthesis see below, p. 101 sq.

[282] On the doctrinal affiliations of these two masters see above, p. 67 sq.

their part the Prāsaṅgikas considered these processes to be characterized by a certain indeterminism; and they strictly kept to a method of reasoning criticizing all speculative opinions by means of *prasaṅga* arguments which preclude any attempt to propound theses and syllogisms concerned with processes of the world involving entities *(bhāva)* conceived of as amenable to onto-logical construction. On the other hand the (Sautrāntika-)Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas were prepared to assign an at least limited and provisional degree of (non-*pāramārthika*) reality to the dependent origination of things without stressing so forcefully the indeterminism of the *dharma*s and processes of the world; in addition, they gave an important place in their doctrine both to independent inference and to a particular kind of propositional knowledge regarded as conforming to reality (the *saparyāya-paramārtha*).

On their side the Yogācāra-(Svātantrika-)Mādhyamikas appear to have continued earlier trends of thought when they undertook to complement the Madhyamaka theory of the pure *paramārtha* both with a system of metaphysics, epistemology and logic providing an elaborated philosophical construction and analysis of *saṃvṛti* and with a system of ethico-spiritual praxis.[283] As for the impact of the Buddhist logico-epistemological school on these Mādhyamikas, Śāntarakṣita is known to have been influenced by Dharmakīrti (seventh century) on whose Vādanyāya he wrote a long commentary, the Vipañcitārthā; and he thus shared certain antecedents with Bhāvaviveka. But quite unlike Bhāvaviveka the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesized the pure Madhyamaka—which it regarded as perfectly valid and adequate with respect to the *paramārtha*—with a form of philosophical analysis derived from the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda, a school which by the eighth century had attained a high degree of development and whose achievements could not, it was evidently thought, be ignored by the Mādhyamika.

### *Śāntarakṣita*

Śāntarakṣita flourished in the eighth century and is reported to have been born in a royal line of Vaṅga (Bengal, at Sahor, Tibetan Za·hor). He worked at the great monastic seminaries of his time and became one of the most prominent and influential thinkers in the later history of Indian Buddhism. More is known to us about his later life because he was one of the Indian teachers chiefly responsible for the implantation of Buddhism in Tibet, and he is therefore well known to the Tibetan records of the Dharma. Renowned there as the Upādhyāya and Ācārya-Bodhisattva, he was the first abbot *(upādhyāya)* of bSam·yas, the main Tibetan monastery at that time. On the basis of the Tibetan records it may be inferred that he went from Nepal to Tibet for the

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[283] On the question of the *bodhicittotpādavidhi* according to the Mādhyamika and the Vijñānavādin see e.g. 'Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal, Deb·ther·sṅon·po, ca, fol. 15a (i, p. 272).

first time in about 763, and that he again resided there from about 775 to the time of his death in about 788.[284]

Śāntarakṣita's ordination-lineage is given as: Nāgārjuna, Bhavya (i.e. Bhāvaviveka), Śrīgupta, Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita.[285] It was due to him and his illustrious disciple Kamalaśīla that the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka became the leading school of the Madhyamaka at that time, and so influenced very deeply much of Buddhist thought in Tibet not only during his lifetime but for centuries afterwards. He and Kamalaśīla have been counted by doxographers as Satyākāravādins (Sākāravādins).[286]

Śāntarakṣita's most extensive work, the Tattvasaṃgraha, is a critical study of the doctrines of the different schools of Indian philosophy, the value of which is enhanced by the detailed commentary on it by his disciple Kamalaśīla. Both these works are extant in the original Sanskrit as well as in Tibetan translation. The treatise begins with (i—iii) a discussion of the Sāṃkhya *prakṛti* and theory of causation,[287] and of the concept of God *(īśvara)*;[288] and it then goes on to examine the doctrine of a world endowed with own being (iv). Next Śāntarakṣita takes up the theories of the *śabdabrahman* (v), and *puruṣa* (vi); and he examines the views of the Nyāya, the Mīmāṃsā, the Sāṃkhya, the Jainas, and the Aupaniṣadikas (i.e. the Advaitadarśana according to Kamalaśīla) on the subject of a self *(ātman)*, as well as the Buddhist Vātsīputrīya's *pudgala* (vii).[289] He then considers the doctrines of the existence of permanent and stable (i.e. non-momentary) entities (viii), of action *(karman)* and its fruit (ix), of the six categories *(padārtha)* of substance *(dravya)* (x), quality *(guṇa)* (xi), action *(karman)* (xii), the universal *(sāmānya)* (xiii), the particular *(viśeṣa)* (xiv), and inherence *(samavāya)* (xv). The problem of words and their intentional objects *(śabdārtha)* is also discussed in detail (xvi). Next Śāntarakṣita takes up direct perception *(pratyakṣa)* and inference *(anumāna)*[290] as the means of correct knowledge *(pramāṇa)* (xvii—xviii). And

[284] See E. Frauwallner, WZKSO 5 (1961), pp. 141—3, and G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, ii (Rome, 1958), pp. 28—31. Cf. Bu·ston, Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 125b sq. (ii, p. 187 sq.); sBa·bžed (ed. R. A. Stein, Paris, 1961); 'Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal, Deb·ther·sṅon·po, ka, fol. 21b (i, p. 42—44); dPa'·bo·gĆug·lag·phreṅ·ba, mKhas·pa'i·dga'·ston, ja, fol. 74b—114a; Sum·pa·mkhan·po, dPag·bsam·ljon·bzaṅ (ed. S. Ch. Das), p. 112 and p. 49.

[285] See e.g. 'Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal, Deb·ther·sṅon·po, ka, fol. 17b (i, p. 34); dPa'·bo·gĆug·lag·phreṅ·ba, mKhas·pa'i·dga'·ston, ja, fol. 103a. Cf. G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, ii, pp. 25 sq., 122.

[286] See e.g. 'Jam·dbyaṅs·bžad·pa·Ñag·dbaṅ·bŕcon·'grus, Grub·mtha'·chen·mo, fol. 130a; Phar·phyin·mtha'·dpyod, i, fol. 11b (p. 23). But see below, p. 92.

[287] See W. Liebenthal, Satkārya in der Darstellung seiner buddhistischen Gegner (Stuttgart, 1934).

[288] On the Mādhyamika's critique of the *īśvaravāda* see above, p. 30 note 73a and p. 83.

[289] See S. Schayer, RO 8 (1932), pp. 68—93.

[290] See A. Kunst, Probleme der buddhistischen Logik in der Darstellung des Tattvasaṃgraha (Krakow, 1939).

he also discusses verbal knowledge *(śabda)*, analogy *(upamāna)*, presumption *(arthāpatti)*, absence *(abhāva)*, and traditional testimony *(aitihya)* claimed by some to be further means of correct knowledge (xix). In the next sections Jaina tropology *(syādvāda)* (xx) and Lokāyata materialism (xxii) are discussed, as are also the theory of the existence of past, present and future time *(traikālya)* (xxi)[291] and the problems of the existence of an external object *(bahirartha)* (xxiii), valid verbal knowledge *(śruti)*, the eternity of Word *(śabda)*, the impersonal nature *(apauruṣeyatva)* of the Veda (xxiv) and its self-validation *(svataḥprāmāṇya)* (xxv), suprasensory cognition, and omniscience (xxvi). Since these topics have been discussed with reference to the views the various Indian philosophical schools held on them, Śāntarakṣita's basic treatise and Kamalaśīla's Pañjikā are very valuable sources for the study both of the Śrāvakayānist and Mahāyānist schools of Buddhist thought at the peak of their development and of Indian philosophy as a whole.

Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālaṃkāra, a treatise in 97 stanzas accompanied by an autocommentary (Vṛtti), is of capital importance as the basic text of the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka school.[292] The Vṛtti refers to the Tattvasaṃgraha, and the treatise may therefore be regarded as one of Śāntarakṣita's later works representing his mature thinking. In it we find not only that Śāntarakṣita has (like Bhāvaviveka) formulated inferences to establish the Mādhyamika's principle of the insubstantiality of all factors of existence *(dharma)*, but that (unlike Bhāvaviveka) he regarded the doctrine of Mind-only *(cittamātra)* of the Vijñānavāda as a philosophical propaedeutic leading up to the Mādhyamika's goal of establishing the insubstantiality of all factors including the mind. As Śāntarakṣita puts the matter following the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, 'On the basis of the *cittamātra* one is to know the non-existence of external things, and on the basis of this [Madhyamaka] system one is to know complete non-substantiality; riding the chariot of the two systems [i.e. the Cittamātra and Madhyamaka] and holding the reins of reasoning *(yukti)*, [the philosopher] therefore attains the sense as it is, the Mahāyānist one itself.'[293]

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[291] See S. Schayer, Contributions to the problem of time in Indian philosophy (Polska Akademia Umiejętności, Prace Komisji Orientalistycznej, Nr. 31, Krakow, 1938), pp. 29—70.

[292] On this work see Y. Kajiyama, Later Mādhyamikas on epistemology and meditation, in M. Kiyota, ed., Mahāyāna Buddhist meditation (Honolulu, 1978), pp. 114—43. For a brief analysis of it see M.Ichigō, IBK 20/2 (1972), pp. 995—989.

[293] Madhyamakālaṃkāra 92—93 (Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti, fol. 79a—b).—The Laṅkāvatārasūtra passage (x. 256—7) reads (in Vaidya's edition):

*cittamātraṃ samāruhya bāhyam arthaṃ na kalpayet|*
*tathatālambane sthitvā cittamātram atikramet||*
*cittamātram atikramya nirābhāsam atikramet|*
*nirābhāsasthito yogī mahāyānaṃ sa paśyati||*

(Nanjō reads *na paśyate*).—On the following quotation of the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā see above, note 44.

The principle demonstrated in this treatise—first by means of reasoning (*yukti*, verses 2–62) with respect to the analysis of knowledge and its objects and then with regard to the two truths following philosophical tradition (*āgama*, 63–97)—is the basic one that all entities *(bhāva)* held to be real by either Buddhists or others are in fact without self-nature *(niḥsvabhāva)*.[294] To prove this by reasoning Śāntarakṣita adduces as the logical reason the argument that entities have neither a unitary nature *(ekasvabhāva)* nor a multiple one *(anekasvabhāva)*, the homologous example here being a reflection *(pratibimbavat)*. Now, taking the axiom[295] that an entity would indeed by definition have to be by nature either unitary or multiple as his basic argument by which to establish that there exists no thing having self-nature *(svabhāva)*, he proceeds to apply it to both conditioned *(saṃskṛta)* elements such as the *paramāṇu* (11–15) and to the unconditioned *(nirvāṇa)*, as well as to constructs like the Vātsīputrīya's *pudgala* (cf. 9), the composite gross body, and all-pervading space *(ākāśa)*. He observes moreover (8) that an *asaṃskṛta* that is permanent and unchanging cannot have a capacity for causal efficiency *(arthakriyā)*, which had been established by Dharmakīrti as the criterion for existence (Pramāṇavārttika, Svārthānumāna chapter, 166).

Turning from the discussion of *rūpa* to that of *vijñāna*, Śāntarakṣita shows that it also is devoid of a unitary and a multiple nature (16 sq.). He divides theories of knowledge into the realist variety positing a duality between knower (cognition) and external cognized object, and the 'mentalist' variety maintaining the non-duality of cognition and the object of cognition which, accordingly, is not really an external object *(bāhyārtha)*. Examples of the realist variety are the Vaibhāṣika theory that assumes a formless *(anākāra)* knowledge—i.e. one that *per se* does not have a cognitive image *(ābhāsa)* of the object of cognition *(viṣaya)*—and the Sautrāntika one that assumes that knowledge has such a form *(sākāra)*—i.e. that it does possess a cognitive image of the cognized (and external) object. Śāntarakṣita goes on to discuss the idea of the reflexivity of cognition (*svasaṃvedana* 'self-awareness'). And he argues against the assumption that either a cognition that is imageless *(anirbhāsa)* or one that possesses such an image *(sanirbhāsa)* could apprehend an external object (16–21 and 22–34). In addition, he considers a number of theories on the subject drawn from other non-Buddhist systems (35–40). The conclusion then is that *vijñāna* is not unitary (41–43). The theory of knowledge that Śāntarakṣita next examines is the 'mentalist' one of the Vijñānavādin, who rejects any real duality between cognition (as *grāhaka*) and the cognized (as *grāhya*) (44–60).

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[294] Madhyamakālaṃkāra 1 (quoted in Prajñākaramati's Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā ix. 2):

*niḥsvabhāvā amī bhāvās tattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ|*
*ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt pratibimbavat||*

Compare the beginning of Śrīgupta's Tattvāvatāravṛtti (above, p. 68).

[295] Cf. above, p. 38 sq.

The Vijñānavādins differ among themselves, however, as to whether the non-dual *vijñāna* contains an objective image or not; and they accordingly are divided into the two schools of the Satyākāravāda (or Sākāravāda), which accepts that it does, and the Alīkākāravāda (or Anākāravāda), which holds that it does not. Śāntarakṣita records arguments against both the former doctrine (in its three versions, 46–51) and the latter one (52–60). And he finally concludes that in the *vijñāna* just like any other entity there can be neither unitariness nor multiplicity of nature (61). But since no third possibility is available in the case of something supposed to have a *svabhāva*, the conclusion must be that *vijñāna* is no ultimately real entity (62); on this point, then, he agrees with the rest of the Madhyamaka school which refuses to assign a specially privileged status to mind, which it regards as empty of self-nature like any other *dharma*. Śāntarakṣita also subjects the Vijñānavādin's theory of the three natures (*svabhāva*, i.e. *parikalpita*, *paratantra* and *pariniṣpanna*) to a critique (Vṛtti, fol. 68a).[296] The last part of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra is devoted to a discussion of the two truths. The *paramārtha* is free from the four extreme positions of existence, etc. (68), and from all discursive development *(prapañca)* (70). On this level there is no coming into existence (production), etc., of any kind of entity; and one cannot therefore even postulate the non-production of an entity, for such a negation could only relate to what has objective existence, which any entity does not (71–72).[297] The *saṃvṛti* has efficiency *(arthakriyāsāmarthya)*, however (64); and it allows the use of inferences (*anumāna*, 75) and logical proofs (76–78). In Śāntarakṣita's system eternalism and annihilation are then both equally rejected (82). And the elimination of affects *(saṃkleśa)* and the achievement of purification *(vyavadāna)* as well as the assembly of pure equipment *(sambhāra)* thus remain possible (83–85). Compassion *(karuṇā)* finally is a distinguishing feature of those following the way of the Tathāgata (96). And the Protector becomes the object of the devotion of those who perceive that other systems lack substance (97).

Although the Madhyamakālaṃkāra and its Vṛtti are not available in the original Sanskrit, a number of verses from the *mūla* are to be found in the

[296] Śāntarakṣita has been counted by doxographers as belonging to the Satyākāravāda/Sākāravāda branch of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas (see above, p. 89 note 286)—as have his disciple Kamalaśīla and his predecessor Ārya Vimuktisena—because, while rejecting the view that the *vijñāna* is an ultimately real entity, he has inclined toward the theory that cognition is endowed with an image at least on the level of relativity (see Vṛtti, fol. 57b3). Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, WZKSO 12–13 (1968), p. 307. But in the first part of his treatise Śāntarakṣita has criticized the Sautrāntika and his Sākāravāda (in its three versions, 23–34) as well as the Vaibhāṣika and his Anākāravāda (16–21, especially 20). And the Alīkākāravāda is even presented as a higher philosophical stage; cf. Y. Kajiyama, loc. cit., pp. 120–32, 140. (The Sanskrit of many of the relevant stanzas is to be found in Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasamgraha, 1999 sq.).

[297] See Haribhadra, Abhisamayālaṃkāralokā v. 8–9 (p. 838) who quotes verse 72: *na ca nirviṣayaḥ sādhu prayogo vidyate nañaḥ| vikalpāpāśrayatve vā sāṃvṛtaḥ syān na tāttvikaḥ||* (See also op. cit., i. 27 [p. 45]).

Pratyakṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣā and the Bahirarthaparīkṣā of the Tattvasaṃgraha, while others correspond with Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika on which work Śāntarakṣita drew in appropriate places in his treatise;[298] it has also been quoted by Haribhadra in his Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā and by Prajñākaramati in his Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā. Both works are available in Tibetan translation. On this treatise there exists in Tibetan translation an extensive Pañjikā ascribed to Kamalaśīla.[299]

The Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā, a commentary on Jñānagarbha's Satyadvayavibhaṅga, is ascribed to Śāntarakṣita.[300] It is available only in a Tibetan translation.

In addition to the works by Śāntarakṣita included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan-'gyur, other sections of this collection contain treatises of his dealing with logic—e.g. the Vipañcitārthā on Dharmakīrti's Vādanyāya which is available also in Sanskrit—and Tantra—e.g. the Tattvasiddhi (which quotes Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra).[301]

Śāntarakṣita's Saṃvaraviṃśakavṛtti, a work linked with Candragomin's Bodhisattvasaṃvaraviṃśaka, is of special interest as an example of a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika treatise that lays particular emphasis on the Bodhisattva's ethico-spiritual praxis *(caryā)*. It is to be observed that the Saṃvaraviṃśaka is related to the teaching of the Bodhisattvabhūmi, a basic text of the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda school, and that (unlike e.g. the Śikṣāsamuccaya) it therefore does not belong to the Madhyamaka tradition properly speaking.[302]

*Kamalaśīla*

Kamalaśīla (*c.* 740—795) was the disciple of Śāntarakṣita. As mentioned above, he wrote an extensive and valuable commentary (Pañjikā), now available only in Tibetan, on his teacher's Madhyamakālaṃkāra. As for his Pañjikā on Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṃgraha, it is as already noted an invaluable source for the history of Indian philosophy, non-Buddhist as well as Buddhist; it contains the first known reference in a Buddhist treatise to the Advaitadarśana, which Kamalaśīla mentions in his chapter on the Aupaniṣadikas' doctrine of the *ātman* (on Tattvasaṃgraha 328).[303]

[298] Madhyamakālaṃkāra 8 corresponds to Pramāṇavārttika i. 211, and Madhyamakālaṃkāra 26ab corresponds to Pramāṇavārttika iii. 138cd (cf. Tattvasaṃgraha 1251).

[299] This commentary is said not to be by Kamalaśīla in mKhas-grub-dGe-legs-dpal-bzaṅ, rGyud-sde-spyi-rnam (ed. Lessing-Wayman), p. 90. lCaṅ-skya-Rol-pa'i-rdo-rje, Grub-mtha', kha, fol. 6b, states that Dharmamitra has ascribed it to Kamalaśīla(!?).

[300] See above, p. 68 and note 224.

[301] See above, note 266.

[302] See above, p. 88.

[303] Cf. H. Nakamura, HJAS 18 (1955), p. 104.—Concerning Kamalaśīla's citations of his predecessors, see E. Steinkellner, WZKSO 7 (1963), p. 116 sq.

Kamalaśīla was invited to Tibet to carry on Śāntarakṣita's work there; and like his master he played a leading part in the establishment of Buddhism and the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka in Tibet towards the end of the eighth century. His role at the Council of Tibet (or council of bSam·yas) in opposing the 'simultaneist' teachings associated with the Chinese Hoshang Mahāyāna has often been regarded as decisive by Tibetan writers;[304] but their accounts have been questioned in some recent research on the subject.[305] At all events, and whatever the exact historical part played by Kamalaśīla may in fact have been during this famous debate on the process of attaining Awakening, his gradualist theory on the subject is amply set out in his treatises on progressive realization—the three Bhāvanākramas—in which he deals with the interrelation between calm *(śamatha)* of the mind and intellective insight *(vipaśyanā* or *prajñā)* with respect to the understanding of reality.[306] He died in Tibet in about 795.[307]

Kamalaśīla's most extensive independent work is his Madhyamakāloka, which is extant only in Tibetan translation. Based on both scripture *(āgama)* and reasoning *(yukti)*, this treatise expounds in detail the theory of the non-substantiality of things according to the Yogācāra-[Svātantrika-]Madhyamaka system which maintains the doctrine of non-production in reality and of production on the surface-level. The logical and epistemological problems connected with this theory are extensively discussed in this work, which is therefore one of the most important of the Indian Madhyamaka treatises from these points of view. Much attention is given also to soteriology, and in particular to establishing that the teaching of the one vehicle *(ekayāna)* is of certain meaning *(nītārtha)* by contrast with the opposed doctrine of three ultimately

[304] For a study of this and connected events see P. Demiéville, Le concile de Lhasa (Paris, 1952); G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, ii (Rome, 1958); Y. Imaeda, JA 1975, pp. 125—46. See also the older article by E. Obermiller, JGIS 2 (1935), pp. 1—11, and his preface to his publication of Kamalaśīla's third Bhāvanākrama in Pamjatniki literatury naradov vostoka, Teksty, Malaja serija xvi (Moscow, 1963).

[305] On this question see D. Ueyama, Tōhō gakuhō 35 (1964); P. Demiéville, TP 56 (1970), p. 40 sq.; Y. Imaeda, JA 1975, p. 140—1.

[306] Compare in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan·'gyur two works by Vimalamitra concerned with this problem: the Cig·car·'jug·pa·rnam·par·mi·rtog·pa'i·bsgom·don and the Rim·gyis·'jug·pa'i·sgom·don (below, p. 107).—The Tibetan critics of the Hoshang Mahāyāna have attributed to him a teaching that is more or less quietistic; but this description does not altogether tally with what is known from the Chinese records (studied by P. Demiéville and his successors).—Kamalaśīla's first and third Bhāvanākramas are preserved in Sanskrit and have been edited by G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, ii—iii (Rome, 1958 and 1971) (see also above, note 304). The first exists also in a Chinese translation (Taishō 1664).—For bibliographical particulars see A. Yuyama, IIJ 17 (1975), p. 265 sq.

[307] See E. Frauwallner, WZKSO 5 (1961), pp. 143—4. (According to some Tibetan accounts of the events, Kamalaśīla met his death as the victim of his defeated opponents; see e.g. Bu·ston, Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 129b [ii, p. 196]. Cf. P. Demiéville, Le concile de Lhasa, p. 11; G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, ii, p. 45).

distinct vehicles of liberation. In this connexion Kamalaśīla discusses also the *gotra* and *tathāgatagarbha* theories, thus assuring them a much more prominent place in later Madhyamaka thought than they had occupied in the works of the earlier Mādhyamikas.[308]

As is to be expected of a treatise belonging to this school, the Madhyamakāloka contains discussions of Vijñānavāda doctrine. Regarding the three natures —the *parikalpita*°, *paratantra*° and *pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*—accepted by the Vijñānavāda, it is argued that they have a propaedeutic function in philosophy because an understanding of the first two may help one to avoid the twin philosophical pitfalls of imputation *(samāropa)* and denial *(apavāda)*; yet the last two are not to be taken to be ultimate realities, and any canonical statement representing them as such in fact constitutes a statement of provisional indirect meaning *(neyārtha)* that is simply meant to introduce philosophically inexperienced and fearful beginners to an understanding of non-production and non-substantiality *(avatāraṇābhisaṃdhi)* (fol. 166 b). Similarly, the doctrine of *cittamātra* may assist one to understand that no external object *(bāhyārtha)* separate from cognition exists corresponding to the object of cognition, and that the supposed duality of cognition *(grāhaka)* and cognized object *(grāhya)* is false; but any canonical statement representing mind to be an entity that exists in ultimate reality is merely a statement of provisional indirect meaning

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[308] Kamalaśīla was perhaps the first of the leading Madhyamaka masters to incorporate the theory of the *tathāgatagarbha* into one of the main schools of Madhyamaka thought. (But on Rāhulabhadra and 'Nāga' see above, pp. 54—57.) The *tathāgatagarbha* and *gotra* theories occupy an important place also in the writings of Dharmamitra (*fl. c.* 800 ?), and then in those of Abhayākaragupta and other later Mādhyamika masters (see the next chapter).

Since some of the problems connected with the *tathāgatagarbha*, the *gotra* and the *ekayāna* figured prominently in the history of Buddhist thought in Central Asia (e.g. Khotan; cf. the 'Book of Zambasta') and China where the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka is not known to have been an influential school, the significance attached to these philosophical topics cannot, however, be assumed to stem from the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka exclusively. This complex of doctrines is in fact already attested in a number of Sūtras as well as in the Ratnagotravibhāga, which is not frequently quoted by the Indian scholars of the Madhyamaka until a quite late date (10th—11th century). These doctrines have been especially carefully studied in the Tibetan exegetical literature; and the importance they assumed in Tibet may indeed be due largely to the influence of the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka school in that country (e.g. in the domain of the Prajñāpāramitā-Madhyamaka synthesis; see the next chapter). The Indo-Tibetan tradition based on the Ratnagotravibhāga, the fundamental Indian Śāstra on the *tathāgatagarbha*, however appears to have its origins elsewhere.—As for the *ekayāna* theory, it is closely linked with the doctrine of the *tathāgatagarbha* and the *prakṛtistha-gotra*. Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, La théorie du *tathāgatagarbha* et du *gotra* (Paris, 1969), p. 177 sq.; Le traité du *tathāgatagarbha* de Bu·ston Rin·chen grub (Paris, 1973), pp. 9, 27 note, 69, 142 sq.; The *gotra*, *ekayāna* and *tathāgatagarbha* theories of the Prajñāpāramitā according to Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta, in: Prajñāpāramitā and related systems (Studies in honor of E. Conze, Berkeley, 1977), pp. 283—312; A. Kunst, Some aspects of the Ekayāna, ibid., pp. 313—26.

meant to introduce the novice to the theory of *pudgala-nairātmya (avatāraṇābhisaṃdhi)* (fol. 170b). The *cittamātra* doctrine of the Vijñānavāda is accordingly nothing but a step on the way toward comprehension of the *paramārtha*. This interpretation is supported with quotations from the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, as was already the case in Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālaṃkāra-Vṛtti.[309] It is furthermore to be noted that, for the Vijñānavāda, the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching refers only to *tathatā*, thus making possible the theory that there exist three ultimately distinct vehicles of liberation (fol. 159b);[310] but, as already noticed, Kamalaśīla rejects this last interpretation in favour of the theory of the *ekayāna*, which he holds to be of certain meaning and according to which all sentient beings *(sarvasattva)* will attain Buddhahood. Kamalaśīla thus differed significantly from the Vijñānavāda theory that understood the *triyāna* as three altogether separate paths leading to three ultimately different forms of *bodhi*, and that also maintained the existence of a category of persons who are permanently excluded from attaining Awakening.

Kamalaśīla's first Bhāvanākrama (in the arrangement of the bsTan·'gyur) begins by specifying that compassion *(kṛpā, karuṇā)*, the *bodhicitta* and the Bodhisattva's practice *(pratipatti)* are the triad of factors leading to the omniscience *(sarvajñatā)* of the *buddha*. Compassion is described as the root *(mūla)* of all *buddhadharmas* (§ 1 of Tucci's edition of the Sanskrit text); and Kamalaśīla explains how it is to be cultivated (§ 2). It is explained that it is a prerequisite for the *bodhicitta* (§ 3). This *bodhicitta*, which is described as consisting essentially in the Bodhisattva's practice, is then stated to be the seed *(bīja)* of all *buddhadharmas* (§ 4). Such practice consists in the conjunction of transcending discriminative knowledge *(prajñā)* and means *(upāya)*, there being no incompatibility whatsoever between these two factors which, when brought to completion, are known as the perfections *(pāramitā)* (§§ 5—7). This practice leads then to *apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*, i.e. the *nirvāṇa* in which the Bodhisattva does not fix himself because of his full complement of compassionate means, although by *prajñā* he will have eliminated all errors that would fix him in *saṃsāra* (§ 8). The first two stages of *prajñā* are the one consisting in learning *(śrutamayī)* whereby the sense of the scriptural tradition *(āgama)* is retained, and the stage consisting in reflection *(cintāmayī)* whereby the final and certain sense *(nītārtha)* of the teaching is distinguished from the provisional and uncertain sense *(neyārtha)* and ultimate reality *(bhūta-artha, bhūta-vastusvarūpa)* is realized through analysis based on both reasoning *(yukti)* and scriptural tradition (§ 9). The function of *āgama* and *yukti* are investigated with respect to penetration of the non-origination *(anutpāda)* and non-destruction *(anirodha)* of all *dharmas*, in keeping with the theory of the Middle Way (§ 10). In connexion with *cintā* there follows a critique, according to the

[309] See above, note 293.

[310] See D. Seyfort Ruegg, La théorie du *tathāgatagarbha* et du *gotra*, p. 277 note 3; Le traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu·ston Rin·chen grub, pp. 31, 52 note, 99.

principle of the absence of both a unitary and a multiple self-nature *(ekānekasvabhāva)*, of the notions of material atoms *(aṇu)* and a non-material consciousness *(vijñāna)*, and of the duality of 'matter' *(rūpa)* and 'mind' *(citta)* (§ 11). Next, the third stage of *prajñā* consisting in meditative realization *(bhāvanāmayī)* is described as leading to direct perception *(pratyakṣīkaraṇa)* of reality *(bhūta-artha)* (§ 12 sq.). In the first place, calm *(śamatha)* is to be achieved for the sake of imperturbability of mind *(cittasthirīkaraṇa)* (§ 13); Kamalaśīla explains how this is to be brought about with reference to the nine phases of the settling of mind, the six defects and the eight counteragents in concentration *(samādhi)* (§ 14) and the four meditations *(dhyāna)* (§ 15). Following the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (x. 256–8, referred to above, p. 90), the transcending of both external objects and idealism *(cittamātra)* and the topic of non-conceptuality *(nirvikalpasamādhi)* and non-dual gnosis *(advayajñāna)* are then taken up (§ 16); and Kamalaśīla expounds the *paramatattvadarśana* of the Mahāyāna (§ 17). Through the process of understanding thus described, the obstacles of the passions *(kleśāvaraṇa)* and the knowable *(jñeyāvaraṇa)* are both eliminated (§ 18). A section is devoted to the distinction between *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha* (§ 19). Kamalaśīla then returns to the subject of the Path that leads (to the goal of buddhahood) through the conjunction of discriminative knowledge and means *(prajñopāyayuganaddhavāhī mārgaḥ)* (§ 20). And he concludes with further observations on *pratipatti* which does not neglect analysis *(pratyavekṣaṇā)* (§ 21) and with a section on the stages of the Path which begins with the *adhimukticaryābhūmi* (§ 22), passes through the ten stages of the Bodhisattva and culminates in the *buddhabhūmi* (§ 23).

The second Bhāvanākrama is similarly devoted to a treatment of the causes and conditions required for achieving the omniscience of the *buddha*. Such omniscience cannot be attained without the appropriate cause *(hetu)*, for it could otherwise always arise without any effort ever being needed. He who wishes to attain omniscience must accordingly cultivate the triad of great compassion, the *bodhicitta* and means *(upāya)*. This involves both completing the spiritual equipment *(sambhāra)* of merit *(puṇya)* and gnosis *(jñāna)*, and achieving *apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa* the root of which is great compassion. In order to attain this goal, calm *(śamatha)* and intellective insight (*vipaśyanā*, i.e. *bhūtapratyavekṣā*) must be realized in conjunction. Under the rubric of *vipaśyanā* Kamalaśīla discusses the doctrine of the lack of difference in their onto-logical status between the material *(rūpin) dharma*s and mind *(citta)* and the meaning of the canonical statement 'The three levels of existence *(dhātu)* are simply *citta*'. And he observes that in ultimate reality *(paramārtha) citta* also cannot be real *(bden pa = satya)* because it perceives *rūpa* and the other factors which are false *(alīka)* in nature; moreover, *citta* is, as already stated, not different in its onto-logical status from the false *rūpa*. There follows a detailed exposition of the procedure to be employed in meditation. Attainment consists in the realization of *śūnyatā* endowed with all excellent modes *(sarvākāravaropetā)*, i.e. Emptiness inseparable from the six *pāramitā*s as means. Thus *prajñā* and

*upāya* must operate simultaneously *(cig car = yugapat)*, and the Path conveys through their conjunction *(yuganaddhavāhin)*. In sum, with respect to realization of the Middle Way, the Buddha has declared that the gnosis of the Omniscient has its root in compassion, its cause in the *bodhicitta*, and its issue in means (compare the quotation from the Vairocanābhisaṃbodhi found in the Sanskrit text of Bhāvanākrama I, § 7: *sarvajñajñānaṃ karuṇāmūlaṃ bodhicittahetukam upāyaparyavasānam*).

The third Bhāvanākrama is concerned more particularly with realization in the form of concentration *(samādhi)*, with special reference to the Path that conveys through the conjunction of calm and intellective insight *(śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddhavāhī mārgaḥ)*. In fact all *samādhi*s are subsumed under *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* together. Here four noetic objects *(ālambanavastu)* are enumerated for meditation: (i) the *nirvikalpapratibimbaka* for which the image of all *dharma*s and, for example, a Buddha-icon are objectified in *śamatha* without any conceptualization *(vikalpa)* pertaining to the understanding of reality, the *dharma*s being those one has learnt and retained; (ii) the *savikalpapratibimbaka* for which there is analysis through *vipaśyanā* which marks the *vikalpa* pertaining to the understanding of reality; (iii) the *vastuparyantatā-ālambana* where Thusness marked by the final limit of things *(vastuparyantatālakṣaṇā tathatā)* is penetrated beginning with the first stage of the Bodhisattva, this being done in both *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā;* and (iv) the *kāryapariniṣpatti-ālambana* for which, as a consequence of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, there is complete accomplishment of the required, characterized by elimination of the obstacles and associated with transmutation of the psychic base *(āśrayaparāvṛtti)* on the succeeding stages culminating in the *buddhabhūmi*. Here *śamatha* is defined as one-pointedness of mind *(cittaikāgratā)*, and *vipaśyanā* as accurate comprehension of reality *(bhūtapratyavekṣā)* (§ 1). Describing next in detail how these two factors are to be practised conjointly (§§ 2–4), Kamalaśīla observes that the form of *bhāvanā* wherein the mind *(manas)* which has stopped analysis *(vicāra)* is entirely free from discursivity *(nirjalpaikarasa)* and flows on in virtue of its nature *(svarasavāhin)* will arise only after *vicāra* in *vipaśyanā* relating to reality, i.e. the non-substantiality of *pudgala* and *dharma*s (§ 2, pp. 5 and 8). Kamalaśīla then gives a brief statement (§ 5) and a long refutation (§ 6) of the thesis of non-mentation *(amanasikāra)*, non-direction of attention *(asmṛti)*, non-thinking, and ataraxia or quietistic non-practice of the perfections. In conclusion, the significance of the cultivation of *sarvākāravaropetaśūnyatā* is explained. There is to be no cultivation of mind-only *(cittamātrasevana)* without noetic object *(ālambana)*. Expertness in means has to be cultivated, as does accurate comprehension of reality; for practice *(pratipatti)* comprises both *prajñā* and *upāya*. This practice is necessarily progressive, gradual. Finally, special reference is made to Nāgārjuna's teaching as comprising both scriptural tradition and exact reasoning (§ 7).

Between the three Bhāvanākramas there is considerable overlap and repetition. Kamalaśīla clearly composed his three treatises for the purpose of re-

futing what he considered to be serious misconceptions about the Path and establishing the correct philosophical theory and meditational praxis of the Mahāyāna by means of concise explanations supported by quotations from numerous Sūtras. And whether he in fact personally met in debate with the Chinese Hoshang or not (see above), it seems that Kamalaśīla composed the Bhāvanākramas in order to respond to and document problems under discussion at the 'Council of Tibet'. It is to be noted at the same time that several at least of the Sūtras quoted—e.g. the Akṣayamatinirdeśa, Gayāśīrṣa and Vimalakīrtinirdeśa on the relation between *prajñā* and *upāya* (I, §§ 5–7, 20 and III, § 6) and the Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī on the meaning of *amanasikāra* (I, § 17)—show that some of the theses being propounded by the Hoshang which Kamalaśīla has refuted were not being proposed for the first time in the history of Buddhist thought; and just as the Hoshang could cite Sūtra texts in support of his position, Kamalaśīla was able to quote other canonical texts (often from the same Sūtras) which take up and reject views ascribed to the Hoshang. Since they are among the relatively few later Madhyamaka texts extant in Sanskrit, and because they contain important quotations from the Sanskrit texts of Sūtras otherwise available only in Chinese and Tibetan translations, the first and third Bhāvanākramas now constitute our main original documentation for the study of this school toward the end of the eighth century.

In addition, other works connected with the Madhyamaka and attributed to Kamalaśīla are found in the bsTan·'gyur: the *Bhāvanāyogāvatāra (?) (a work of the same type as Jñānagarbha's Yogabhāvanāpatha or °mārga), the *Sarvadharmā(sva)bhāvasiddhi, and the Tattvāloka. Kamalaśīla also composed commentaries on the Saptaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā, the Vajracchedikā,[311] and the Śālistamba(ka)sūtra.

*Later Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas*

The Madhyamakanayasārasamāsaprakaraṇa by Vidyākaraprabha appears to belong to the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka school; following Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti (92), it discusses Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 35 in which it is stated that the four elements *(mahābhūta)* are contained in *vijñāna*. This work employs the Vijñānavādin's refutation of external objects and his establishment of the internal (i.e. subjective) only *(naṅ ćam)* as a preliminary to refuting the subjective also in accordance with the Mādhyamika's theory of nonsubstantiality and *śūnyatā* on the level of ultimate truth. Vidyākaraprabha collaborated with the Tibetan translator dPal·brćegs rakṣita in producing the Tibetan version of his treatise, and he may therefore be placed *c.* 800.

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[311] While closely connected with Vasubandhu's commentary on the Vajracchedikā, this work emphasizes certain concepts of the Madhyamaka. Cf. G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, i (Rome, 1956), pp. 21 sq., 28, 131 sq.

Another work belonging to the current of thought that sought to synthesize the Vijñānavāda and the Madhyamaka is the short tract entitled Nirākārakārikās by Nandaśrī, a Nepalese Paṇḍit.

Jitāri (whose name is also written Jetāri) is counted by doxographers as a Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika (Samala-Alīkākāra branch). His Sugatamatavibhaṅga-Kārikās and Bhāṣya deal with the four main schools of Buddhist thought. His discussion of the Madhyamaka begins (fol. 330b) with arguments in favour of the principle that things have neither a unitary nor a multiple nature in reality (a point stressed by Śrīgupta and Śāntarakṣita for example) and that they are as non-substantial as a sky-lotus. Unlike the Vijñānavādin the Mādhyamika does not postulate a *vijñāna* existing in reality *(paramārthataḥ)*; and his theory is quite free of the four extreme positions *(anta)* that posit existence, non-existence, both, and neither. In the Bhāṣya (fol. 354a) Jitāri endeavours in particular to demonstrate that Dharmakīrti was in agreement with Nāgārjuna and that he taught the Madhyamaka. Jitāri also wrote treatises on logic.[312]

Other late Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas will be mentioned below in the chapters on the Madhyamaka-Prajñāparamitā and Madhyamaka-Vajrayāna syntheses.

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[312] It would appear that there were two masters named Jitāri (or Jetāri), one of whom lived *c.* 800 and the other *c.* 1000; cf. G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, i, pp. 249—52. The later one is said to have been a teacher of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna and also of Ratnākaraśānti.

The Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikās are virtually identical with the verses of Āryadeva's Jñānasārasamuccaya (see below, p. 106) which deal with the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Madhyamaka schools. The colophon states that the author was born in Bengal. The Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya has been assigned to the tenth century by Kenjō Shirasaki, IBK 27/1 (1978), p. 493. (Verses corresponding to the Kārikās are found quoted in Mokṣākaragupta's Tarkabhāṣā, as well as in the Subhāṣitasaṃgraha where the last three are ascribed to Saraha.)

## THE MADHYAMAKA-PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ SYNTHESIS

Beside the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis discussed in the last chapter there exists a synthesis of the Madhyamaka with the tradition of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, a fundamental Śāstra of the Prajñāpāramitā doctrine which is ascribed (like the basic Śāstras of the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda system) to Maitreya(nātha).[313] This synthesis is traced back at least as far as the sixth century to Ārya Vimuktisena, who composed the earliest commentary now available on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra: the Vṛtti which relates this treatise to the text of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, one of the large Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtras.[314] Ārya Vimuktisena was followed in this same line of thought by Bhadanta Vimuktisena (sixth or seventh century?), the author of a Vārttika on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra.[315]

The connexion between Madhyamaka thought and the Pāramitā-yāna is of course even older. Nāgārjuna himself is generally supposed to have been closely linked with it.[316] And the *Upadeśa (Ta-chih-tu-lun) attributed to (a) Nāgārjuna is in fact formally a commentary on the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā.[317] The Prajñāpāramitāstotra ascribed to Rāhulabhadra has also been mentioned above.[318] Moreover, while the bond between the *prajñāpāramitā* and Madhyamaka philosophy is evident from many of the treatises of the school, the first five *pāramitās* are intimately connected with the Bodhisattva's practice, a topic that has been dealt with in a host of works by Mādhyamika authors beginning with Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva.[319]

A very important later representative of this movement was Haribhadra, who flourished in the later part of the eighth century, in the reign of the Pāla king Dharmapāla (*rg. c.* 770—810 or 775—812).[320] Haribhadra was a disciple of

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[313] Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, La théorie du *tathāgatagarbha* et du *gotra*, pp. 39—55, on the problem of the identity of Maitreya(nātha), with a bibliography of the question.

[314] See above, p. 87.

[315] On Ārya Vimuktisena and Bhadanta Vimuktisena see D. Seyfort Ruegg, WZKSO 12—13 (1968), pp. 303—17.

[316] See above, p. 6.

[317] See above, p. 32.

[318] See above, p. 54.

[319] For example in the Ratnāvalī, *Bodhisambhāra-śāstra, and the commentary on the Daśabhūmikasūtra, all attributed to Nāgārjuna; in Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka; in Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra, etc.

[320] See the colophon of the Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā. — On the dates of the Pāla kings see D. C. Sircar, JAS (Bengal) 18 (1976), p. 98, who proposes a slightly different chronology from R. C. Majumdar's. See also Sircar, XIX. Deutscher Orientalistentag (ZDMG Supplementa III, 2, 1977), pp. 964—9.

Vairocanabhadra, and also according to Tāranātha of Śāntarakṣita;[321] he worked at the Trikaṭuka Vihāra. He is renowned as the author of the very extensive Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā—a commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra which relates it to the text of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā—, of a shorter Śāstra-Vṛtti in verse (the 'Sphuṭārthā') and of an explanation of the Saṃcayagāthās, and also as the editor of a version of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā. By some doxographers Haribhadra is considered to belong to the Nirmala-Alikākāravādin branch of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka.[322]

To this same current of thought belonged also Buddhajñāna(pāda), a disciple of Haribhadra,[323] who thus was a representative of Śāntarakṣita's Yogācāra-Madhyamaka school. He seems to be the author of a Pañjikā on the Saṃcayagāthās[324] and, perhaps, of the Mahāyānalakṣaṇasamuccaya. At the same time he was an important master of the Vajrayāna and the founder of the Jñānapāda lineage of the Guhyasamāja tradition.

Another representative of this synthesis was Dharmamitra, the author of the Abhisamayālaṃkārakārikā-prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstraṭīkā. In the colophon of the Tibetan translation of this work, the only text of it available, he is referred to as an Ācārya of the Madhyamaka born in Baṅ·la (i.e. Baṅgala ?). Dharmamitra is placed in the reign of a son of King Dharmapāla by Tāranātha,[325] who makes him a contemporary of Dharmottara (*fl. c.* 800), Vimalamitra and Dharmākara.[326] Dharmamitra would thus be an immediate successor of Haribhadra. At the very beginning of his commentary he mentions in particular Nāgārjuna; he also refers to Maitreyanātha as the Yogācāra author of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃ-

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[321] Bu·ston, Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 111b—112a (ii, p. 157); Tāranātha, rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 166—9.

[322] For Haribhadra's explanations of the *nirākārajñānavāda* and *sākārajñānavāda* see his Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā iv. 14—17. — Cf. 'Jam·dbyaṅs·bžad·pa Ñag·dbaṅ·brćon·'grus, Phar·phyin·mtha'·dpyod, i, fol. 11b (= p. 23); Grub·mtha'·chen·mo, fol. 131a—132a.

[323] Bu·ston, Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 112b (ii, p. 159—60); 'Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal, Deb·ther·sṅon·po, ja, fol. 7b (i, p. 367 sq.); Tāranātha, rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, pp. 157, 166—9; 'Jam·dbyaṅs·bžad·pa·Ñag·dbaṅ·brćon·'grus, Grub·mtha'·chen·mo, fol. 132a. Tāranātha (p. 195) makes him a contemporary of King Dharmapāla.

[324] This work translated by Vidyākarasiṃha and dPal·brćegs (and the author of which is Buddhaśrījñāna according to the bsTan·'gyur) is ascribed to Buddhajñānapāda by Bu·ston (Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 112b6 [ii, p. 159]) and the Deb·ther·sṅon·po, ja, fol. 8a (i, p. 367). Buddhajñāna-pāda/Buddhaśrījñāna is thus to be distinguished from the Buddhaśrījñāna mentioned below, p. 117.

[325] Tāranātha, rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 171.

[326] Tāranātha distinguishes this Dharmamitra from the Vaibhāṣika master of the same name who wrote a Ṭīkā on Guṇaprabha's Vinayasūtra (rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 152—153). This earlier Dharmamitra is in fact reported to have been a pupil of Guṇaprabha (see Bu·ston, Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 113b2 [ii, p. 161]), which would make him approximately a contemporary of Ārya Vimuktisena. — Dharmākara(datta) was the religious name of Arcaṭa (*c.* 730—90 ?) (cf. Durvekamiśra, Arcaṭāloka [GOS ed.], p. 233).

kāra, and to Kamalaśīla. His work is generally known as the Prasphuṭapadā; it is a commentary on Haribhadra's shorter explanation of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, the Śāstravṛtti ('Sphuṭārthā').[327] In his treatment of the *prakṛtistha-gotra*, one of the basic topics of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, in the first chapter of his work Dharmamitra discusses the *tathāgatagarbha* (fol. 54a); he thus differs from the two Vimuktisenas and Haribhadra and follows Kamalaśīla who, as already noted, introduced the *tathāgatagarbha* and *ekayāna* theories into his presentation of Madhyamaka thought.[328]

Abhayākaragupta, the author of a commentary on the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā entitled Marmakaumudī, was also a leading later representative of this current of thought, as well as of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school in general and of the Madhyamaka-Vajrayāna synthesis.[329]

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[327] Cf. Bu·ston, Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 105a1—2 (ii, p. 140); Tāranātha, rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 153.

[328] See above, p. 96, and D. Seyfort Ruegg, The *gotra*, *ekayāna* and *tathāgatagarbha* theories according to Dharmamitra etc., in Prajñāpāramitā and related systems (Studies in honor of E. Conze, Berkeley, 1977), pp. 283—312.

[329] On this master see below, p. 114—15.

## MADHYAMAKA AND VAJRAYĀNA

Another religio-philosophical movement to have a very important influence among the Mādhyamikas especially during the last centuries of the first millennium P.C. was the Vajrayāna, also known as Mantrayāna (as the correlative of the Pāramitāyāna) or Tantrism. Since, beside the Yogācāra, the chief theoretical source of the Vajrayāna is to be found in Madhyamaka thought the connexion between the two cannot be deemed secondary or external. The synthesis that came about between the two, which represents a confluence and coordination of theory and praxis, is now only partially accessible to us through written documents and the iconological study of the art of the Vajrayāna; it was indeed to a great extent an acroamatic tradition communicated through the Guru's oral instructions and adapted in principle to the intellectual capacity and psychological propensities of each disciple individually. Although it is not possible here to discuss this important current of thought, it is indispensable to say at least a few words concerning the links between the Vajrayāna and the Mādhyamikas.[330]

One of the central figures in this movement was Ārya Nāgārjuna. This Vajrayānist master bore the same name as the teacher revered by the Mādhyamikas as the originator of their school. The first and presumably most important of the Vajrayānists to have this illustrious name[331] seems to have lived in the seventh (or at the latest in the eighth) century. The Bodhicittavivaraṇa may

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[330] Already I-ching (635—713) mentions Nāgārjuna's having studied the Vidyādharapiṭaka; see E. CHAVANNES, Mémoire composé à l'époque de la grande dynastie T'ang sur les religieux éminents qui allèrent chercher la loi dans les pays d'Occident (Paris, 1894), p. 102. About the year 400 the great Serindian Mādhyamika master Kumārajīva, who was established in Kučā and had close links with Kāśmīr, is credited with the translation of a 'Tāntrik' text, the Mahāmāyūrī (Vidyārājñī) (Taishō 988) — a work with which 'Nāga' has indeed been connected by the Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa (liii. 450). Much later, *c.* 1000, Shih-hu translated into Chinese works by Nāgārjuna and Tāntrik texts. In India, beside works by Tāntrika Mādhyamikas mentioned below, a Ṭīkā on the Anantamukhanirhāradhāraṇī was composed by Jñānagarbha in the eighth century (on him see above, p. 69). — Since this book is concerned with the philosophical literature of the Madhyamaka school in the strict sense, works dealing with practice and Tantra can here only be referred to briefly. (The distinction between Madhyamaka treatises as such and other kinds of works written by Mādhyamikas was adopted also in the classifications of the Tibetan authorities, who of course did not thereby wish to contest the complementarity and indeed indivisibility of theory and praxis, and the ultimate coincidence of *pāramitānaya* and *mantranaya*).

[331] There may well have been more than one Tāntrika named Nāgārjuna (see the literature cited below, note 333).

well be his composition;[332] and he was most probably the author also of the commentary on the Guhyasamāja (the Tantraṭīkā) and of the Pañcakrama, and thus the founder of the Ārya lineage belonging to the Guhyasamāja tradition. This Nāgārjuna was presumably the disciple of one of the most famous of the early Vajrayānist masters, Saraha, who is also known as Rāhulabhadra.[333] Nāgabodhi has been mentioned above (p. 57, together with 'Nāga'); he appears to have been a disciple of Ārya Nāgārjuna and a teacher of Vajrabodhi (*c.* 671—741).

This Vajrayānist lineage evidently included other masters bearing the names of (earlier) Mādhyamika Ācāryas. Candrakīrti-pāda is the author of a famous commentary on the Guhyasamāja entitled Pradīpoddyotana.[334] Āryadeva-pāda

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[332] This work is apparently quoted by Haribhadra, Abhisamayālaṃkālokā ii. 1. A Tibetan translation of it was made by Jayānanda and mDo·sde·''bar (see below, p. 114).

[333] This teacher-disciple relationship between Saraha — Rāhulabhadra and Ārya Nāgārjuna seems to have been projected back by some traditions to the relationship between Nāgārjuna, the author of the MMK, and an earlier Rāhulabhadra, the author of the Prajñāpāramitāstotra, who appears to have been a successor of Nāgārjuna I; see above, p. 54. — A Rāhulabhadra is listed as a disciple of Buddhajñāna along with Dīpaṃkarabhadra ('Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal, Deb·ther·sṅon·po, ja, fol. 9b [i, p. 371]). The Bodhisattvagocarapariśuddhisūtrārthasaṃgraha included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan·''gyur is ascribed to (a) Rāhulabhadra.

The history and lineages of the Siddhas and Tāntrika masters remains very obscure for us, and our sources sometimes give quite divergent accounts of them so that it is not yet possible to fit them coherently into the history of Indian and Buddhist thought. On the subject cf. G. Tucci, Animadversiones indicae, JPASB 26 (1930), p. 138 sq. (= Opera minora, i, p. 209 sq.), and Tibetan painted scrolls, i (Rome, 1949), pp. 214, 231; S. Lévi, BSOS 6 (1930—32), p. 417 sq.; Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana, JA 1934, p. 209 sq.; H. Hoffmann, Beiträge zur indischen Philologie und Altertumskunde (Festschrift W. Schubring, Hamburg, 1951), p. 142; A. Wayman, The Buddhist Tantras (New York, 1973), p. 14 sq., and Yoga of the Guhyasamājatantra (Delhi, 1977); P. Kvaerne, An anthology of Buddhist Tantric songs (Oslo, 1977), p. 4 sq. (with bibliography, p. 270).

[334] Buddhist tradition has distinguished between those writings of Candrakīrti that belong to the Sūtra system *(mdo lugs)*, such as the Madhyamakāvatāra and the commentaries on Nāgārjuna's and Āryadeva's treatises, and those that belong to the Mantra system *(sṅags lugs)*, such as the Pradīpoddyotana; but it ascribes both categories to one and the same person. (The case is thus comparable with that of Nāgārjuna himself, between different categories of whose works Buddhist tradition has clearly distinguished while at the same time ascribing them to the same author).

The *Triśaraṇa[gamana]saptati contained in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan·''gyur is presumably by the Tantrika author since it not only picks up the *akliṣṭājñāna* theme of the Bodhicittavivaraṇa but refers to seven *piṭakas* including the *vidyādharapiṭaka* (fol. 293b5 and 294a7). Verse 33 seems to be quoted by Haribhadra, Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā i. 3 (p. 8—9).

On a later Candrakīrti who lived in the eleventh century, see above, p. 81.

Concerning the Pradīpoddyotana and the related literature, cf. A. Wayman, Yoga of the Guhyasamājatantra (Delhi, 1977).

is the author of the Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa,[335] which is connected in its subject-matter with Ārya Nāgārjuna-pāda's Pañcakrama.[336] He is perhaps also the author of the Jñānasārasamuccaya, a not specifically Tāntrika work included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan-'gyur which describes *inter alia* the doctrines of the later schools of Indian philosophy, Brāhmanical as well as Buddhist.[337] According to this treatise the Mādhyamika does not accept the *vijñāna* as a real entity because it has neither a single nor a multiple own being *(ekānekasvabhāva)*, just like a sky-lotus; for him reality *(tattva)* is free from the four positions postulated in dichotomizing conceptualization (viz. existence, non-existence, both, and neither) (fol. 30b). To this line of masters may belong a (later) Śāntideva known also as Bhusuku,[338] as well as a Bhavya.[339]

The Indo-Tibetan records frequently identify these Vajrayānist masters with the illustrious teachers of the earlier Madhyamaka school whose names they bore, and to whom these records accordingly ascribe extraordinarily long lifespans. However, at the same time, these records often differentiate very clearly between distinct phases in these masters' teachings—such as the so-called Sūtra-system and Mantra-system—so that the identification of the persons of these masters did not in fact necessarily result in confusion by the doxographers of distinct doctrines.

In addition to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla who were also Vajrayānists several later masters, many of whose works are included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan-'gyur, are known as representatives of the Madhyamaka-Vajrayāna synthesis.

Kambalapāda wrote a Maṇḍalavidhi and the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa (both of which works are found in the Madhyamaka section of the Peking bsTan-'gyur), as well as the Navaślokī[340] on the Prajñāpāramitā together with an abridgement and a commentary. He is regarded by doxographers as a Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika (Nirmala-Alīkākāra branch). In his Ālokamālā he makes very extensive use of Yogācāra ideas.[341]

[335] This is the title of the work as quoted in the Subhāṣitasaṃgraha and as edited by P. Patel (Santiniketan, 1949). The bsTan-'gyur has Cittāvaraṇaviśodhana-nāma-prakaraṇa (for the text it ascribes to Āryadeva) and Cittaratnaviśodhana (for the text it ascribes to Indrabhūti-pāda). The relation between these two works, apparently translated about the same time (eleventh century), is not clear.

[336] The Tāntrika Āryadeva is also known as Karṇari or Kaṇheri; cf. G. Tucci, JPASB 26 (1930), p. 141 (= Opera minora, i, p. 211).

[337] Cf. S. Yamaguchi, Chūgan bukkyō ronkō (Kyōto, 1944), pp. 256—431; K. Mimaki, La réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses (Paris, 1976), pp. 186—9. See also above, note 312.

[338] Cf. Bu-ston, Chos-'byuṅ, fol. 114a; A. Pezzali, Śāntideva (Florence, 1968), pp. 4 sq., 44—45, 87—89; H. Hoffmann, Asien: Tradition und Fortschritt (Fests. H. Hammitzsch, Wiesbaden, 1971), p. 207 sq.

[339] He is perhaps the author of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa mentioned above, p. 66. A Pañjikā on the Pañcakrama was composed by a certain Bhavya-kīrti, as well as a commentary on the Pradīpoddyotana.

[340] Cf. G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, i (Rome, 1956), pp. 211—31.

[341] In the bsTan-'gyur there is found a commentary entitled Ālokamālāṭīkā on

Advayavajra—also evidently known as Maitrī-pāda, a master who is reported to have rediscovered the Ratnagotravibhāga—is the author of the Tattvaratnāvalī, Tattvaprakāśa, Madhyamaṣaṭka and other treatises in which short outlines are given of the main doctrines of the Buddhist philosophical schools.[342]

Kṛṣṇapāda is the author of the Madhyamakapratītyasamutpāda and the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāraduravabodhananirṇaya, as well as of other short works included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan·'gyur.[343]

Mention should finally be made here of two works by Vimalamitra that are included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan·'gyur. The first is a treatise on non-conceptual *(nirvikalpa)* meditative realization *(bhāvanā)* in which entry is simultaneous *(cig car = yugapad)* entitled Cig·car·'jug·pa·rnam·par·mi·rtog·pa'i bsgom·don, and the second is a longer text on meditative realization in which entry is gradual entitled Rim·gyis·'jug·pa'i· (b)sgom·don. According to the colophons both texts were translated into Tibetan by Ye·šes·sde. And their author Vimalamitra, who thus evidently flourished by the end of the eighth century, is apparently to be identified with the master of the same name, a contemporary of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, who was one of the more prominent and influential figures in the early history of Buddhism in Tibet and who is counted as one of the chief teachers of the *rÑogs chen* tradition of the rÑiṅ·ma school of Tibetan Buddhism. These two treatises belong to the same category as the works on *bhāvanā* by Jñānagarbha and Kamalaśīla mentioned earlier.

Further representatives of the last period of the Madhyamaka school in India who were at the same time Vajrayānists—and some of whom in addition

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Kam(b)ala(pāda)'s Ālokamālā (sNaṅ·ba'i·phreṅ·ba) ascribed to Asvabhāva, whom Tāranātha appears to make an approximate contemporary of Jñānagarbha and Kambala and describes as an advocate of the Vijñapti-Madhyamaka *(rnam rig gi dbu ma)* (rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 152). According to M. HATTORI, Dignāga on perception (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 5, Asvabhāva preceded Dharmapāla in the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda school. Is this then another Asvabhāva? — On Kambala/Kamala see G. TUCCI, Minor Buddhist texts, i, p. 213. See also Tāranātha, rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, pp. 144, 146, 152; bKa'·babs·bdun·gyi·rnam·thar (transl. A. GRÜNWEDEL, p. 53 sq.).

[342] Cf. 'Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal, Deb·ther·sṅon·po, cha, fol. 9b—10a (i, pp. 347—9); da, fol. 2a sq. (ii, p. 842); D. SEYFORT RUEGG, La théorie du *tathāgatagarbha* et du *gotra*, pp. 36—39. He lived in the 10th—11th century. — On the Madhyamaṣaṭka of Advayavajra/Maitrīpāda see S. K. PATHAK, ALB 25 (1961), pp. 539—49.

[343] A Kṛṣṇa is included in a list of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's teachers given by 'Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal, Deb·ther·sṅon·po, ca, fol. 2a (i, p. 243—4); he was a contemporary of Nāropā (Nāḍapāda), Jitāri and Ratnākaraśānti. Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna translated a Triskandhasādhana by a Kṛṣṇa-pāda. This Kṛṣṇapāda might perhaps be the same person as the collaborator of Nag·ćho·Ćhul·khrims·rgyal·ba (born in 1011) in the translation of Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra-kārikās; or he may be a namesake.—On the masters bearing this name cf. D. L. SNELLGROVE, Hevajratantra, i (London, 1959), p. 13 note.

made extensive use of the Prajñāpāramitā and Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda philosophies and thus contributed to the elaboration of a synthesis of several currents of thought in later Indian Buddhism—will be mentioned in the next chapter.

# THE LAST PERIOD OF THE INDIAN MADHYAMAKA SCHOOL

*Bodhibhadra, Dharmakīrti (Dharmapāla) and Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna*

Bodhibhadra (*fl. c.* 1000), a master at Nālandā and a teacher of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna, wrote a Nibandhana on Āryadeva-pāda's Jñānasārasamuccaya.[344] Like the text on which it comments, it is of interest for the later history of the doctrines of the Indian philosophical schools, Buddhist and Brāhmanical. According to this commentary (28), for the Mādhyamika absolute reality *(tattva)* is free from the four extreme positions postulated in the form of the 'tetralemma' *(catuṣkoṭi)* within the frame of dichotomizing conceptualization *(vikalpa)*, viz. existence (of the Vijñānavādin's *vijñāna*), non-existence (according to the Lokāyata's doctrine), neither, and both. It is explained that reality has been stated not to be some thing that is without both existence and non-existence *(gñis daṅ bral ba'i bdag ñid)* in order to remove the idea that there exists some kind of entity having a mode of being between existence and non-existence *(tṛtīya-rāśi)*, in conformity with the principle of the excluded middle. And because the Mādhyamika therefore asserts no dogmatically postulated ontological position concerning the existence of any kind of entity his theory cannot be attacked (fol. 51 b).[345] Turning to the systematic analysis of the *saṃvṛti* level, Bodhibhadra mentions both the doctrine of Bhavya and his school and that of Śāntarakṣita and his school; according to the first an image *(snaṅ ba)* is not made the object of valid cognition *('jal ba)*, and according to the second internal knowledge appears in various forms, no mental entity *(snaṅ ba'i dṅos po)* being however ultimately real. With respect to praxis, the Mādhyamika is of course to engage in spiritual training *(śikṣā)* (fol. 51 b—52 a).

Bodhibhadra also composed important works on the Bodhisattva's vows *(saṃvara)*[346] and on *yoga* and meditation.

Dharmakīrti of Suvarṇadvīpa (*fl. c.* 1000), another of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's principal teachers, was born in a royal house of Indonesia. His major work, a

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[344] Cf. K. Mimaki, La réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses (Paris, 1976), pp. 190—207.

[345] See Nāgārjuna, Vigrahavyāvartanī 29 and 59; Āryadeva, Catuḥśataka xvi. 25; Śāntarakṣita, Madhyamakālaṃkāra 68.

[346] One such work is entitled Bodhisattvasaṃvaraviṃśaka-Pañjikā. Together with Śāntarakṣita's Saṃvaraviṃśakavṛtti, this work depends on Candragomin's Bodhisattvasaṃvaraviṃśaka and thus belongs to the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesizing movement (see also above, pp. 88, 93). Bodhibhadra also wrote a short Bodhisattvasaṃvaravidhi included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan-'gyur.

Ṭīkā on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra entitled Dur[ava]bodhālokā, was composed in the town of Vijayanagara/Vijayapura (rNam·par·rgyal·ba'i·groṅ) in the kingdom of Suvarṇadvīpa (gSer·gliṅ)[347] at the time of King Śrī Cūḍāmaṇivarman (dPal·gĆug·gi·nor·bu'i·go·cha).[348]

Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's master known as Dharmapāla (Chos·skyoṅ) is credited with a work entitled Śikṣāsamuccayābhisamaya. Two other works, the Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra-ṣaṭtriṃśatpiṇḍārtha and the Bodhisattvacaryāvatārapiṇḍārtha, are connected with him in the bsTan·'gyur (which states that they were requested by his disciples Kamalarakṣita and Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna).[349] Although these works are very brief, their author has been given an important place in the history of later Buddhist thought as the teacher of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna.

The epithet 'of Suvarṇadvīpa' (gSer·gliṅ·pa) is given to the above-mentioned Dharmakīrti and to Dharmapāla, and these are evidently two names of one and the same person.

Dharmakīrti of Suvarṇadvīpa was, however, not a Mādhyamika but a follower of the Satyākāra- or Sākāra-Vijñānavāda who held the Madhyamaka to be of indirect meaning *(neyārtha)* according to a biography of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (the rNam thar rgyas pa, fol. 12a). According to this same source (fol. 5a—b, 12a—b and 24b—25a), his great disciples were Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti—both of whom are described also as Sākāra-Vijñānavādins—, Ratnākaraśānti—a follower of the Alīkākāra- or Nirākāra-Vijñānavāda who held his version of this doctrine to be the true Madhyamaka (the so-called 'Vijñapti-Madhyamaka')—, and Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna—a Mādhyamika who followed Candrakīrti although he had received instruction also in the synthesizing Yogācāra-Madhyamaka from Avadhūtipāda and in the 'Vijñapti-Madhyamaka' from Ratnākaraśānti (see below, Appendix II).

Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna, who is very frequently known by the appellation Atiśa, was born in a royal lineage—according to some sources that of Sahor/Za·hor—

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[347] Suvarṇadvīpa is apparently to be identified as Sumatra (and perhaps also Java, and Malaysia; Suvarṇabhūmi on the other hand is Burma); cf. G. Coedès, Les états hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie[2] (Paris, 1964), pp. 259, 264.—A certain Guru and Bhikṣu Paiṇḍapātika of Yavadvīpa *and* Suvarṇadvīpa is cited in Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's Bodhimārgadīpapañjikā (fol. 336b3).

[348] As an important artistic creation attesting the significance of the Prajñāpāramitā in Indonesia mention may be made of the famous image from C(h)aṇḍi Singhasari which has been described as the portrait of a thirteenth century queen identified with Prajñāpāramitā (this image is in the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde in Leiden). Such an identification of a queen with Prajñāpāramitā is also known from Champa in the twelfth century. — See G. Coedès, op. cit., pp. 317—18, 341. Cf. E. Conze, Thirty years of Buddhist studies (Oxford, 1967), p. 246 sq.

[349] The bsTan·'gyur no. 5280 seems to ascribe at least the first of the two works directly to these two disciples, but the colophons are not quite clear. Bu·ston has attributed the Bodhicaryāvatārapiṇḍārtha to Suvarṇadvīpa(-Dharmapāla) (Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 159a). These two texts were translated into Tibetan by Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna and Nag·ćho Lo·ća·ba; they are summaries of the Bodhicaryāvatāra.

in Bengal *c.* 982. After having been the disciple of the best teachers of Northeastern India—such as Bodhibhadra, Jitāri, Kṛṣṇapāda, and Ratnākaraśānti—he is said to have travelled to Suvarṇadvīpa, with whose kings the Pāla rulers of Northeastern India had long entertained relations,[350] to study there with Dharmakīrti. Following his return to India Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna became renowned as one of the most eminent teachers of his time. At Vikramaśīla he was instated as abbot under King Mahīpāla (*rg. c.* 988—1038 or 977—1027) and was reconfirmed in this office under King Nayapāla (*rg. c.* 1038—1054 or 1027—1043). Owing to his great fame as a master at one of the most illustrious Buddhist monastic seminaries—and perhaps also because of his reputed connexion with the royal house of Za·hor from which Śāntarakṣita, the great Upādhyāya and Ācārya-Bodhisattva of the Tibetans at the time of the old kingdom, was said to have issued—he was invited, on the advice of Ye·šes·'od of the royal house of mNa'·ris, by King 'od·lde and the Prince-Monk *(lha bćun)* Byaṅ·chub·'od to the kingdom of western Tibet. He arrived there in 1042 and collaborated at the monastery of (m)Tho·l(d)iṅ with the great translator Rin·chen·bzaṅ·po (958—1055), who had himself studied in Kāśmīr. With him Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna undertook the Tibetan translation of his teacher Dharmakīrti's Dur[ava]bodhālokā and in addition revised the Tibetan translation of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra. A few years later Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna arrived in central Tibet. First in India and then in Tibet he worked closely with his disciple Nag·ćho·Ćhul·khrims·rgyal·ba (born in 1011), with whom he translated many fundamental texts of the Madhyamaka including Bhāvaviveka's Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās, Tarkajvālā and Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha, Candrakīrti's Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa, and Dharmapāla's Bodhisattvacaryāvatārapiṇḍārtha, Ṣaṭtriṃśatpiṇḍārtha and Śikṣāsamuccayābhisamaya, as well as Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya and Guṇaprabha's Bodhisattvabhūmivṛtti. In central Tibet he worked also very closely with his disciple 'Brom·ston·rGyal·ba'i·'byuṅ·gnas (1005—1064), the founder of the bKa'·gdams·pa school. Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna died at sÑe·thaṅ in central Tibet *c.* 1054.[351]

Among Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's best-known works is the Bodhipathapradīpa composed at (m)Tho·liṅ at the request of Byaṅ·chub·'od. A short guide to the path of Awakening, it is one of the basic works of the bKa'·gdams·pa and dGe·lugs·pa schools in Tibet; and its classification of practisers of the path into three types—the lesser, the middling and the superior—was employed for example by Ćoṅ·kha·pa in his treatises on the graded path *(lam rim)*.[352]

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[350] Cf. R. C. Majumdar, History of ancient Bengal (Calcutta, 1971), pp. 116, 525, 582. The historicity of this voyage has however been questioned.

[351] Cf. A. Chattopadhyaya, Atiśa and Tibet (Calcutta, 1967); H. Eimer, Berichte über das Leben des Atiśa (Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna) (Bonn, 1977). Cf. also G. Tucci, Rin c'en bzaṅ po e la rinascita del buddhismo nel Tibet intorno al mille (Indo-Tibetica ii, Rome, 1933).

[352] On this work see H. Eimer, Bodhipathapradīpa (Wiesbaden, 1978), which contains an edition and German translation.

The Bodhipathapradīpa has a commentary attributed to Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna himself the title of which is given in our sources as Bodhimārgadīpa-pañjikā.[353] In addition to expanding on the outline of the path given in the basic text, this commentary sketches the history of the Madhyamaka school and its basic doctrines. Among the latter special attention is given to four 'great reasons' *(gtan ćhigs: hetu)* employed by the Mādhyamika in establishing the understanding of the non-substantiality of all *dharma*s: (i) the 'reason' analysing the (supposed) production of a product;[354] (ii) the so-called *Vajrakaṇa-'reason' *(rdo rje gzegs ma'i gtan ćhigs)* analysing origination from any of the causes postulated in the frame of the *catuṣkoṭi*[355] by either non-Buddhists (e.g. *īśvara, puruṣa, svabhāva,* the *guṇa*s, Brahman, Viṣṇu, Mahādeva) or Buddhists (e.g. the Ābhidharmika's six *hetu*s and four *pratyaya*s); (iii) the 'reason' analysing things as devoid of both a single and a multiple nature *(eka-aneka-svabhāva);*[356] and (iv) the 'reason' constituted by origination in dependence *(pratītyasamutpāda)* establishing *śūnyatā*.[357]

This commentary also provides lists of works which were regarded as being by Nāgārjuna (including, in addition to the writings generally considered today to be certainly by him, the *Akutobhayā, the Mahāyānaviṃśaka and the Akṣaraśataka)[358] and by Āryadeva (including the *Madhyamakabhramaghāta [dBu·ma·rnam·par·'thag·pa·chen·po], the Hastavālaprakaraṇa and the Jñānasārasamuccaya).[359] It also lists eight commentaries on the MMK: Nāgārjuna's own (i.e. the *Akutobhayā), Candrakīrti's, Bhāvaviveka's, Buddhapālita's, Sthiramati's, Guṇamati's, Guṇaśrī's, and Guṇadatta's, adding that the two great sub-commentaries on Bhāvaviveka's Prajñāpradīpa were by Avalokitavrata and Devaśarman (i.e. the dBu·ma·dkar·po·'char·ba).[360]

This list appears to link Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna above all with the pure Madhyamaka traditions transmitted from Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti, rather than with the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis represented by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Whereas this latter tradition had become firmly established in Tibet during the second half of the eighth century, at the time of the Early Propagation *(sṅa dar)* of Buddhism in that country, Dīpaṃkara-

[353] The title of this commentary is so given in the Peking and sDe·dge editions of the bsTan·'gyur.

[354] The commentary here speaks of a *catuṣkoṭi* 'tetralemma', but just like the basic text it enumerates only three alternatives: production of an existent product, of a non-existent one (e.g. a sky-flower), and of one that is both existent and non-existent. Each alternative is shown on analysis to be unacceptable.

[355] See Nāgārjuna, MMK i.1.

[356] This principle has been elaborated especially by Śrīgupta (above, p. 68) and Śāntarakṣita.

[357] Pañjikā, fol. 322a—323a.

[358] Later Tibetan scholarship has not accepted this list uncritically. Cf. above, p. 49 note 129. (Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's authorship of this commentary has indeed been called into question.)

[359] Pañjikā, fol. 324a.

[360] Pañjikā, fol. 324b.

śrījñāna and his collaborators and followers were evidently responsible for the consolidation of the two branches of the pure Madhyamaka—those of Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti—towards the beginning of the Later Propagation *(phyi dar)* of Buddhism in that country (for the role played by Jayānanda and Pa·čhab in the establishment of Candrakīrti's Prāsaṅgika school see below, p. 114).

Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna composed the Satyadvayāvatāra for a king of Suvarṇadvīpa. In this discussion of the two truths he explains that the *saṃvṛti* is twofold (*mithyā* and *tathya*) but the *paramārtha* is one only, for there can be no multiplicity in *dharmatā*. After having referred to Bhavya's view that unconceptualizable reality may be known by *savikalpaka* as well as by *nirvikalpaka* knowledge, the author states that *śūnyatā* or *dharmatā* is to be known in the way explained by Candrakīrti in his Madhyamakāvatāra.[361]

Among Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's numerous other writings his very brief Madhyamakopadeśa (on which there is a commentary by Prajñāmokṣa) and his longer Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭanāma-Madhyamakopadeśa require special mention together with his Sūtrasamuccayasaṃcayārtha and Mahāsūtrasamuccaya. His Dharmadhātudarśanagīti incorporates a number of verses from the Dharmadhātustava ascribed to Nāgārjuna (making up approximately one seventh of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's text).

*Jayānanda*

Jayānanda (flourished in the second half of the eleventh century), a scholar of Kāśmīri origin, lived at a time when there took place a renewal of interest in Candrakīrti's branch of the Madhyamaka. He contributed very considerably to this movement especially in Tibet, where he worked extensively.[362]

Jayānanda is the author of a large Ṭīkā on Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra, the only commentary by an Indian master now extant on this work.[363] It

[361] Vol. ha, fol. 70b = vol. gi, fol. 7b.

[362] This Jayānanda would seem not to be identical with the person of the same name who collaborated in the Tibetan translation of the Yuddhajaya[arṇava]-nāmatantrarāja Svarodaya-nāma (the *āmnāya* appended to the Tibetan version of this Tantra states that the latter was from Ya·čhe [Semjā], and that he was connected with the Kāśmīri spiritual lineage of Somānanda and Abhinavagupta; cf. P. Cordier, Catalogue du fonds tibétain de la Bibliothèque Nationale, iii, p. 477). In the colophons of the Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā and Tarkamudgara, our Jayānanda is stated to be from Kāśmīr. The translator of the Svarodaya would moreover appear to have lived somewhat later than our Jayānanda (cf. E. Gene Smith's introduction to the edition of the dByaṅs·'char published at Gangtok in 1970). — A certain Kha·che Ānanda/Ananta is mentioned among the ancient translators, including Vairocana and lDan·ma·rČe·maṅ, at the end of the eighth century in Tibet (cf. dPa'·bo·gČug·lag·phreṅ·ba, mKhas·pa'i·dga'·ston, ja, fol. 125a); and he has to be distinguished from our Jayānanda.

[363] Cf. N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Journ. of Oriental Research (Madras) 6 (1932), pp. 171—83.

is available only in Tibetan translation; and the colophon informs us that Jayānanda composed it far from his native Kāśmīr, in Mi·ñag ('near the Huang-ho and the Wu-t'ai-shan', as stated in the colophon). It was translated into Tibetan by its author with the Tibetan translator Kun·dga'·grags. The circumstances of the composition of this work make it one of the most extensive works of Indian philosophy to have been written outside the Indian subcontinent.[364] Jayānanda is also the author of another work included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan·'gyur, the Tarkamudgara, a very short text in verse on logic.

In Tibet Jayānanda collaborated with the translator Pa·čhab Ñi·ma·grags (born in 1055) who—together with him and other scholars like Kanakavarman, Tilakakalaśa and Sūkṣmajana[365]—was largely responsible for the establishment in the land of snows of Candrakīrti's school of the Madhyamaka, revised the Tibetan translation of the MMK, and translated Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka along with Candrakīrti's commentary on it, the Madhyamakāvatāra, and the Prasannapadā. With Pa·čhab and Khu mDo·sde·'bar Jayānanda translated a Sūtrasamuccaya ascribed to Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna; and with mDo·sde·'bar he translated the Vaidalyaprakaraṇa and the Bodhicittavivaraṇa[366] ascribed to Nāgārjuna and revised the Tibetan translation of the Vigrahavyāvartanī-Kārikās. With Grags·'byor·šes·rab he translated the Vaidalya-'Sūtra', the Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayavyākhyāna and one of the versions of the Mahāyānaviṃśaka; and he revised the Tibetan translation of the Akṣaraśataka and its Vṛtti.[367]

*Abhayākaragupta*

Abhayākaragupta flourished about 1100 and was a scholar of the Vikramaśīlā monastic seminary. There, in the thirtieth year of the reign of King Rāmapāla (*rg. c.* 1077—1130 or 1072—1126), he composed the Munimatālaṃkāra.[368] This very extensive treatise of encyclopaedic character expounds Mahāyānist gnoseology and soteriology in connexion with the Prajñāpāramitā doctrine and includes many references to the basic texts of both the Madhyamaka and

[364] On Buddhism and Tibetan culture in Mi·ñag, among the Tanguts, see E. J. Kyčanov, Tibetans and Tibetan culture in the Tangut state Hsi hsia, in L. Ligeti, ed., Proceedings of the Csoma de Kőrös Memorial Symposium (Budapest, 1978), p. 205 sq.

[365] Cf. J. Naudou, Les bouddhistes kaśmīriens au moyen-âge (Paris, 1968), pp. 73, 139.

[366] The version in the Tantra section of the bsTan·'gyur (there is another version in the Sūtra section).

[367] In view of this work accomplished by Jayānanda and Pa·čhab and by their Indian and Tibetan contemporaries, it is not possible to ascribe the great importance of the Prāsaṅgika school in Tibet only to Čoṅ·kha·pa's influence and to date it from the fourteenth century, as has been done by some recent scholars.

[368] See the author colophon in the Tibetan translation. — According to Sum·pa Ye·šes·dpal·'byor's Re'u·mig, Abhayākaragupta died in *šiṅ sbrul* = 1125.

Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda schools. In Chapter i, beside a treatment of the *bodhicitta* as the main subject, there is an explanation of the *tathāgatagarbha* theory and the single vehicle *(ekayāna)* (fol. 189a). Chapter ii deals chiefly with *bhāvanā* as concentration *(samādhi)*, attainment *(samāpatti)* and meditation *(dhyāna)*, with the objects of meditation, and with ultimate reality as comprehended in meditation. Chapter iii is devoted to a study of the eight *abhisamaya*s of the Prajñāpāramitā doctrine; the treatment of the first *abhisamaya*—the *sarvākārajñatā*—includes an exposition of the theory of the spiritual 'germ' which exists by nature *(prakṛtisthagotra)*, and in this connexion the author discusses further the *tathāgatagarbha* and *ekayāna*.[369] Chapter iv is devoted to the qualities that are constitutive of buddhahood and comprises an exhaustive treatment of Mahāyānist gnoseology and buddhology. Abhayākaragupta describes his exposition as based on Nāgārjuna and Ārya Vimuktisena (fol. 396b).

The Munimatālaṃkāra is one of the last of the major comprehensive treatises of Indian Buddhism, and it presents a treatment of Mahāyānist thought based on the Prajñāpāramitā, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra traditions. Although as such it is not in the narrowest sense a work of the Madhyamaka, it bears testimony to the efforts made by the later Mādhyamikas systematically to elaborate a synthesis of the entire Mahāyānist tradition.

Abhayākaragupta's commentary on the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā is held by some doxographers to conform to the Svātantrika position, like the commentaries on the Prajñāpāramitā doctrine by the two Vimuktisenas, Haribhadra and Buddhajñānapāda. And Abhayākaragupta is counted as a representative of Śāntarakṣita's Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school.[370]

In addition, Abhayākaragupta was the author of a number of works on iconology, ritual and several Tantrik cycles.[371]

*Other later Mādhyamikas*

To this later period of Indian Buddhism, the last in the history of the Madhyamaka in India, belong also the following Mādhyamika masters several of whose works are included in the Madhyamaka section of the Tibetan bsTan-'gyur.[372]

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[369] See D. Seyfort Ruegg, The *gotra*, *ekayāna* and *tathāgatagarbha* theories of the Prajñāpāramitā according to Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta, in: The Prajñāpāramitā and related systems (Studies in honor of E. Conze, Berkeley, 1977), pp. 283—312.

[370] Cf. mKhas-grub-rje-dGe-legs-dpal-bzaṅ, rGyud-sde-spyi-rnam, p. 96; sToṅ-thun-chen-mo, fol. 37a—b. Cf. above, p. 87 sq., 103.

[371] Abhayākaragupta is known to have worked with Tibetan translators, and he was for example associated with sNur-Dar-ma-(or: Dharma-)grags in the translation made at Nālandā of Candrakīrti's Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti. Cf. 'Gos-gŽon-nu-dpal, Deb-ther-sṅon-po, cha, fol. 7b (i, p. 342).

[372] It is unnecessary to underscore again the fact that the historical information available on these masters is complex and difficult to interpret with certainty,

Reference has already been made above to a later Jitāri or Jetāri who evidently lived *c.* 1000 (p. 100), as well as to a later Bhavya (p. 66), a later Candrakīrti (p. 81), and a later Jñānagarbha (p. 69), all of whom flourished in the eleventh century. On Advayavajra/Maitrīpāda and Kṛṣṇapāda see also above, p. 107.

A certain dGe·ba('i)·lha (Kalyāṇadeva, Śubhadeva ?) is known as the author of the *Bodhisattvacaryāvatārasaṃskāra.

Prajñākaramati (*fl. c.* 950—1000) is reported to have been a contemporary of Ratnākaraśānti, Jñānaśrīmitra and Nāḍapāda (Nāropā) at Vikramaśīlā.[373] He is the author of an extensive Pañjikā on Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra and of a work on the Prajñāpāramitā doctrine entitled Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛttipiṇḍārtha.

Parahitabhadra (eleventh century), a Kāśmīri scholar, is the author of a Vivṛti on Nāgārjuna's Śūnyatāsaptati, which he translated into Tibetan together with gŽon·nu·mchog. He also composed a special commentary on two verses of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra.[374]

Vairocanarakṣita (eleventh century), a contemporary of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna and a scholar at Vikramaśīlā, composed the Śikṣākusumamañjarī and a Pañjikā on the Bodhicaryāvatāra.[375]

Dharmākaramati (eleventh century), a pupil of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna, wrote a commentary on the latter's Satyadvayāvatāra.[376]

Another pupil of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna known as dBu·ma'i·seṅ·ge (*Madhyamaka-Siṃha) wrote a short treatise on the philosophical systems.[377]

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especially since the same name has often been borne by more than one person. The writings of these masters as well as the Tibetan and other records concerning them still await detailed study; often even their Sanskrit titles are uncertain.

[373] See Tāranātha, rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, pp. 178, 181; 'Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal, Deb·ther·sṅon·po, ña, fol. 2a (i, p. 206). Cf. J. Naudou, op. cit., p. 132—3.

[374] A(n earlier ?) Parahitabhadra is reported to have been the pupil of Ratnavajra, the grandfather of Sajjana and the great grandfather of Sūkṣmajana. Tāranātha makes him a contemporary of King Mahīpāla (*rg. c.* 988—1038 or 977—1027), whose death he however places at the time of King Khri·ral's death (!?) (rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 172).—A Parahitabhadra (evidently the one in question above) is known as the teacher of rÑog·Blo·ldan·šes·rab (1059—1109) and as a translator at mTho·liṅ. Cf. J. Naudou, op. cit., pp. 104, 176, 182—3.

[375] On (this ?) Vairocanarakṣita see 'Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal, Deb·ther·sṅon·po, da, fol. 3a sq. (ii, p. 844 sq.), who however makes him also a disciple of Abhayākaragupta (who flourished *c.* 1100). — The Tibetan translation of Āryaśūra's Pāramitāsamāsa included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan·'gyur is ascribed to a Vairocanarakṣita.

[376] This dKa'·'grel (Pañjikā) is listed by Bu·ston as having been translated into Tibetan by rGya·brČon·'grus·seṅ·ge (Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 158b 3). It is not to be found in the Peking and sDe·dge editions of the bsTan·'gyur.—For another Dharmākara see above, note 326.

[377] The lTa·ba·tha·dad·pa·rnam·par·phye·ba (*Saṃkṣiptanānādṛṣṭivibhāga), a text evidently written down by the Upāsaka Taro(Tāra)śrīmitra, who translated it into Tibetan with Chos·kyi·šes·rab.—dBu·ma'i·seṅ·ge, 'Lion of the Madhyamaka,' seems to be an epithet of Dharmākaramati in the Deb·ther·sṅon·po, ca,

Dānaśīla wrote the Dhyānaṣaḍdharmavyasthānavṛtti included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan·'gyur.[378]

Buddhaśrījñāna was invited to Tibet in 1200 by Khro·phu·lo·ćа·ba Byams·pa'i·dpal.[379] He wrote the Jinamārgāvatāra which contains sections on Madhyamaka theory (*nairātmya* and *pratītyasamutpāda)* as well as on practice, and a commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra entitled Prajñāpradīpāvalī.[380]

Vibhūticandra (*fl. c.* 1200) from Varendra was one of the group of so-called Junior Paṇḍits who accompanied the great Paṇḍit of Kāśmīr, Śākyaśrībhadra, to Tibet in 1204;[381] like his teacher he was connected with the Vihāra of Jagaddala.[382] He composed a quite extensive work the Sanskrit title of which is given in the bsTan·'gyur as Bodhicaryāvatāratātparyapañjikā Viśeṣadyotanī.[383]

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fol. 10a (i, p. 261—2). However, Dharmākaramati and dBu·ma'i·seṅ·ge are listed as different disciples of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna in most of the biographies relating to him, including the rNam thar rgyas pa and Tāranātha, rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 188.

[378] This text translated by Rin·chen·bzaṅ·po (958—1055) relates to a work ascribed to Avadhūti-pāda also translated by Rin·chen·bzaṅ·po.

According to Tāranātha, a Kāśmīri named Dānaśīla was the contemporary of King Mahīpāla (*rg. c.* 988—1038 or 977—1027, whose death he however places at the time of King Khri·ral's death in rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 172); it may be this Dā(naśīla) who is mentioned as a teacher of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (under the appellation mKhas pa chen po Dā chen po) by 'Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal, Deb·ther·sṅon·po, ca, fol. 2a (i, p. 243) (?). Elsewhere Tāranātha has mentioned a Dānaśīla as the contemporary of King Gopāla (*rg. c.* 750—770 or 775) (op. cit., p. 157); he may then be the Dānaśīla who collaborated with dPal·brćegs·rakṣi·ta and dPal·'byor·sñiṅ·po in the translation of the Hastavāla-Vṛtti, and with Jinamitra, Śīlendrabodhi and Ye·šes·sde in the translation of Candrakīrti's Yuktiṣaṣṭikā-Vrtti (?). Still another Dānaśīla was the contemporary of Śākyaśrībhadra (1127—1225 or 1145—1243?; see below, note 381); see Bu·ston, Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 140a (ii, p. 222). — Cf. J. Naudou, op. cit., pp. 21, 86—87, 90, 186; and pp. 14, 198. It is to be noted that a Tibetan tradition distinguishes between three persons bearing the name Dānaśīla; see e.g. Ňor·chen·dKon·mchog·lhun·grub et al. Dam·pa'i·chos·kyi·byuṅ·ćhul·legs·par·bšad·pa, fol. 124b, 136b, 138a.

[379] See 'Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal, Deb·ther·sṅon·po, ña, fol. 135b (ii, p. 709); ba, fol. 3a (ii, p. 1065); Sum·pa·Ye·šes·dpal·'byor, Re'u·mig under the year *lcags sprel* = 1200.

[380] The Prajñāpradīpāvalī was translated into Tibetan by the author and gNubs(!) Byams·pa'i·dpal. In Bu·ston's Chos·'byuṅ (fol. 139b7 [ii, p. 222]), the context suggests the identification of the author of the Jinamārgāvatāra with the Kāśmīri Buddhaśrījñāna. (On the commentary on the Saṃcayagāthās, the translation of which is attributed to dPal·brćegs, who lived *c.* 800, see above, p. 102).

[381] See Bu·ston, Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 140a1 (ii, p. 222); 'Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal, Deb·ther·sṅon·po, ña, fol. 87a (ii, p. 600). — For the dates of Śākyaśrībhadra (1127—1225 or 1145—1243) see D. Seyfort Ruegg, The Life of Bu·ston Rin·po·che (Rome, 1966), p. 42—43 note.

[382] On the Jagaddala monastery see the introduction by D. D. Kosambi to his edition of the Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. xxxvii note 7; Y. Kajiyama, An introduction to Buddhist philosophy (Kyoto, 1966), p. 11.

[383] Vibhūticandra appears to have been known also by the epithet rNal·'byor·zla·ba; see fol. 229b5—6 of his work and the colophon. Cf. J. W. de Jong, IIJ 16 (1975), p. 166—7.

In the final section of the Tarkabhāṣā by Mokṣākaragupta, who was also associated with the Jagaddala Vihāra, the Mādhyamika's theories of knowledge and inference are briefly treated.[384] This section follows the Jñānasārasamuccaya, and it quotes Dharmakīrti and Prajñākaragupta.

Many of the later treatises mentioned above place special emphasis on the practice of the Bodhisattva beside philosophical theory, and they are connected with Madhyamaka thought in particular through Śāntideva's great works, which were in fact the source of inspiration for so many of them.

The fact that treatises belonging to the later period of the Indian Madhyamaka or at least closely connected with it—in particular the Dur[ava]bodhālokā composed in Suvarṇadvīpa by Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's teacher Dharmakīrti and the Ṭīkā on Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra composed in the Mi·ñag region by Jayānanda—were written outside the Indian subcontinent clearly testifies to the wide geographical diffusion and appeal of this school of thought.[385] During the first 900 years of its existence the Madhyamaka thus spread from India to both Central and East Asia, and perhaps also to some degree to Indonesia.

[384] The Tarkabhāṣā has been edited by E. KRISHNAMACHARYA (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, vol. 94) and H. R. RANGASWAMI IYENGAR (Mysore, 1952); it has been translated by Y. KAJIYAMA, An introduction to Buddhist philosophy (Kyoto, 1966). Mokṣākaragupta is placed by Kajiyama between 1050 and 1292 since he quotes Ratnakīrti and is quoted by Malliṣeṇa in his Syādvādamañjarī.

[385] See above, p. 32 on the Ta-chih-tu-lun·

# APPENDIX I

*Works on practice in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan·'gyur ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa, Ārya-Śūra, Dharma-Subhūti(ghoṣa), and Mātṛceṭa*

In the Madhyamaka section of the Tibetan bsTan·'gyur is found a poetical work dealing with the six perfections *(pāramitā)*—liberality, conduct, patience, energy, meditation, and discriminative understanding—entitled Pāramitā-samāsa by Ārya-Śūra.[386] If, as seems likely, he is the same person as the author of the Jātakamālā, he is perhaps to be placed in the third or fourth century (at the latest).[387] As to why a work on the *pāramitās* was included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan·'gyur, attention has already been drawn above to the close connexion of the Mādhyamikas with Pāramitā philosophy. It is also to be noted that parallels to verses from another work tentatively ascribed to Ārya-Śūra (the colophons refer in this case to Ācārya Śūra)—the Subhāṣitaratnakaraṇḍakakathā found in both the Madhyamaka and Epistle sections of the Peking bsTan·'gyur[388]—are to be traced in Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra and in the Prajñādaṇḍa ascribed to Nāgārjuna, as well as in Ārya-Śūra's own Jātakamālā and Mātṛceṭa's Śatapañcāśatka.[389]

According to an identification recorded by Tāranātha (and apparently going back to Indian sources) Ārya-Śūra, Mātṛceṭa and Dharma/Dhārmika-Subhūti are nothing but various names under which Aśvaghoṣa was known.[390] Aśvaghoṣa's works would seem to have been familiar to Nāgārjuna and other Mādhyamikas;[391] and the Pratītyasamutpādahṛdaya (verse 7), which is traditionally ascribed to Nāgārjuna, paraphrases a verse found in Aśvaghoṣa's Saun-

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[386] Ed. A. Ferrari, Il "Compendio delle perfezioni" (Annali Lateranensi, vol. x, Vatican City, 1946).

[387] On the question of his date, beside the standard histories of Sanskrit literature, see Lin Li-kouang, L'aide-mémoire de la Vraie Loi (Paris, 1949), pp. 102, 310—13.

[388] But not in the Madhyamaka section of the sDe·dge bsTan·'gyur.

[389] See H. Zimmermann, Die Subhāṣita-ratna-karaṇḍaka-kathā (Wiesbaden, 1975), pp. 18—21.

[390] Tāranātha, rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 71. — The question of the association of these persons and their works has been much mooted in the past. See S. Lévi, JA 1928, ii, pp. 204—7; 1929, ii, pp. 255—85; and 1936, p. 101 sq. (on Mātṛceṭa); L. de La Vallée Poussin, L'Inde aux temps des Maurya ... (Paris, 1930), p. 324; P. Mus, La lumière sur les six voies (Paris, 1939), pp. 1—17; Lin Li-kouang, op. cit., pp. 103 sq., 306 sq. (who notes, p. 311—12, that according to a Chinese tradition Ārya*deva* was a co-author of the composite work in the Chinese canon corresponding to the Jātakamālā).

[391] See E. H. Johnston, Buddhacarita, ii (Calcutta, 1936), pp. xxix, 232.

darananda (xiii. 44).[392] As for Mātṛceṭa, he is reported to have been a disciple of Āryadeva;[393] and this association might also help to account for the fact that works attributed to these authors have been included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan·'gyur (in particular in the Peking edition).[394]

Mātṛceṭa and Nāgārjuna—as well apparently as Aśvaghoṣa—are in addition referred to as ascetics concerned with the affairs of the realm *(yatayo rājya-vṛttinaḥ*, Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa liii. 867 sq.).

Examples of such works included in the Madhyamaka and Epistle sections of the bsTan·'gyur are the Mahārājakani(ṣ)kalekha (classified alongside Nāgārjuna's Suhṛllekha and Candragomin's Śiṣyalekha), Caturviparyaya[parihāra]-kathā and Kaliyugaparikathā ascribed to Mātṛceṭa; the Aṣṭākṣaṇakathā, Paramārthabodhicittabhāvanākrama,[395] Saṃvṛtibodhicittabhāvanopadeśa, and Daśākuśalakarmapathanirdeśa[396] ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa; and the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna-Ṣaḍgatikārikās,[397] Daśakuśalakarmapathanirdeśa and Bodhisattvacaryā[saṃgraha]pradīparatnamālā ascribed to Dharma or Dhārmika Subhūti(ghoṣa).[398]

Mātṛceṭa is furthermore renowned as the author of lyric devotional hymns addressed to the Buddha,[399] the cataphaticism of which is comparable to that of

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[392] See above, p. 28.—Hsüan-tsang makes Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna contemporaries at the time of Kaniṣka; cf. S. Beal, Si-yu-ki: Buddhist records of the western world (London, 1906), ii, p. 302; and T. Watters, On Yuan Chwang's travels in India, i (London, 1904), p. 245.

[393] See Bu·ston, Chos·'byuṅ, fol. 103a (ii, p. 136). Cf. Tāranātha, rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 70 sq.

[394] It is to be noted that many of these works are found a second time elsewhere in the Peking edition, in the sPriṅ·yig (Epistle) section of the bsTan·'gyur. In the sDe·dge edition several of these works are not to be found in the Madhyamaka section at all, but in the sPriṅ·yig and Jo·bo'i·chos·chuṅ sections.

[395] This work in particular is quoted in the Tibetan Siddhānta (Grub·mtha') literature on the Madhyamaka, where it is ascribed to Ārya-Śūra. It is clearly a later composition.

[396] Edited in part by S. Lévi, JA 1929, ii, p. 268—9.

[397] See S. Lévi, JA 1925, i, p. 37 sq.; P. Mus, op. cit.; Lin Li-kouang, op. cit., p. 104 sq. — Beside the Sanskrit text of the Ṣaḍgatikārikās (edited by Mus) and their Tibetan translation, we have versions in Chinese and in Pali; see Mus, op. cit. Contrary to what has been stated by Mus (pp. 2, 16), the colophon of the Tibetan translation (Peking edition) makes no mention of the Kārikās being extracted from the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna-*sūtra*.

[398] The *Sarvayānālokabhāṣya (?) also included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan·'gyur and ascribed to Subhūtighoṣa was translated into Tibetan by its author with the assistance of Tiṅ·ṅe·'jin·bzaṅ·po; this writer must therefore be a later namesake of our Dharma-Subhūti(ghoṣa), who lived much earlier (see below, p. 121 note 404). The work deals with the schools of Indian philosophy, including some later developments.

[399] See D. R. Shackleton Bailey, The Varṇārhavarṇastotra of Mātṛceṭa, BSOAS 13 (1949—50), pp. 671 sq., 947 sq., and The Śatapañcāśatka of Mātṛceṭa (Cambridge, 1951); D. Schlingloff, Die Buddhastotras Mātṛceṭa's (Abh. der deutschen Akad. der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1968); P. Python, Sugatapañcatrimśatstotra, in Vinayaviniścaya-Upāliparipṛcchā (Paris, 1973).

certain hymns ascribed to Nāgārjuna.[400] These works are included in the Hymn section of the bsTan·'gyur.

Whatever historical connexions may lie behind these associations between persons and texts, all of which are undoubtedly not of the same period, these works were evidently regarded (at least by some later Mādhyamikas) as forming a cycle of related tracts (*parikathā*, etc.), epistles and manuals setting out the ethical, devotional and ritual praxis followed in the Madhyamaka school.[401] For while the Madhyamaka as a school is no doubt concerned essentially with philosophical theory, the Mādhyamikas have regularly coordinated theory with practice on the pragmatic level of *vyavahāra* or *saṃvṛti* embracing 'worldly' *(laukika)* conduct, devotion, ritual, and other forms of realization.

Aśvaghoṣa (I) has been usually placed in the first or second century, at the time of or shortly before Kaniṣka I; his doctrinal affiliations are difficult to determine with precision.[402] Mātṛceṭa is generally placed in the second century; his particular doctrinal affiliations are also difficult to determine because of the nature of his writings.[403] Dharma-Subhūti also must be placed fairly early; he evidently belonged to an Ābhidharmika line.[404]

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[400] See above, p. 31, and D. Seyfort Ruegg, Le Dharmadhātustava de Nāgārjuna in Études tibétaines dédiées à la mémoire de Marcelle Lalou (Paris, 1971), p. 456 sq.

[401] P. Mus, op. cit., pp. 189—92, has described the Daśakuśalakarmapathanirdeśa, the Daśākuśalakarmapathanirdeśa, the Suhṛllekha, and the Ṣaḍgatikārikās as elementary school-manuals; but such a description can cover only one of their purposes.

[402] See E. H. Johnston, Buddhacarita, ii (Calcutta, 1936), p. xiii sq. on the date. Johnston suggests connecting Aśvaghoṣa with the Bahuśrutika section of the Mahāsāṃghikas (p. xxviii sq.). But B. C. Law, Aśvaghoṣa (Calcutta, 1946), pp. 16—17, proposes linking him with the Dharmaguptakas; and J. W. de Jong, IIJ 20 (1978), pp. 125—6, envisages a link with the Sautrāntikas. — Aśvaghoṣa I has presumably to be distinguished from the author of the Gurupañcāśikā, and also of the Paramārthabodhicittabhāvanākrama (see above, note 395).

[403] D. R. Shackleton Bailey, The Śatapañcāśatka of Mātṛceṭa, p. 7 sq., has placed Mātṛceṭa in the second century, at the time of Kani(ṣ)ka II ( ?), to whom his Epistle is apparently addressed. Similarly A. K. Warder, Indian Kāvya literature, ii (Delhi, 1974), p. 242. However, É. Lamotte. Histoire du bouddhisme indien, i (Louvain, 1958), p. 656, supposed Mātṛceṭa's Epistle to have been addressed to Kaniṣka at the end of the third century. — Tāranātha distinguishes between an earlier and later Mātṛceṭa (rGya·gar·chos·'byuṅ, p. 75; cf. also p. 152).

[404] A verse by Dharma-Subhūti is found in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (iii. 59) and in the Mahāvibhāṣā, as well as in Chinese translations of the earliest period by An Shih-kao and Saṃghavarman. See Lin Li-kouang, op. cit., p. 102 sq.

# APPENDIX II

*Ratnākaraśānti's 'Vijñapti-Madhyamaka'*

In connexion with the synthesis of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka thought discussed above (p. 87 sq.) mention should be made of another synthesis of Maitreyanātha's and Asaṅga's Vijñānavāda philosophy with certain elements of Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka that was worked out by Ratnākaraśānti (*c.* 1000).[405]

In his Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti-Madhyamapratipadāsiddhi and Madhyam(ak)ālaṃkāropadeśa Ratnākaraśānti firmly rejects the idea that all is false, stating that it is incompatible with Nāgārjuna's as well as with Maitreyanātha's and Asaṅga's teachings. But in both these compositions, which are contained in the Cittamātra (Sems·tsam) section of the bsTan·'gyur, none of the main lines of development of the Madhyamaka discussed above prevails; and Ratnākaraśānti's doctrine is in essence a Nirākāra-Vijñānavāda teaching with the Middle Way presented following the system of the three *svabhāva*s (the *parikalpita*°, the *paratantra*° and the *pariniṣpanna*°) of the Madhyāntavibhāga for example. The traditions of the logico-epistemological schools also occupy a prominent place in Ratnākaraśānti's doctrine; and he takes his opponents to task for having neglected the *pramāṇa*s and logical procedures.[406] Ratnākāraśānti's doctrine has been referred to as the 'Vijñapti-Madhyamaka' *(rnam rig dbu ma)*.[407] And the above-mentioned Upadeśa is said to have been written to oppose the doctrine of Bhadanta Candrakīrti, who had strayed from the true purport of Nāgārjuna (but who later abandoned nihilism in his Tantrik commentary).[408]

In the Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti (fol. 136a–b) Ratnākaraśānti makes the stages of understanding recognized by the Laṅkāvatārasūtra into four *bhūmis* of the Yogācāra.[409] The first *yogabhūmi* consists in taking all existing *dharma*s as (noetic) objects *(ālambana)*. The second *yogabhūmi* consists in understanding that there is no external object of knowledge *(grāhya)*; since everything ap-

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[405] Ratnākaraśānti is stated to have been a contemporary at Vikramaśīlā of Jñānaśrīmitra, Prajñākaramati and Nāḍapāda; Maitrīpāda met with him; and 'Brog·mi was among his Tibetan disciples. See 'Gos·gŽon·nu·dpal. Deb·ther·sṅon·po, kha, fol. 2a (i, p. 206); da, fol. 2a (ii, p. 842).

[406] Madhyam(ak)ālaṃkāropadeśa, fol. 264b sq.

[407] See for example the colophon to the Madhyam(ak)ālaṃkāropadeśa, fol. 267a3. Cf. above, p. 56 on the *rnam rig (gi) dbu ma*.

[408] See the colophon to the Madhyam(ak)ālaṃkāropadeśa, fol. 266b4–5. A pseudo-Madhyamaka (*dbu ma ltar snaṅ*: Madhyamakābhāsa) holding that all is false is mentioned in the Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti, fol. 138a2.

[409] Laṅkāvatārasūtra x. 256 sq. See above, pp. 90, 96.

pears as mind only *(cittamātra)* no *dharma* is different from mind. The third *yogabhūmi* consists in transcending this *cittamātra* and understanding that, because no *grāhya* exists, no corresponding cognizing subject *(grāhaka)* can exist either; *cittamātra* then becomes residence in the *ālambana* of *tathatā*, a non-dual gnosis which is without the *grāhaka-lakṣaṇa*. Finally the fourth *yogabhūmi* is direct comprehension of the *mahāyāna* consisting in residence in gnosis absolutely free from appearance *(nirābhāsa)*, and in which *nāman* and *lakṣaṇa* as well as *grāhya* and *grāhaka* have disappeared. In the same author's Upadeśa (fol. 266a) these four stages are referred to as the four *bhūmis* having respectively the *ālambana* of the existence of things in terms of the extreme of eternalism (as opposed to nihilism), the *ālambana* of *cittamātra*, the *ālambana* of *tathatā*, and absence of *ālambana*.

In his Triyānavyavasthāna included among the Tantra-Commentaries (rGyud-'grel) of the bsTan-'gyur, Ratnākaraśānti has divided Mādhyamikas into those who maintain that relative knowledge *(saṃvṛtijñāna)* has images or modes *(ākāra)* and those who hold that traces *(vāsanā)* only are there (fol. 114a), a division inspired by the well-known classification of the Vijñānavādins as Sākāravādins-Satyākāravādins and Nirākāravādins/Alīkākāravādins.[410] According to the first group of Mādhyamikas, while *citta* and *jñāna (ye śes)* do not exist on the *paramārtha*-level, all determinations *(vyavasthā)* on the surface-level of *saṃvṛti*—the *ākāra*s of *citta* and *manas*—are thought to exist in the form of cognitive objects *(viṣaya)*. The second group who deny that *jñāna* has modes agree with the former about the *paramārtha*-level, but they hold that the determinations of *saṃvṛti* are nothing but *vāsanā;* and *citta* is therefore free from appearance in the nature of *ākāra*s. Both groups are stated to agree in rejecting any substantial self-nature for *pratītyasamutpāda* (fol. 114b—115a). Ratnākaraśānti also cites authorities who stated that the two groups differ in their rejection of other doctrines by means of the *catuṣkoṭi*, which the first formulate in terms of existence/non-existence whereas the latter formulate it in terms of permanence/impermanence (fol. 115a).

In another major treatise, the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa, Ratnākaraśānti also discusses the connexion between the Vijñānavāda/Cittamātra and the Madhyamaka. Beside the Laṅkāvatārasūtra he quotes in particular Nāgārjuna's Yuktiṣaṣṭikā in support of the doctrine of consciousness only (fol. 161b—162a; cf. 169b8).[411] And he concludes that—notwithstanding any other differences—the

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[410] On this classification see for example Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṃgraha 1998, and Kamalaśīla, Pañjikā 2081; Mokṣākaragupta, Tarkabhāṣā (ed. H. R. Rangaswami Iyengar, Mysore, 1952), pp. 23, 63 (the first passage is missing in Krishnamacharya's edition, p. 11, but the second is found on p. 34); Guṇaratna, commentary on Haribhadrasūri, Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya 11 (p. 47); Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha (ed. Abhyankar), p. 46; Advayavajra, Tattvaratnāvalī, p. 18—19. Cf. Y. Kajiyama, IBK 14/1 (1965), p. 26 sq., and An introduction to Buddhist philosophy (Kyoto, 1966), p. 62, 154 sq.; H. Nakamura, ABORI 48—49 (1968), p. 119.

[411] Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 22 (?) with however the variant reading *śes pa* (instead of *dgos pa*) also found in Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti (92): *dṅos rnams skye*

Yogācārins and the Mādhyamikas finally agree concerning the four above-mentioned *yogabhūmi*s (fol. 169b). In addition, Ratnākaraśānti criticizes the doctrine of those philosophers, Mādhyamikas as well as Yogācārins, who hold that knowledge has an image *(sākāra-jñāna)* (fol. 168a4, 170a4).

The only work by Ratnākaraśānti actually included in the Madhyamaka section of the bsTan·'gyur is his Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya-ratnālokālaṃkāra which contains extracts from canonical Sūtras on many of the principal topics of Mahāyānist doctrine together with explanations derived from Nāgārjuna's and Asaṅga's teachings. Thus, like the Sūtrasamuccaya ascribed to Nāgārjuna, this work is not concerned exclusively with doctrines of the Madhyamaka school in the strict sense.

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*ba yod min žiṅ/ /'gag pa'aṅ gaṅ na yod min žiṅ/ /šes pa 'di ñid kho na ni/ /skye žiṅ 'gag par 'gyur ba yin//* (but see Kamalaśīla's Pañjikā, fol. 138a–b). And Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 35: *'byuṅ ba che la sogs bšad pa/ /rnam par šes su yaṅ dag 'du/ /ye* [read: *de*] *šes kyis ni da bral na/ /log par rnam brtags cis ma yin//*. — Cf. Y. Kajiyama, Later Mādhyamikas, in: Mahāyāna Buddhist meditation, ed. M. Kiyota (Honolulu, 1978), p. 132, and the synopsis published by S. Katsura, IBK 25/1 (1976), pp. 38–41; above, note 44.

The source of the first of these two verses and Ratnākaraśānti's interpretation have been critically discussed by Ćoṅ·kha·pa, Legs·bšad·sñiṅ·po, fol. 56a.

# MODERN EDITIONS OF THE SANSKRIT TEXTS OF THE MADHYAMAKA SCHOOL

## Advayavajra

Apratiṣṭhānaprakāśa. Ed. Haraprasad Shastri, Advayavajrasaṃgraha, Gaekwad's Oriental Series xl, Baroda, 1927, p. 48.
Amanasikārādhāra. Ed. Haraprasad Shastri, op. cit., p. 60—62.
Tattvadaśaka. Ed. Haraprasad Shastri, op. cit., p. 59.
Tattvaprakāśa. Ed. Haraprasad Shastri, op. cit., pp. 46—47.
Tattvaratnāvalī. Ed. Haraprasad Shastri, op. cit., pp. 14—22; H. Ui, Shinri no hōkan, Nagoya Daigaku Bungakubu Kenkyūronshū iii, Tetsugaku, i, pp. 1—31.
Premapañcaka. Ed. Haraprasad Shastri, op. cit., p. 58.
Madhyamaṣaṭka, Ed. Haraprasad Shastri, op. cit., p. 57; S. K. Pathak, ALB 25 (1961), pp. 546—47 (with an English translation).
Mahāyānaviṃśikā. Ed. Haraprasad Shastri, op. cit., p. 54—55.
Māyānirukti. Ed. Haraprasad Shastri, op. cit. p. 44.
Pañjikā on the Dohākoṣa (of Saraha). Ed. P. C. Bagchi, Calcutta Sanskrit Series, Calcutta, 1938.

## Amṛtākara

Catuḥstavasamāsārtha. Ed. G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, i, Serie Orientale Roma ix. 1, Rome, 1956, pp. 238—46 (from an incomplete MS containing a part of the commentary on the Niraupamyastava and the commentary on the Acintya° and Paramārtha-stava).

## Āryadeva

(Bodhisattvayogācāra-)Catuḥśataka. Sanskrit fragments ed. Haraprasad Shastri, Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. iii, no. 8, pp. 449—514, Calcutta, 1914. (Cf. P. L. Vaidya, Études sur Āryadeva et son Catuḥśataka, Chapitres viii—xvi, Paris, 1923 [with French translation]. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva with extracts from the commentary of Candrakīrtti, reconstructed from the Tibetan version with an English translation, Chapter vii, Proceedings and transactions of the Fourth Oriental Conference, Allahabad 1928, pp. 831—71; The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva: Sanskrit and Tibetan texts with copious extracts from the commentary of Candrakīrtti, reconstructed and edited, Part ii, Visva-Bharati Series no. 2, Calcutta, 1931 [includes Chapters viii—xvi]. The Kārikās of Chapters vii—xvi have been republished, together with a Sanskrit version of parts of Candrakīrti's Vṛtti, and rendered into Hindi by Bhāgcandra Jain Bhāskar, Catuḥśatakam, Nāgpur, 1971. Chapters ix—xvi have been translated into Italian on the basis of Hsüan-tsang's Chinese version by G. Tucci, RSO 10 [1923], pp. 524—67.)
Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa (presumably by a Deutero-Āryadeva), ed. P. Patel, Visvabharati Studies 8, Santiniketan, 1949. Cf. Haraprasad Shastri, JASB 67 (1898), pp. 175—84; Bhāgcandra Jain Bhāskar, Catuḥśatakam, Nagpur, 1971, pp. 161—9.

## Kamalaśīla

Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā. See under Śāntarakṣita.
Bhāvanākrama. First Bhāvanākrama, ed. G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, ii,

Serie Orientale Roma ix. 2, Rome, 1958, pp. 185—229. (French translation by J. van den Broeck, La progression dans la méditation, Publication de l'Institut Belge des Hautes Études Bouddhiques, Série "Études et textes", No. 6, Brussels, 1977. A brief analysis of this text based on the Chinese translation was published by P. Demiéville, Le concile de Lhasa, Paris, 1952, pp. 333—5.)—Third Bhāvanākrama, ed. G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, iii, Serie Orientale Roma xliii, Rome, 1971. (Italian translation by C. Pensa, RSO 39 [1964], pp. 211—42. A partial French translation from the Tibetan was published earlier by É. Lamotte in P. Démieville, Le concile de Lhasa, pp. 336—53).

Kambala(pāda)/Kam(b)alāmbara(pāda)/Kamala(pāda)

Āryāṣṭasāhasrikāyāḥ Prajñāpāramitāyāḥ Piṇḍārthaḥ (Navaślokī). Ed. G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, i, Serie Orientale Roma ix. 1, Rome, 1956, pp. 216—17 (with Tibetan versions, Chinese version and English translation).

Candrakīrti

(Bodhisattvayogācāra-)Catuḥśatakaṭīkā. Fragments ed. Haraprasad Shastri, Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, iii, no. 8, pp. 449—514, Calcutta, 1914. (See also under Āryadeva).
Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛttiḥ. Ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica iv, St. Petersburg, 1903—13. (See also under Nāgārjuna).
Madhyamakaśāstrastuti. Ed. J. W. de Jong, Oriens Extremus 9 (1962), pp. 49—51 (with the Tibetan translation and a French translation).

Nāgārjuna

Catuḥstava. The Niraupamyastava and Paramārthastava have been edited by G. Tucci, JRAS 1932, pp. 309—25 (with English translation). (The Sanskrit versions of the Nirupama°, Lokātīta°, Acintya°, and Stutyatīta-stavas published by Prabhubhai Patel, IHQ 8 [1932], p. 317 sq., were restorations from the Tibetan translations of these hymns). (An Italian translation was published by R. Gnoli as an appendix to his Nāgārjuna: Madhyamaka Kārikā, Turin, 1961).
Pañcakrama (presumably by a Deutero-Nāgārjuna). Ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Études et textes tantriques: Pañcakrama (Université de Gand, Recueil de travaux publiés par la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres, 16me fascicule), Gand et Louvain, 1896.
Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikā. Ed. V. V. Gokhale, Studia indologica (Festschrift W. Kirfel, Bonn, 1955), pp. 103—4 (verses 1—5). See also L. de La Vallée Poussin, Bouddhisme, Études et matériaux: Theorie des douze causes, Gand, 1913, pp. 123—4 (French translation from the Tibetan); V. V. Gokhale, Pratītyasamutpādaśāstra des Ullaṅgha, Bonn, 1930.
Mahāyānaviṃśikā (apparently by a Deutero-Nāgārjuna). Ed. G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, i, Serie Orientale Roma ix. 1, Rome, 1956, pp. 201—3 (with English translation).
Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (as found in the Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛttiḥ by Candrakīrti). Ed. together with the Prasannapadā by L. de La Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica iv, St. Petersburg, 1903—13; reprinted with alterations by P. L. Vaidya, Madhyamakaśāstra of Nāgārjuna, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts no. 10, Darbhanga, 1960. New edition (using a fourth manuscript of the Kārikās only) by J. W. de Jong, Adyar, 1977. (The first translations into European languages were by Th. Stcherbatsky, Appendix to: Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, Leningrad, 1927 (Chapter i and xxv, in English); S. Schayer, Feuer und Brennstoff, RO 7 (1931), pp. 26—52 (Chap. x, in German), and Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Pra-

sannapadā, Krakow, 1931 (Chap. v, xii—xvi, in German); É. Lamotte, MCB 4 (1936), pp. 265—88 (Chap. xvii, in French); J. W. de Jong, Cinq chapitres de la Prasannapadā, Paris, 1949 (Chap. xviii—xxii, in French); J. May, Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, Paris, 1959 (Chap. ii—iv, vi—ix, xi, xxiii, xxiv, xxvi, and xxvii, in French). There are in addition complete English translations by F. J. Streng, Emptiness, Nashville and New York, 1967, pp. 183—220; and by K. K. Inada, Nāgārjuna, a translation of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with an Introductory Essay, Tōkyō, 1970. An Italian translation was published by R. Gnoli, Nāgārjuna: Madhyamaka Kārikā, Le stanze del cammino di mezzo, Turin, 1961. An English translation of Chapters i—vii has been published by H. N. Chatterjee, Mula-Madhyamaka-Karika, 2 vol., Calcutta, 1957—62. And another English translation of Chapters i—vi, viii—x, xiii, xv, xviii—xix, xxii—xxv together with an abridged version of Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā thereon has recently been published by M. Sprung in collaboration with T. R. V. Murti and U. S. Vyas, Lucid exposition of the Middle Way, London, 1979. A German translation of Chapters i, xv, xviii, xxiv, and xxv was published by E. Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin, 1956, p. 178 sq.

Ratnāvalī. Parts of Chapters i and ii and the whole of Chapter iv have been edited by G. Tucci, JRAS 1934, pp. 307—25, and 1936, pp. 237—52 and pp. 423—35 (with an English translation). This edition has been reprinted by P. L. Vaidya, Madhyamakaśāstra of Nāgārjuna, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts no. 10, Darbhanga, 1960, Appendix Six, pp. 296—310; and by H. Chatterjee Sastri, The philosophy of Nāgārjuna as contained in the Ratnāvali, Part i, Calcutta, 1977, pp. 83—100. (An English translation based on the Tibetan translation has been published by J. Hopkins and Lati Rimpoche, The precious garland, London, 1975.)

Vigrahavyāvartanī with the autocommentary. Ed. E. H. Johnston and A. Kunst, MCB 9 (1948—51), pp. 99—152; reprinted, together with an English translation, in K. Bhattacharya, The dialectical method of Nāgārjuna, Delhi, 1978. (This edition replaces the inadequate one by K. P. Jayaswal and Rāhula Sāṅkṛityāyana, JBORS 23 (1937), which was reprinted with alterations by P. L. Vaidya, Madhyamakaśāstra of Nāgārjuna, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts no. 10, Darbhanga, 1960, Appendix Five, pp. 277—95). Earlier English versions of the Sanskrit Kārikās were published by S. Mookerjee, The absolutist's standpoint in logic, Nava-Nalanda-Mahavihara Research Publication, i, Nalanda, 1957, pp. 7—41; and by F. J. Streng, Emptiness, pp. 222—7. The first English translation, based on the Tibetan and Chinese translations, was published by G. Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist texts on logic from Chinese sources, Gaekwad's Oriental Series no. xlix, Baroda, 1929. A French translation based on the Tibetan and Chinese translations was published by S. Yamaguchi, JA, Juillet-septembre 1929, pp. 1—86. An Italian translation of the Sanskrit Kārikās was published by R. Gnoli as an appendix to his Nāgārjuna: Madhyamaka Kārikā, Turin, 1961, p. 139 sq.

Prajñākaramati

Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā. Edited, together with Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra, by L. de La Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta 1902—14; P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 12, Darbhanga, 1960.

Bhāvaviveka

Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās. Chap. ii. 1—12, ed. V. V. Gokhale, IIJ 14 (1972), pp. 42—44. Chap. iii. 1—136, ed. S. Iida, Reason and emptiness, a Study in logic and mysticism (Tokyo, 1980); iii. 275—84, ed. V. V. Gokhale, IIJ 5 (1961—62), p. 273. Chap. iv. 7 and 56, ed. V. V. Gokhale, IIJ 2 (1958), p. 179. Chap.

viii. 1—16, ed. V. V. Gokhale, IIJ 2 (1958), pp. 167—77; viii. 18—96, ed. H. Nakamura, ALB 39 (1975), pp. 301—29. (On v. 1, 7—9, see S. Iida, Kanakura kinenronbunshū [Kanakura Festschrift], Tōkyō, 1966, pp. 79—96.)

Rāhulabhadra

Prajñāpāramitāstotra. Ed. R. Hikata, Suvikrāntavikrāmi-Paripṛcchā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, Fukuoka, 1958, pp. 1—2. (English translation by E. Conze, Buddhist texts through the ages, Oxford, 1954, pp. 147—9).

Śāntarakṣita

Tattvasaṃgraha. Edited together with Kamalaśīla's Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā by E. Krishnamacharya, Gaekwad's Oriental Series vol. xxx—xxxi, Baroda, 1926; Svāmī Dvārikādās Śāstrī, Bauddha Bharati Series 1—2, Varanasi, 1968. (English translation by Ganganath Jha, The Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the commentary of Kamalaśīla, Gaekwad's Oriental Series vol. lxxx and lxxxiii, Baroda, 1937—9.—Individual chapters have been translated by W. Liebenthal, Satkārya in der Darstellung seiner buddhistischen Gegner, Stuttgart, 1934 (German translation of chap. i, Prakṛtiparīkṣā); S. Schayer, Kamalaśīlas Kritik des Pudgalavāda, RO 8 (1932), pp. 68—93 (German translation of chapter vii, Ātmaparīkṣā) and Contributions to the problem of time in Indian philosophy, Krakow, 1938, pp. 29—70 (English translation of chapter xxi, Traikālyaparīkṣā); A. Kunst, Probleme der buddhistischen Logik, Krakow, 1939 (German translation of Chapter xviii, Anumānaparīkṣā, together with an edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of the Kārikās).)

Śāntideva

Bodhicaryāvatāra. Ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin together with Prajñākaramati's Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1902—14; P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 12, Darbhanga, 1960. (French translation by L. de La Vallée Poussin, Paris, 1907, originally published in Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuses 10—12 [1905—7]. Other translations are by L. Finot, La marche à la lumière, Paris, 1920; R. Schmidt, Der Eintritt in den Wandel der Erleuchtung, Paderborn, 1923; and G. Tucci, Il cammino verso la luce, Torino, 1925).

Śikṣāsamuccaya. Ed. Cecil Bendall, Bibliotheca Buddhica i, St. Petersburg, 1902. (English translation by C. Bendall and W. H. D. Rouse, A compendium of Buddhist doctrine, London, 1922).

Saraha(pāda)

Dohākoṣa. Ed. P. Ch. Bagchi, Dohākoṣa, Part i, Calcutta Sanskrit Series, pp. 14—50, Calcutta, 1938 (with the commentary of Advayavajra). See also Journal of the Department of Letters, University of Calcutta, vol. xxviii (Calcutta, 1935), pp. 52—120; Rāhul Sāṅkṛtyāyan, Dohākoś, Patna, 1957 (with Tibetan and Hindi translations).

N. B. Texts of the Indian Madhyamaka school mentioned in this book which are not in the above list of Sanskrit texts are available, either in single or multiple translations, in Chinese in the Taishō shinshū daizōkyō and/or Tibetan in the bsTan-'gyur (the Peking edition of which has been used in this book).

# MODERN EDITIONS OF THE TIBETAN VERSIONS OF INDIAN WORKS OF THE MADHYAMAKA SCHOOL

## Āryadeva

bŽi brgya pa (Catuḥśataka). Chapters viii—xvi edited, together with parts of Candrakīrti's commentary, by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, The Catuḥśataka: Sanskrit and Tibetan texts with copious extracts from the commentary of Candrakīrtti, Part ii, Visva-Bharati Series No. 2, Calcutta, 1931.

Yi ge brgya pa (and 'Grel pa) (Akṣaraśataka [and Vṛtti], ascribed to Nāgārjuna but probably by Āryadeva). Cf. V. V. Gokhale, Akṣara-Çatakam (the Hundred Letters), Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus xiv, Heidelberg, 1930.

Ye šes sñiṅ po kun las btus pa (Jñānasārasamuccaya, probably by a Deutero-Āryadeva). Verses 20—28 ed. K. Mimaki, La réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses, Paris, 1976, pp. 186—8 (with French translation).

## Kamalaśīla

(b)sGom pa'i rim pa (daṅ po) (Bhāvanākrama [I]). Ed. S. Yoshimura, Tibetan buddhistology, Kyōto, 1953; G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, ii, Serie Orientale Roma ix. 2, Rome, 1958, pp. 229—82.

(b)sGom pa'i rim pa (bar ma) (Bhāvanākrama [II]). Ed. S. Yoshimura, op. cit.

(b)sGom pa'i rim pa (tha ma) (Bhāvanākrama [III]). Ed. S. Yoshimura, op. cit. Translated in part by E. Lamotte in P. Demiéville, Le concile de Lhasa, Paris, 1952, Appendix II, pp. 336—53.

De kho na ñid bsdus pa'i dka' 'grel las rJes su dpag pa brtag pa. (Chapter xx of the Tibetan version of the Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā, Anumānaparīkṣā). Ed. A. Kunst, Kamalaśīla's commentary on Śāntarakṣita's Anumānaparīkṣā of the Tattvasaṃgraha, MCB 8 (1947), pp. 166—211.

## Kambala(pāda)/Kam(b)alāmbara(pāda)/Kamala(pāda)

bCom ldan 'das ma šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i don bsdus pa'i ćhigs su bcad pa dgu pa (Navaślokī). Ed. G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, i, Serie Orientale Roma ix.i, Rome, 1956, pp. 218—22 (both Tibetan translations with the Sanskrit original, a Chinese version, and an English translation).

## Candrakīrti

Phuṅ po lṅa'i rab tu byed pa (Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa). Ed. C. Lindtner, AO 40 (1979), pp. 87—145.

Byaṅ chub sems dpa'i rnal 'byor spyod pa bži brgya pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa (Bodhisattvayogācāra-Catuḥśatakaṭīkā). Extracts from Chapters viii—xvi published by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva, Visva-Bharati Series No. 2, Calcutta, 1931.

dBu ma rća ba'i 'grel pa ćhig gsal ba (Mūlamadhyamakavṛttiḥ Prasannapadā). Chapters xviii—xxii ed. J. W. de Jong, Cinq chapitres de la Prasannapadā, Paris, 1949; chapters ii—iv, vi—ix, xi, xxiii, xxiv, xxvi, xxvii, ed. J. May, Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti, Paris, 1959. The Tibetan translation of the Madhyamakaśāstrastuti found at the end of the Prasannapadā has been edited by J. W. de Jong, OE 9 (1962), pp. 51—54.

dBu ma la 'jug pa (Madhyamakāvatāra) and dBu ma la 'jug pa'i bšad pa (Rań 'grel) (Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya). Ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica 9, St. Petersburg, 1907—12. (A partial French translation from the Tibetan, up to vi. 165, was published by L. de La Vallée Poussin, Le Muséon 8 [1907], pp. 249—317; 11 [1910], pp. 271—358; 12 [1911], pp. 235—328).

Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna

Byań chub lam gyi sgron ma (Bodhipathapradīpa). Ed. J. van den Broeck, Le flambeau sur le chemin de l'Éveil, Publications de l'Institut Belge des Hautes Études Bouddhiques, Série "Études et textes" no. 5, Brussels, 1976 (with a French translation); H. Eimer, Bodhipathapradīpa, Asiatische Forschungen 59, Wiesbaden, 1978 (with a German translation). (English translation by A. Wayman, Calming the mind and discerning the real, New York, 1978, pp. 9—14).

Nāgārjuna

Ga las 'jigs med (*Akutobhayā). Ed. M. Walleser, Die tibetische Version von Nāgārjuna's Kommentar Akutobhayā zur Madhyamakakārikā. Nach der Pekinger Ausgabe des Tanjur herausgegeben, Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus, Heft 2, Heidelberg, 1923 (photographic reprint). (German translation by M. Walleser, Die mittlere Lehre des Nāgārjuna, nach der tibetischen Version übertragen, Die buddhistische Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, 2. Teil, Heidelberg, 1911).

'Jig rten las 'das par bstod pa (Lokātītastava). Ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Muséon 14 (1913), pp. 7—14 (with French translation); P. Patel, IHQ 8 (1932), pp. 326—31.

rTen ciń 'brel par 'byuń ba'i sñiń po'i ćhig le'ur byas pa (Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikās). Ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Bouddhisme, Études et matériaux: Théorie des douze causes, Gand, 1913, pp. 122—3.

bsTod pa las 'das par bstod pa (Stutyatītastava). Ed. P. Patel, IHQ 8 (1932), pp. 703—5.

Theg pa chen po ñi šu pa (Mahāyānaviṃśikā). Ed. Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya, Visvabharati Studies i, Calcutta, 1931 (edition of both Tibetan versions with a Chinese version). Cf. S. Yamaguchi, EB 4 (1926), p. 56 sq.; (1927), p. 169 sq; G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist texts, i, Rome, 1956, p. 195 sq.

Don dam par bstod pa (Paramārthastava). Ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Muséon 14 (1913), pp. 16—18 (with French translation); G. Tucci, JRAS 1932, pp. 322—4.

dPe med par bstod pa (Niraupamyastava). Ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Muséon 14 (1913), pp. 1—7 (with French translation); P. Patel, IHQ 8 (1932), pp. 319—23; G. Tucci, JRAS 1932, pp. 312—20.

dBu ma rća ba'i ćhig le'ur byas pa šes rab ces bya ba (Prajñā nāma Mūlamadhyamakakārikās). Ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna, Bibliotheca Buddhica iv, St. Petersburg, 1903—13 (Tibetan text of the kārikās printed in the footnotes).

rĆod pa bzlog pa'i ćhigs le'ur byas pa and rĆod pa bzlog pa'i 'grel pa (Vigrahavyāvartanī and Vigrahavyāvartanīvṛtti). Ed. G. Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist texts on logic from Chinese sources, Gaekwad's Oriental Series vol. xlix, Baroda, 1929 (with English translation).

Žib mo rnam par 'thag pa (Vaidalyaprakaraṇa). Ed. Y. Kajiyama, Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia 6—7 (1965), pp. 134—55.

Šes rab sdoń bu (Prajñādaṇḍa). Ed. W. L. Campbell, Calcutta, 1919 (with English translation).

Sems kyi rdo rje'i bstod pa (Cittavajrastava). Ed. La de La Vallée Poussin, Muséon 14 (1913), pp. 14—16 (with French translation).

Srid pas las 'das pa'i gtam (Bhavasaṃkrāntiparikathā) and Srid pa 'pho ba (Bhavasaṃkrānti) [and Srid pa 'pho ba'i ṭīkā of Maitreyanātha]. Ed. N. Aiyasvami Sastri, Bhavasaṅkrānti Sūtra and Nāgārjuna's Bhavasaṅkrānti Śāstra, Adyar Library, 1938, pp. 73—103 (with restoration in Sanskrit).
bSam gyis mi khyab par bstod pa (Acintyastava), Ed. P. Patel, IHQ 8 (1932), pp. 694—701.

Buddhapālita

dBu ma rća ba'i 'grel pa Buddha pā li ta (Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti). Chapters i—xii, ed. M. Walleser, Bibliotheca Buddhica xvi, St. Petersburg, 1913—14.

Bodhibhadra

Ye šes sñiṅ po kun las btus pa žes bya ba'i bšad sbyar (Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana). Portion corresponding to verses 20—28 of Āryadeva's Jñānasārasamuccaya, ed. K. Mimaki, La réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses, Paris, 1976, pp. 190—206 (with French translation).

Bhāvaviveka

dBu ma rća ba'i 'grel pa šes rab sgron ma (Prajñāpradīpa-Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti). Chap. i—ii, ed. M. Walleser, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1914. (German translation of Chap. i by Y. Kajiyama, WZKSO 7 [1963], pp. 37—62; 8 [1964], pp. 100—30. English translation of Chapter xxiv by R. Uryūzu, Kinki Daigaku kyōyō gakubu kenkyū kiyō 2/2 [1971], pp. 15—56).
dBu ma'i sñiṅ po'i ćhig le'ur byas pa (Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās). Chap. v, ed. S. Yamaguchi, Bukkyō ni okeru mu to u no tairon, Kyōto, 1941; Chap. viii. 18—96, ed. H. Nakamura, ALB 39 (1975), pp. 301—29.
dBu ma'i sñiṅ po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba (Madhyamakahṛdayavṛtti-Tarkajvālā). Chap. iii. 1—136, with the corresponding Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās, ed. S. Iida, Reason and emptiness, a Study in logic and mysticism, Tōkyō, 1980. Chap. viii. 1—16, with the corresponding Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās, ed. H. Nakamura, IIJ 2 (1958), pp. 181—90.
sDe pa tha dad par (')byed pa daṅ rnam par bšad pa (Nikāyabhedavibhaṅgavyākhyāna, corresponding to part of Chapter iv of the Tarkajvālā). Ed. E. Teramoto and T. Hiramatsu, Kanzō-taishō-ibushūrinron, Kyōto, 1935. (Partial English translation by W. W. Rockhill, Life of the Buddha, London, 1884, pp. 182—96. German translation by M. Walleser, Die Sekten des alten Buddhismus, Heidelberg, 1927, pp. 78—93. French translation by A. Bareau, JA 1956, pp. 167—91).

Śāntarakṣita

De kho na ñid bsdus pa, rJes su dpag pa brtag pa (Tattvasaṃgraha, Anumānaparīkṣā). Ed., together with the Sanskrit text, by A. Kunst, Probleme der buddhistischen Logik in der Darstellung des Tattvasaṃgraha, Polska Akademia Umiejętności, Prace komisji orientalistycznej Nr. 33, Krakow, 1939.

Śāntideva

Byaṅ chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa (Bodhi[sattva]caryāvatāra). Ed. F. Weller, Über den Quellenbezug eines mongolischen Tanjurtextes, Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Phil.-hist. Klasse 45/2, Berlin, 1950 (based on the editions of sNar thaṅ and sDe dge); Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, Bodhicaryāvatāra, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1960.

# ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| ABORI | Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute |
| ALB | Adyar Library Bulletin |
| AM | Asia Major |
| AO | Acta Orientalia |
| BCA | Bodhicaryāvatāra by Śāntideva |
| BEFEO | Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient |
| BSO(A)S | Bulletin of the School of Oriental (and African) Studies |
| CŚ | Catuḥśataka by Āryadeva |
| EB | Eastern Buddhist |
| GOS | Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda |
| HJAS | Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies |
| IA | Indian Antiquary |
| IBK | Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) |
| IHQ | Indian Historical Quarterly |
| IIJ | Indo-Iranian Journal |
| JA | Journal asiatique |
| JAOS | Journal of the American Oriental Society |
| JASB | Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal |
| JGIS | Journal of the Greater India Society |
| JIP | Journal of Indian Philosophy |
| JOIB | Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda |
| JPASB | Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal |
| JRAS | Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland |
| MA | Madhyamakāvatāra by Candrakīrti |
| MCB | Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques |
| MHK | Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās by Bhāvaviveka |
| MMK | Mūlamadhyamakakārikās by Nāgārjuna |
| OE | Oriens Extremus |
| OLZ | Orientalistische Literaturzeitung |
| PEW | Philosophy East and West |
| PP | Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛttiḥ by Candrakīrti |
| RO | Rocznik Orientalistyczny |
| RSO | Rivista degli Studi Orientali |
| TP | T'oung Pao |
| VV | Vigrahavyāvartanī by Nāgārjuna |
| WZKS(O) | Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- (und Ost)asiens |
| ZDMG | Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft |
| ZII | Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik |

# INDICES

## I. *Titles*

The following index lists the titles of Sanskrit texts mentioned in this volume. It is to be noted, however, that in a number of cases these are merely editor's titles, or titles (re)constructed by the different editors of the Tibetan bsTan·'gyur and its catalogues, and that the original Sanskrit titles of several such works cannot therefore be said to be known with certainty. Particularly doubtful forms are preceded by an asterisk. But the titles listed here can in practice serve to identify the texts in question. After the titles the names of their (putative) authors are indicated in parentheses. As already observed, the authorship of a number of works is uncertain, the attributions indicated here being taken from the colophons of the available versions (Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan) or, when the colophons fail us, from the catalogues.

The abbreviation P refers to the Peking edition of the Tibetan bKa'·'gyur and bsTan·'gyur reprinted by the Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute under the direction of D. T. Suzuki (Tōkyō-Kyōto, 1958), this being the edition to which reference is usually made in this book. The numbers following P are the serial numbers of the texts in question, P 5224—5480 corresponding to the dBu·ma (Madhyamaka) section in the Peking bsTan·'gyur (mDo·'grel, volumes xvii—xxxiii). D refers to the sDe·dge edition of which the dBu·ma section, with the serial numbers D 3824—3980, has been reprinted in The sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka — bsTan ḥgyur (Deruge-ban Chibetto Daizōkyō, Ronsho-bu, Tōkyō Daigaku Bugaku-bu shozō) edited by K. Hayashima, J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi, and Y. Ejima, and published for the Faculty of Letters, Tōkyō University, by the Sekai Seiten Kankō Kyōkai Co. Ltd. (Tōkyō, 1977—1979). T refers to the Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō with its serial numbers; its index (2nd edition), compiled by P. Demiéville, H. Durt and A. Seidel, is published as a Fascicule annexe du Hōbōgirin under the title Répertoire du canon bouddhique sino-japonais (Paris—Tōkyō, 1978).


Abhisamayālaṃkāra (ascribed to Maitreya[nātha]; cf. P 5184) 28, 87, 101, 110, 111

Abhisamayālaṃkāra-Bhagavatī-Prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstravṛtti Prajñāpradīpāvalī (Buddhaśrījñāna, P 5198) 117

Abhisamayālaṃkārakārikā-Prajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstraṭīkā Prasphuṭapadā (Dharmamitra, P 5194) 102—103

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